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Philosophy of Value

*An Essay in
Constructive Criticism*

By

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PREFACE

A few years ago a distinguished British thinker said that philosophy is expressed more in terms of value now than at any previous time. To-day, perhaps we may turn his sentence around and say that philosophy is expressed more in terms of value than of anything else.

It is inevitable that theory of value should ask a hearing and that the field of what it means to act and to want should no longer lie fallow. For value is an immediate and practical problem. Theory of knowledge indeed has long stood at the top of the philosophical world, and it has a right to remain there. But the plain man will tell you that there is no problem of knowledge, and at the best you cannot show him that there is such problem. Whether he knows and how he knows—he will not consider these questions. But plain as he may be, he is ready to discuss problems of value and especially of values.

Philosophy of value should have broken out in America. Theoretically, it should. Yet thought is not to be allotted times and places and gerrymandered like an election. At any rate, practicalism and use-ism are as old as man and it would not be unwarranted to push them back to the first living thing. And philosophy of value, we may be sure, is as old as philosophy, and will last as long as philosophy draws a breath. Just now, of course, there are peculiarly modern currents of it, and even these in their sources are not American. Tending to remain on the heights, the Germans have asked what Sein has to do with Sollen, fact with value. The assumption is that value is not but always is to be. Whether this is indeed the statement of the prob-

lem—not its solution, but the statement—certainly this is the dress it currently wears among the Germans.

Philosophy of value is more popular and at home in England and yet more in America. It is our part to inquire, What good is a problem of knowledge and what is the use of any conceivable solution of it? Show us the use, we might say, and we will show you the solution. We took slowly to the Pure Critique and it seems a little foreign for one of us to say that man is the “epistemological animal,” but it was we who ever said that there is no great gulf, perhaps no real gulf, between value and fact and we soon said, as a part of our contribution to the problem, that every animal is a valuing animal.

These admittedly are problems within the problem. Why should value and fact be so rudely at odds? How high does valuing reach, and how very far down does it begin?

During these fervid days the Scholastic has kept remarkably cool. This may be because he has nothing to say on the subject, or does not care what value and valuing may possibly mean, does not care what he acts for or whether he acts for anything. But this unconcern does not seem likely in anyone and least of all, we should think, in a Scholastic. It is therefore from his point of view that we take a look now at the problem of value. It is true that we shall not at once reach a score of finalities, but the philosopher of value is still a young man not too much at home in a great house which he would like to have lighted up in any part. Besides, unlike theories of knowledge which usually die as theories, those of value go perpetually back into life. Value and not duty, says some one; duty and not value, says another. We doubt the wisdom of either and urge that Aquinas, the chief of the Scholastics, would not grant the disruption. But if anyone like duty for duty's sake, he is welcome to it. Most of us find ourselves com-

moner persons who everyday put one good thing before another and in this living way run up a scale or realm of "values."

The conviction that prompts the present study is that such a system of good things cannot rationally be worked out until we come to an adequate concept of value. We accordingly review "value" as it is in current theory and after a brief criticism we undertake construction. The first step is to make out what the problem is and then, if it can be known, what the nature and locus of value. The whole question of value may in time be handled piecemeal like a physical science, but not until we make up our minds where value is and how closely it is to be defined.

Thomas Verner Moore's remarkable researches, which seem to reestablish the faculty-theory of the soul, and Professor Laird's work on *The Idea of Value* came to our attention too late for this study. The author is very grateful to Monseigneur Edward A. Pace of the Catholic University of America and to Father Charles C. Miltner of the University of Notre Dame for their care and patience in criticizing his thought and expression.

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PART I
STATUS OF PHILOSOPHY OF VALUE

CHAPTER I

THE VALUE SITUATION AND PROBLEM

Philosophy never begins in a vacuum, or with an intuition or revelation. One doubts, even, whether it begins well with our highest experiences; and certainly it might as well try to take off from Olympus as from an "original chaos" or a prehistory which after all perhaps never existed. Philosophy begins humbly with the here and now, and if it can work its way far backward and forward, very well, it does so; but it must remain our everyday servant.

What is the problem of value in philosophy? What is the place of value in the real world? This latter is a question that has been asked,¹ and one is not at all sure that it has ever been well answered. "What is the problem of value? That, we may reply, is the problem."² Upon a little reading, one comes more and more to believe that many of the things promiscuously said of value would be unlikely and perhaps not possible if the authors kept a hand firmly upon the concrete experience with which theory of value deals and which it is designed to elucidate. Philosophizing in the air leaves us open to gravest dangers. We wish in the present chapter therefore to say what is the concrete experience with which in the very first instance theory of value has to do, and what the situation out of which a

¹ W. H. Sheldon, "An Empirical Definition of Value," *Journal of Philosophy*, v. 11 (1914), p. 113. The questions raised here by Mr. Sheldon, and in an earlier article (v. 10, pp. 587-8) together with Mr. Schneider's questions (*ibid.*, v. 14, pp. 141-154, 706-14) are probably as pointed as any ever asked on value.

² E. S. Brightman, "Neo-Realistic Theories of Value," in Wilm's *Studies in Philosophy and Theology* (New York and Cincinnati, 1922), p. 24.

theory of value at all arises. On the actuality of this experience and the definiteness with which we grasp the situation any just theory of value depends.

THE RAW EXPERIENCE OF VALUE

One may recall that Stevenson's Will of the Mill forever saw people going by, going by, down into the plains and to the sea: and not a soul ever came back; soldiers came swinging over the mountain and past his shop, rank on rank clip-clop, clip-clop, and not a man ever returned. Now, something like Will's and something unlike is our daily experience. People go, like his, but people come, too; and from an unpolished first view it might seem that only one-half of them could be on the way to Elysian fields. Anyway, there they go; and philosophy of value would like to know where in general they go, and why in general they go. What does it mean, all our going or any of our going? The panorama of everyday action is vast, and the question is whether it can with justness be brought to any common denominator.

Persons and all other agents, if we but look upon them, are marching and countermarching, and this doing of theirs is to be explained. It is not naïve to remark, even so early, that these agents act for something, nor is it premature to say that they find that thing possessed of value; otherwise, they would not act. Value is on the horizon for them. And there is nothing too hurried and nothing abstruse or ecstatic about our saying so.

This is the situation, plain as day. Things act for something: our going is a quest. Now whether we find reason to call any element in such situation "value" or "disvalue" or "valuing,"—this is not so vital or absolute. What is important is that we keep consistently to this situation; justness to it is the whole test of a theory of value.

"The value situation, then, consists of (1) a valuable object, (2) an organism or activity to which it is valuable (or by which it is valued), (3) an end or purpose for which, with a reference to which, it is valuable."³

We are glad to accept this statement of Mr. Schneider's and to accredit it as complete, simple and lucid.

We may say, without ado, that we are determined to treat this problem of value as alive, not in the common usage which would say, "This is a living problem," but even more in the sense that value has to do largely and perhaps altogether with living things, and with their action which is the very proof of their life. Who handles value therefore ought to handle it alive; as Woodrow Wilson said, "whoever studies humanity ought to study it alive."⁴ Or, as it has been said without looseness or exaggeration, theory of value equals a philosophy of life.⁵ It is of course a little tilt at intelligibility and the facts to say that "value is created by valuing." And to say that value is only what value does would be to deal unkindly with common sense and experience as well as with words and thought. Yet to be authentic, this bit of philosophy which we are to know as Theory of Value must come honestly out of the dust of our daily lives.⁶ Action is not value and life (though valued) is not value, but value has intimately to do with life and action.

We may introduce then in the concrete the kind of specific experience with which theory of value has to do. Looking out of my window this morning upon a dog-and-boy world this is what I see: a woman with a basket—

³ H. W. Schneider, "The Theory of Value," *Jnl. of Philos.*, v. 14 (1917), p. 142.

⁴ *Mere Literature and Other Essays* (Boston, 1896), p. 10.

⁵ R. B. Perry, *Present Philosophical Tendencies* (New York, 1921), p. 331: a Philosophy of Life means two things, a theory as to "the nature of goodness or value," and a theory as to its realization.

⁶ Cf., Santayana's conclusion to the Herbert Spencer Lecture (London and New York, 1923): ". . . daily life (which I think the right place for philosophy)."

strangely garmented, too—hanging out clothes to dry, a lad with a tattered pup, a man armed with an axe. This is everyday drama. The question is: What are they out to take? where in general do they go? why this considerable ado? What is the universal thing they are after, which the man would cut down, the woman bring in in her basket, the boy tree? Or, as I shamble down the road this morning a man and woman, perhaps newly weds of the summer, skip by in their car. As I stand still, the car itself is a flash; when it is past, the leaves scuttle around my feet. Not a cloud upon these persons this young autumn day; the problems of life, if there are any, do not now weigh upon them. Is it, as it has been sharply said,⁷ that people do not want to understand life, that they want to forget it? Experience does not teach this. No; people want to enjoy life, and for the most part they do enjoy it. The question then is, Where in general do they go in their seeking? For, plainly, they are seeking. And why in general do they go, or *what in general do they go for*? This last is at the heart of the problem of value: What is action for?

It is very easy of course to say that people love and cherish some things. But "to call these things values is," as Mr. Dewey has simply pointed out, "just to repeat that they are loved and cherished: it is not to give a reason for their being loved and cherished."⁸ We live, we love, we act. So much is a datum, pure description. Yet it solves nothing. This therefore is only the setting of the value problem, not its solution. And when we say that men and women act, and act for things, we wish to include all action whatever; for, as will appear in the sequel, we have never a reasoned right to say that any action is for nothing.

⁷ William Whitman, *The Pieper*, October, 1926.

⁸ John Dewey, "Judgments of Value," *Essays in Experimental Logic* (Chicago, 1916), p. 355.

This then is the experience and the specific situation, this is the way it looks when yet raw; and justness to such situation or experience is and will remain the test of theory of value. Now that we should call an element here, any one element, "value" or "a value"—this is not so important. Worse things could be, perhaps have been, done. The philosopher, as is pretty well known, has the habit of letting his hand off the facts in the case and of letting his theory try to stand without this primal support. And may we remark that the philosopher of value is likely to do this, and that we have met writers on value, and especially on "the values," who did not seem to know what the specific kind of experience in which they dealt? Philosophy of value, we may perhaps repeat, has to do with life,⁹ with action, the most puissant sign of life; and we do not approve or indeed understand Mr. Urban when even in his Preface he says that he aims not to be "interesting and informing," and that he will not add a "glimmer of possible human interest to an otherwise dull book."¹⁰ Why not? We may say, humbly, that we do not understand.

The literature of philosophy need not be a dead thing. It is cut supposedly, as we have said, out of the living reality, and if it is found to be dead let it be simply buried. "The supreme and perfect degree of life," as is well said by Aquinas, "is the intellectual": for the intellect turns back upon itself, i.e., it can know that it knows.¹¹ If this

⁹ Cf., Brightman, *A Philosophy of Ideals* (New York, 1928), pp. 210-211: "Of all the problems of philosophy none is closer to the heart of life than this; indeed it is the very problem of the heart of life. If philosophy is to justify itself as an interpretation of life, the theory of value ought to furnish results of the most illuminating and practical significance for the understanding and guidance of human civilization."

¹⁰ Wilbur M. Urban, *Valuation: Its Nature and Its Laws* (New York and London, 1909), p. vii.

¹¹ *Contra Gentiles*, 4, c.11: "*Est igitur supremus et perfectus gradus vitae qui est secundum intellectum; nam intellectus in seipsum reflectitur, et seipsum intelligere potest.*"

is the kind of living thing that Intellect is, it is hard to advance good reason why it should be served up in philosophy as a cold soup from very dry bones. We need not, however, repudiate philosophy merely because certain philosophers have forgotten life. It is enough to note, if we practically remember, that the intellectual is the supreme and perfect degree of life, and, if we may anticipate by a long way a term which we deprecate, that thought and science and truth are high among "the values."¹²

As Mr. Urban will not let a "glimmer of possible human interest" into his philosophy of value, so Münsterberg in his disallowed bread and butter as objects of value.¹³ In this we look forward again; but we may ask, Why the exclusion if bread and butter are wanted and if nothing is more needed? As matter of method we begin otherwise, and we thought it high encomium when a Doctor of Human Right, which seems a severe science, was publicly termed a Bread-and-Butter Moralist.¹⁴ And it is a fine thing to say of any man, as is said of Paul Carus, that for him philosophy is a "quest for the social illumination of mankind."¹⁵ But on the very contrary we thought it a condemnation of the philosophers when someone said that newspaper men, sitting through a recent meeting of the American Philosophical Association, "listened doggedly, frantically hoping for some tangible item, some faint connection with the ordinary world of things and people to

¹² Cf., E. A. Burtt, *International Journal of Ethics*, v. 31 (1921), p. 435: "Is not life itself a value, the very consummation of values?" It would be hard to dispute this view.

¹³ *The Eternal Values* (Boston and New York, 1909), pp. 27-8.

¹⁴ "Dr. Ryan on Bread-and-Butter Morals," *American Magazine*, July, 1924.

¹⁵ Hartley B. Alexander, Introduction to Dewey's *Experience and Nature* (Chicago, 1926), pp. ix-x.

emerge from the torrent of abstract incomprehensibilities." ¹⁶ It may be—one is not sure of it—that philosophy cannot be by the people, but it may be for them and must largely be of them.

PHILOSOPHY BEGINS AT HOME

"Value," whatever it turns out to be, is not a peg for the supertranscendentalist to hang his everyday hat on when he conducts a séance or goes into a trance. And even Mr. Dewey has erred in stating that choice among notions of value is arbitrary "because the problem of value is arbitrary." ¹⁷

This is a mistake, unless we believe—what Mr. Dewey of all men has disbelieved—that philosophy begins with a notion and not with experience. As we understand it, philosophy takes the findings of the several sciences, that is, our verified and tabulated experiences, ¹⁸ and uses them in support of its own position. This is patently the dictum of Aquinas, ¹⁹ and we do not know that it has ever been bettered.

Does this seem a tirade against all philosophy? If it is needed, let it be so; and if not, so much is pure profit. The one important and relevant point just now is that theory of "value" is not the plaything of an élite who have left life and the day out of their reckoning, not a sophisticated toy.

Philosophy begins at home. It feeds on its environment, and in a significant sense it never outgrows this. It keeps

¹⁶ Helen Huss Parkhurst, *Jnl. of Philos.*, v. 25 (1928), p. 98.

¹⁷ *Experience and Nature*, p. 395.

¹⁸ One of the best studies of the function of science is Keyser's *Pastures of Wonder* (New York, 1929), Part II., "The Realm of Science"; Science aims to establish propositions, not to deduce from them.

¹⁹ C.G., 2, c.4: "Nam, et apud philosophos, Prima Philosophia utitur omnium scientiarum documentis ad suum propositum ostendendum."

to normal and common ways if it is to do well and even if it is to survive. It does not disdain the abnormal but this, because exceptional, is secondary. To begin "arbitrarily" and abroad, is to unleash imagining beyond all warrant. The philosopher is tethered to experience, and he breaks with it at the peril of his life. We begin in philosophy right where we are. We make no inordinate plunge into the realm of essence, if there is such realm, or into the Whole or an original chaos. If any of these at any time exist, it is not at once evident, and we must come to it—if at all—only by humble steps, inch by inch, feeling our way. As an associate has observed, we begin in the garage where everyone has daily experience starting the car. We begin *with things as they are*, in their immediacy: so Saint Thomas says of method in philosophy.²⁰ Afterwards, it is our business to see—if we can see—how things came to be that way. For this reason we shall diverge at once from Münsterberg whose initial question was "whether we have to acknowledge anything in our world as absolutely valuable."²¹ This seems indeed a part of the problem, but a refinement and finishing touch of it. The question first and always is: Why is any object wanted? what in general is action for? what does it mean to act?

Action is fact, and philosophy of value begins with so common a fact; it can thus keep both feet resolutely upon the ground. If with that fact always in good command, it can make its way to a prehistory or the dawn of things or, in the other direction, to a realm of essences or an absolute Perfection, let it do this; but what it may not in justice do is to let go the early and primal fact, which is observed action.

²⁰ C.G., 2, c.4: "*Nam in doctrina philosophiae, quae creaturas secundum se considerat et ex eis in Dei cognitionem perducit, prima est consideratio de creaturis et ultima de Deo.*"

²¹ *The Eternal Values*, p. 10.

The philosopher after all is not a mystic; but if as philosopher, that is, as man, he can reach one hand up to the sky, he had better for safety keep his feet on the earth.

The immediate problem then is to explain or elucidate, if it can be done, this everyday datum, my action. I want some things, every conscious being, or perhaps every living being, wants things. And I reach out for things. Nor am I at all content with a mere one thing after another: I select and reject; I judge, and approve or condemn. The animal of course does something of this, too; the animal, or even the plant, cannot accept everything. And it is worth while in passing to note that the animal far less often than man, and the plant never, is fooled. The plant seems to "know" what is really good for it. Hence the distinction Saint Thomas points out between "natural" conation, which ever seeks a really existing good, and "voluntary" conation, which tend toward a good as apprehended.²² This truth, that I want some things and that ordinarily there is a practical choice among them, seems to give great weight to Professor Brogan's theory of value. The universal and irreducible element in value, he says, is a preference. "To have value or to be 'a value' is to be better than anything." "Better," then, or "worse" is "the fundamental value universal."²³

Now if we may so far anticipate, supposing that we

²² *Summa Theologica*, I-2, q.8, a.1, c.: "*Sicut igitur id in quod tendit appetitus naturalis, est bonum existens in re; ita id in quod tendit appetitus animalis vel voluntarius, est bonum apprehensum.*" (We adopt throughout this work what we think the least cumbersome system of reference to the Works of St. Thomas Aquinas consistent with ready intelligibility. When a work is not named, the *Summa Theologica* is understood. "C. G." is used for *Summa Contra Gentes* or *Gentiles*. References to *Sum. Theol.* and the first three books of C. G. are from the Leonine edition; all others are from the Vivès.)

²³ A. P. Brogan, "The Fundamental Value Universal," *Jnl. of Philos.*, v. 16 (1919), pp. 96-100.

know in a rough way what it means "to value," we should say that there is an ultimate sense in which Mr. Brogan's theory is ironclad. We should say that a radical comparison, but not (it seems) the one supposed by Mr. Brogan, sets the problem. When I value anything, I prize it above the total non-being that is its contradictory. I act, beings act; that is the universal experience. I marry a wife; but it is perhaps not true that I prefer her to certain others, and my "rejection" of them may be a kind of sour-grape affair. The fact is, I prefer marrying to not marrying. The problem then is, Why do beings act? It is not, radically, a choice among several desirable objects, but the observed or experienced fact of action. So, if we are not mistaken, Mr. Brogan confuses theory of "values" with that much more ultimate study, namely, theory of value. This seems fairly evident, since his immediate addendum to the citation above is: "To be on the value scale means to be better or worse than anything." Now, the "value scale" is the gradation of many or several goods, some of which are taken to be "better" than others. This is, even more overtly, the error of Nietzsche, who says that "the future task of the philosopher" means "that he must solve the problem of *value*, that he has to fix the hierarchy of values."²⁴ Professor DeWulf does the very same, mixing theory of value with theory of values. "Here," he says, "we are confronted with the theory of value. Concrete good things of many kinds lie within my grasp . . . but it becomes necessary to draw up a scale of their respective values."²⁵

²⁴ *Genealogy of Morals* (London, 1924), p. 58.

²⁵ Maurice DeWulf, *Mediæval Philosophy* (Harvard University Press, 1922), pp. 101-2.

Cf., *Idem*, *History of Mediæval Philosophy*, v. 1 (tr. by Messenger, New York and London, 1925), p. 302: Man acts for an end which "can only be the good. To will the good, and all good, is the supreme purpose of all men." But some goods must be "subordinated to others

Yet Professor Brogan has stated something that is of practical and everyday importance: I do in fact prefer one good thing to another this very day in my life. He has opened up a view that lets in great light. And still it must be said that the problem of value lies deeper. Why do I want anything? Not, why do I prefer this to that, but why do I act at all? What, on a far view, does it mean to act? It is conceivable that I should come to this: not to a choice among goods, but to a choice between acting and not acting, and if I were to continue to be conscious I would act; for it is characteristic of the conscious being that it does not cease to act.

We shall therefore not accept Mr. Brogan's view as the complete one, even though it is, so far as it goes, one of the most enlightening. It is not radical enough. It does however call attention again to a truth that is primal for philosophy of value or any other. This truth is that philosophy of value arises out of the doings and observation of our daily lives. Philosophy of value is the most plebeian and democratic affair in the world, because the raw experience of value is human, democratic, and sometimes even animal. Mr. Dewey has said that every criticism is or aims to be a transvaluation,²⁶ and this is true; indeed, Nietzsche himself—poor fellow!—never meant more than substituting his own valuation for the existing ones, and it can be shown that his *Yenseits* was not, even conceivably, other than what his own impressionistic self thought "good." But may we not go farther than Mr. Dewey and say that every one of us, and by analogy every animal and every thing that acts, is a dogmatist declaring that what it acts for is worthy, is possessed of functional value? Of

as means. . . . Such are the facts. The Scholastic infers from them that there must be a supreme end, and that a scale of values is necessary."

²⁶ *Essays in Experimental Logic*, p. 386.

course, we do not now deal with the very meaning of value, and we do not at any time in this study deal with standards of value or with validity. We only say, as often as there is action there is this business of valuing, and there is the demonstration of the existence of at least subjective value; so that it is Mr. Dewey again who underestimates the situation when he declares that desires, strivings, and ideals are as natural to us as our aches and our clothes.²⁷ Ever so much more natural, we should say, if he leave out the word "ideals," since strivings and desires are as native to us, and to every conscious living thing, as is our own existence.

THE CONSTANTS IN VALUING

The one constant in both value and valuing, we may note without delay, is an existent. As Dean Inge has well said, "A value-judgment which is not also a judgment of existence is in the air."²⁸ And in excellent chapters on Value it has been said: "Reality is the support of value";²⁹ "an ideal realm which has no roots in existence has no efficacy or relevancy."³⁰

There would seem to be no reasonable doubt about this, that we find value resting upon existence. Otherwise, all talk of value is airy. Of this we shall see something in its place. But just now we wish to know which are the constant elements in the experience of value, or in valuing. These are: the agent who values, the object, real or conceptual, which he values, and some kind of action brought

²⁷ *Experience and Nature* (1926), p. 418.

²⁸ *Outspoken Essays* (New York, 1921), p. 271.

²⁹ James Lindsay, *Great Philosophical Problems* (Edinburgh and London, 1922), ch. 1, "The Greatest Problem in Value," p. 35.

³⁰ Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, ch. 10, "Existence, Value and Criticism," p. 418.

by him upon the object. What we should particularly like to know is the one best word by which to express this "action."

Some, and indeed many, have said that it is a feeling. "Values are primarily felt."³¹ Dr. Schiller, though he is reluctant to define at all, says that value itself is an "attitude."³² Mr. Brogan, as we saw, says that the fundamental element is a preference: "Value is better or worse than anything." Interpretation, says Mr. Sellars, is the "generic category."³³ Appraisal, "funded meanings," approval and rejection, desire, tendency, what-ought-to-be, struggle, an affection for—these are words which are on a thousand lips and by many writers are, like Mr. Schiller's "attitude," made synonymous with value. Windleband contrasts *Beurtheilung*, or judgment of value, with *Urtheilung*, or judgment of mere fact.³⁴ And we shall see that many would define or locate value as "opposed to" something, as chiefly "against."

Must value "oppose" something? It is often said so, almost generally said so. We shall deal peremptorily with this view at present, and return to it. We only say now that value is not "opposed" to fact, or description, or science, or intelligence, or being. Why must it "oppose?" Is this a puritanic and agonized-conscience view, that value—as anything else—to thrive at all must raise up bristles

³¹ J. S. Mackenzie, *Elements of Constructive Philosophy* (London and New York, 1918), p. 61.

Cf., J. Ward, *Psychological Principles* (Cambridge, 1918), pp. 386-7: Feeling is prior to desire and makes an object valuable for me. W. H. Sheldon, "An Empirical Definition of Value," *Jnl. of Philos.*, v. 11 (1914), p. 123: Values exist, "if they are felt."

³² "Value," Hastings' *Encyclopedia*, v. 12 (New York, 1922), p. 584.

³³ "Cognition and Valuation," *The Philosophical Review*, v. 35 (1926), p. 133.

³⁴ *Präludien: Aufsätze und Reden* (v. 1, Tübingen, 1911), pp. 33-43.

against something and be chiefly against? In the present context, we do not grasp the argument.

And though we shall not go the whole way with Dr. Schiller,³⁵ who says that what comes into my realm as "fact" comes in also as value for me, we shall certainly maintain that it is marked with value for me. That is to say, I cannot know that a thing exists, unless it be of some importance to me. If, for instance, I know that this book exists, the "fact" is not wholly a matter of indifference to me: I have, in an important sense, appropriated the existence or, perhaps, the meaning of the book. I am very well aware of the fact that it is raining this afternoon. A complete indifference to the fact, it-is-raining, would mean that I were unconscious of the fact; in other words, it would not be a "fact," but the rain would have, for me, a valueless objectivity. The truth is, of course, that I have moved upon the "fact" and appropriated it. And so we shall reject the quite contrary view, that of Mr. Perry for example,³⁶ that when I merely know and name the boundaries of anything, say, of England, this object is yet in no sense or measure of value to me: I must, in this opinion, get more or less worked up over the "fact" before it wears value for me. In Mr. Perry's own words, you have a "motor-affective attitude" toward the object before this has value for you. We are not sure about the fitness of the word "attitude"; even so modified, it seems a little thin and colorless for so concrete and real an expe-

³⁵ F. C. S. Schiller, *Humanism: Philosophical Essays* (New York, 1903), p. 10: "Neither the question of *Fact*, therefore, nor the question of *Knowledge* can be raised without raising the question of *Value*." By "fact" Mr. Schiller means an existent as known to us (cf., his "Existence and Value," *Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy*, 1926, pp. 296-7). It seems, however, that Mr. Schiller allows valuing and usefulness to make truth (cf., his *Studies in Humanism*, 1907, pp. 7, 76, 244). With this view we have no commerce.

³⁶ *General Theory of Value* (1926), pp. 1-4.

rience as human and other action. Yet if such "attitude" is the irreducible constant for the action between me and the object which I value, then I have that attitude when I subscribe honestly to the mere existence of England or anything else. The object need not be passionately "loved and hated" before it is valued.

Our position then is this. If I know of the existence of anything, I am *eo ipso* not wholly indifferent to it; my cognizing it as existing, precludes this. Intellection is an action,³⁷ and the act of knowledge is a kind of appropriation. Desire more plainly is an action; it means a real change in the desirer. Whatever I know as existing, either really or but mentally, has for me some slight measure of "importance" and relevance.³⁸ It is true that China's oil supply or the news of this morning concerns me very little, but if I know of its existence, it makes some difference to me. "Truth for the intellect," says Aquinas, is one of "the several particular goods" which go toward the making of "the whole man."³⁹ And if we were writing on the "values" we should certainly put "truth for the intellect" high among them.

It must be remembered that, according to Aquinas, conation or "appetitus," is *ad res*, a going toward the object; whereas, "cognitio," or the act of knowledge, is *a rebus*, a taking of the object, significantly, into ourselves. But we shall see that every act, of cognition and of conation, tends to appropriate, is a "claim," an assertion and at the least a kind of personalistic dogma. The whole matter is put

³⁷ "Velle est motus quidam, et intelligere," 1, q.59, a.1, ad 3.

³⁸ Cf., O. C. Quick, "The Humanist Theory of Value," *Mind*, v. 19 (1910), pp. 218f.

³⁹ 1-2, q.10, a.1, c.: "Non enim per voluntatem appetimus solum ea quae pertinent ad potentiam voluntatis; sed etiam quae pertinent ad singulas potentias, et ad totum hominem . . . ut cognitionem veri . . . et . . . sicut quaedam particularia bona."

simply: "As good is that toward which appetite tends, so truth is that toward which intellect tends."⁴⁰

As Professor Pringle-Pattison has finely said, the individual "must appropriate the idea in order to transmit it; he must identify himself with the purpose in order to be its instrument."⁴¹ I am aware of the existence of a thing, I appreciate its beauty, I want to possess it. In each instance, I take the thing, importantly, into myself and make it my own. Yet in knowing and appreciating, I leave the thing wholly to others to comprehend and enjoy. Now this is not so precisely or fully true in wanting, in coveting, we may say, in courting; for I here desire to get the thing into my personal possession, and perhaps in such a way that I will not, or even cannot, share it with others. The desiring, if we could isolate it in our lives, is thus, unlike knowing and appreciating, a selfish and often an animal experience; and the desired good is in some sense to be called a "fungible" good, i.e., consumed in first use.

Value, we should be inclined to say farther, does not stand proxy for anything. Certainly not—as we shall hear said—for soul, or substance, or reality. And if valuing or the experience of value must "oppose" something, that thing can only be a total indifference; and this of course for the conscious being is hypothetical, like Mr. Perry's greatest good, and never demonstrable fact. For as existing things, we act; we are not indifferent. We shall hardly seem then to be talking out of the skies if we begin by saying that to exist supposes effort: to live is to act, to struggle. And on this very point, maybe more than on any other, modern

⁴⁰ I, q.16. a. 1, c.: "*Sicut bonum nominat id in quod tendit appetitus, ita verum nominat id in quod tendit intellectus*"; cf., H. O. Taylor *Human Values and Verities* (New York, 1928), p. 2: "Possibly in all thinking, however sheer and pure, there enters an element of effort or conation."

⁴¹ *The Idea of God* (Oxford, 1920), p. 253.

philosophy is at peace with itself. Natural selecting, as interpreter of many things, appears pretty well to have worn itself out, but natural struggling and suffering is perpetual, and is observed and experienced fact. We may say then that for the action of valuing the general word "conation" is as fit as any that has been used: it is a good Thomistic word, it should be and is a good modern word, taking in perhaps *nisus* and *élan*, and it seems to be a word that covers the experience. Professor Hobhouse has well described "conation" as "involved in the maintenance or recovery of the optimum or equilibrium state in the presence of disturbing causes"; and he adds, very significantly for our application of it, "the equilibrium itself is at any moment a state of tension or conation."⁴²

The generic word "conation," then, would seem perhaps best to describe the process of valuing, and the word "appropriation" to describe the effect.

For whatever value may mean and wherever it reside, we may say that to value is to lay siege to something, to claim it, to aim at appropriating it. This is so, we have urged, even with regard to acts of knowledge. "Objects of belief and of refusal to believe are value-objects; for each object is something acquiesced in, accepted, adopted, appropriated."⁴³ Valuing, if it must oppose anything, will oppose only indifference; or, as Professor Hocking has said with fine exactitude, the "proper contrast" to interest or concern or value-feeling is "callousness."⁴⁴

⁴² *Development and Purpose* (London, 1913), p. 58; cf., p. 52: "Defining conation generically as action dependent on the difference between the existing state of the organism and some other state which it directly or indirectly tends to bring about"; and, p. 75: "Conation in its earliest forms as a spasmodic activity excited by discomfort and continuing till the discomfort is removed."

⁴³ Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, p. 404.

⁴⁴ W. E. Hocking, *Human Nature and Its Remaking* (New Haven, 1918), p. 81.

Yet, on certain conditions, we shall allow anyone his own fixation of the term "value." The problem, we have maintained, is not arbitrary. It comes to us out of an objective situation and experience. To know where one stands within the whole situation, to be well aware of the elements within the situation—this is the first test; and one may subvert the common-sense usage of words if he gives a sufficient reasoning for the subversion.⁴⁵ Words are words, and our stipulations with regard to the use of them are that they be adequate to the experience and that they be turned only with due warrant from their human and democratic acceptation. Now what we try to explain here is action, and this is a commonplace and real experience. If anyone find an experience more actual and more everyday, let him interpret that. If, for anyone, value is made merely by valuing, then his field, patently, is more narrow and he is less in the open air; but let him study as "value" only that which is made by our valuing, and this, we may without minimizing say, is no very tangible entity nor a very real one. It is his business, anyway, to translate that experience, to push it backward and forward as far as it will consistently go, to hold it up in every available light. And if he find, as others besides Professor Perry have found,⁴⁶ that the business of valuing, as he knows it from experience and observation, precludes mere knowing and mere "facts," let him keep to æsthetic and religious and moral "values"; even in these he has laid out a big land for himself.

For our part, the problem is thus set: acting includes

⁴⁵ Cf., Olaf Stapledon, "Ethics and Teleological Activity," *International Journal of Ethics*, v. 38 (1928), p. 253: "Now so long as we are aware of the various factors in the value situation, it does not perhaps greatly matter which of them we dignify with the word 'good.'"

⁴⁶ E.g., D. W. Prall, *A Study in the Theory of Value* (Berkeley, 1921); H. W. Stuart, *Valuation as a Logical Process* (Chicago, 1918).

valuing, to act—whatever else it may possibly be—is to value. Yet this does not say at all what value is or even where it is, nor does it give us any faint hint of why the agent values. We want to know (if it can be known) what value is, where it is, and why the subject acts. What it means to act—this is the problem. Action is a descent upon an object—this is the experience.

We shall continue to deprecate the term “values.” It seems to have hoodwinked much thought. It is easy to say, so lilting and velvety—“value,” “moral values,” “the values.” Most of us know that “right and wrong” is a stern phrase and that “the goods and the bads,” if we must descend to it, is horrid. Maybe, however, it is not harder to give to these an intelligible content. The mere word itself—“values”—of course explains nothing. It is simply futile to say with Mr. Dewey that “values are values,” or with Mr. Dashiell that “values simply *are*,” or, for that matter, with Mr. Sellars that “values are objects valued.” All this may be blindingly true. But we are left still in the primal darkness; the problem remains. Why is anything valued? why is there any action? We love and cherish some things; but to call these things “values” is a treadmill repetition of the fact that we love and cherish them; “it is not to give a reason.”

Things, as we know them, act. Why do they, or for what do they act? This, we may repeat, is an open-air problem. It will hardly do as solution to say, with Bernard Shaw, Oh, yes, the “evolutionary appetite,” or with Count Keyserling, “cosmic tension,” or with Mr. Israel Levine, things fall into those “patterns”; and General Smuts’ get-together tendency, if it has status in reality, itself waits to be explained. Even Mr. Santayana’s “plastic stress” elucidates little. The pervasive “greater complexity,” too, is facile and far from enlightening. Many, many details and

perhaps the whole substance remain bulging out and falling down. Simply, one wants to know, and a pretty word is not an explanation. Nor in some important senses is Mr. Perry's philosophy of action more pointed. He makes a bad start when after remarking that "the living organism" is an organization and an individual, he goes on to say that "it somehow acts so as to bring this organization and individuality into existence."⁴⁷ This seems unlikely; it is the lifting of oneself by one's own bootstraps. We may appear to belabor Professor Perry's theory of value a little all through our work,⁴⁸ but for one thing his volume deserves more attention than any of the other important current works on the subject, and it is Mr. Perry himself who intimates elsewhere (as we shall see) that he is not well content with the basework of his philosophy. Besides as a matter of philosophical expression it is not enough to criticize mere details—that would be like flicking at the dust on the wheels, and leaving the hounds and running-gears unexamined: a weak method of building strong wagons. Mr. Perry then, after a dubious take-off, suggests that action is a kind of *præsura-cæsura*, perchings and flights, a winding up and going off.⁴⁹ The theory, much more perhaps than its author suspects, comes near to saying that there is properly no action but a being acted upon,

⁴⁷ *General Theory of Value*, p. 157.

⁴⁸ Mr. Perry (like Mr. Dewey) has for years made a statement now and then that is as profound and well-gauged as any ever made in this field of philosophy; *cf.*, his excellent saying (*The Moral Economy*, New York, 1909, pp. 19, 27) that the clinging to life is the primary and most fundamental of all "interests."

⁴⁹ *General Theory of Value*, p. 147: "The organism accumulates energy . . . and then discharges it when subjected to some kind of stimulation. . . . As organisms become more elaborate the discharge comes to depend more and more upon the balance and quantity of stored energy. . . . But even so, this phenomenon of release or discharge does not differ in principle from what happens in the case of combustion or in the case of the action of high explosives."

a mere passivity; and this is in the direction of denying the fact of action. At any rate, it does not explain action. We are aware that systole follows diastole, and that diastole follows systole; but this explains little. The question of why there is any action is as insistent as it was in the beginning. To describe, at whatever length, action and reaction is yet to leave unexplained the fact that there is any action at all.

HOW WIDE THE FIELD?

Metaphysics of value may well aim to say why there is any action, what it means to act. Psychology of value may try to elucidate the genesis of action and to describe how action takes place. Comparative study of value may try a hand at telling why, for instance, value is greater for man than for animal, if it is so, and why that which many men value is thereby demonstrated, perhaps, to be of greater value than the choice of any one.

Any of these is a large field. Philosophy of life is Professor Perry's equation for theory of value, or so it was in an earlier work;⁵⁰ and we have not thought him wrong. But now he seems rather definitely to make value the hub of all philosophy: philosophy of nature and philosophy of mind (Mr. Perry hardly allows this)⁵¹ seem in his theory to lead up to philosophy of value, and philosophy of religion and of conduct to follow from it.⁵² This of course is stretching value pretty far. And to make it a philosophy

⁵⁰ *Present Philosophical Tendencies* (New York, 1921), p. 331.

⁵¹ Mr. Perry believes "consciousness" a theory and not a datum; but "mind," he says, is "an 'emergent characteristic' of the material world."—*General Theory of Value*, pp. 142-3.

⁵² Thus, *ibid.*, pp. 115-145, value is "any object of any interest"; ch. vi and ch. vii, "The Biological Approach to Interest," and "The Psychological Definition of Interests"; and ch. xxii, "The Highest Good," which is the choice, always, of the majority.

of life is perhaps in some sense too broad, since theory of value rather takes life and action for granted. Professor Fite seems to urge, curiously enough, that theory of value is philosophy of conduct with all doctrine of duty left out.⁵³ Professor Urban limits the problem to the meaning of human "interests and their systematic coördination."⁵⁴ And all those who—like Mr. Sellars—have at any time said that value means interpretation simply, are making it, however unwittingly, cover philosophy from tip to tip. These writers, and even those too who allow value to "oppose" science and fact, have merely rediscovered philosophy and perhaps metaphysics.

Theory of value, we believe, deals in action and would explain it. As a consequence it will run over into other fields of philosophy and take data from them, as well as from the several sciences and, particularly, from the perpetual drama of human life. Philosophy of value has to do, as ethics has, with human action aimed at an end; but it never says that any action is right or wrong. It feeds also upon the action which goes on between you and any object which you consider beautiful or charming, and again between you and any object which you know or worship.

Theory of value thus purports to be a theory of the end of action.

When I act, I act for something: I aim, as we shall see, to appropriate it and in some sense and measure, whatever the object, I always do appropriate it. Plainly, then, between me and the object, there arises at once a relation; but to call this relation "a value" or "value," lets in no

⁵³ Warner Fite, *Philosophical Review*, v. 36 (1927), p. 183. Note the, also curious, counter claim of Wm. Cunningham, "The Two Philosophies" (*Catholic School Interests*, v. 6, 1927, pp. 232-3) that philosophy should be of duty only and never of value.

⁵⁴ "The Pragmatic Theory of Value," *Jnl. of Philos.*, v. 14 (1917), p. 703.

great light. The mere word might turn out to be a blind. The problems remain, and are these. (1) Metaphysical: why do I act? (2) Psychological: how does action get under way? (3) Statistical and Comparative: the study of the facts that some objects are, and some objects should be, more strongly and more constantly acted for than others.

That I value the object when I act for it cannot well be doubted, and we are unable to think of any writer who does doubt it. Yet this does not at all say what value is or that it can be defined. And may we for the present say and illustrate it in season that value has never been well defined, if at all? and add that the test of philosophy is not necessarily and plainly a theoretic definition but a just and consequential accounting for the experience of value? Before attempting to construct, we proceed now to repeat something of what is currently said of value, especially of the meaning of value and the fate of values.

CHAPTER II

FANFARE OF DEFINITIONS

Value has been driven hard these few years. Now more than at any previous time, it is said, philosophy is expressed in terms of value. It is true at least that value recurs. A word to conjure with, says Ruggiero. Value, says another, is the great philosophic discovery of the nineteenth century. If this is fact, of course it must be substantiated with care and from a hundred points of view; but it is a claim, too, and it has been suggested that value consists precisely in a claim.

In the present and the two succeeding chapters we wish to repeat, with a modicum of comment and criticism, just what present-day writers are saying of value: of its meaning, its origin and place in the universe, its relation to existence and to God, and its fate. Criticism of these views, so far as we choose to criticize certain of them, will then run through our own constructive treatment in the whole of the second part of the book.

What is meant by "value," "the values," "moral values"? And, much more to the point, to what bit of experience and observation do the terms apply? Do the words make the concepts, and the concepts the reality? Or are value thought and value language tethered to existents? At any rate, to definition belongs a kind of centrality. Professor Perry says that defining is "the fundamental problem of theory of value."¹ We accept his declaration, only with the

¹ *General Theory of Value* (1926), p. 17: "The fundamental problem of theory of value is to define the concept of value." Mr. Perry (*ibid.*

really mild proviso that there be such actuality as value at all. But if, as is sometimes suggested by the definitions, there be no problem of value, i.e., no real value, then the effort to define is, in George Eliot's strong phrase, sagacity wasted on a false scent.

Of current definitions of value we accept some, at least in part; though of course there often go with admirable definitions of value implications which we leave to those whose view of the universe is not ours. Just now, however, we are concerned with other definitions of value. We put these down as they are; little selection is necessary or possible. Had we selected, it seems we should have introduced value or perhaps a value: for value is said to fellow intimately with selection: though what kind of value—æsthetic, religious, scientific, moral, cognitive—who will say? The unacceptable definitions and descriptions, presently to be stated, are of various types. Some of them are vague, and are praised for their fluidity, some aim—one or two even explicitly—to irrationalize, some go round and round with such persistency as to amaze those who seek precision and consequence.

ELASTIC AND FLUID TERMS

Definition of value, or philosophy of value itself, can be made as broad and vague as you like. It can be stretched to cover the three transcendentals. So Professor Alexander, for example, sometimes uses the concept.² Mr. Sorley names

p. 116) makes his own definition the "point of departure" for theory of value. Maybe it were better to begin with ordinary experience and, if this allow, come to definitions. Besides, Mr. Perry does not define. He says (pp. 115-6): an object "acquires value when"; an object is "invested with value" when. . . . This may tell us something of the temporal occurrence of value, but it does not define.

² S. Alexander, *Space, Time and Deity* (1920), v. 2, pp. 236-7; cf., J. C. Smuts, *Holism and Evolution* (1926) p. 107: "Holistic Ideals, or Absolute Values . . . the Ideals of Truth, Beauty and Goodness."

"happiness, beauty, and truth as comprehensive descriptions" of "particular experiences of value."³ This is perilously broad, to begin with; but it is only a start. The idea of value can be drawn out interminably farther. The old triumvirate, Mr. Perry says, was narrow, and he for one is pleased to see philosophy of value substitute an "elastic polytheism for the conventional trinitarianism of the worshippers of the true, the beautiful, and the good."⁴

The less exact term is preferred, and is in demand. We substitute value and worth, says Herbert W. Schneider, for good and goods: because, he explains, these latter seem "theological, metaphysical and objective."⁵ Our fathers spoke plainly, says J. S. Mackenzie: "instead of speaking of values they were in the habit of calling things good or right or again evil or wrong."⁶ Value, he says elsewhere, is "closely related" to the terms "good" and "ought," but these, though difficult concepts themselves, have something yet too precise about them, too settled; he likes better a mere "attitude." Value serves very well. It is vague enough for anybody, "a much more fluid and adaptable term than good." Value is neither fish nor flesh, a strictly neutral term. Value "carries no direct suggestion."⁷ A dozen years

³ W. R. Sorley, *Moral Values and Idea of God* (Cambridge, 1918), p. 27. Cf., pp. 43-4: The eternal values are: truth, beauty and the love of God.

⁴ "The Definition of Value," *Jnl. of Philos.*, v. 11 (1914), p. 154.

⁵ "The Theory of Values," *Jnl. of Philos.* v. 14 (1917), p. 141; cf., J. S. Mackenzie, *Ultimate Values* (1924), p. 93: the term good is "too suggestive of something absolute and unquestionable." Jared S. Moore, "The System of Transcendental Values," *Jnl. of Philos.*, v. 11 (1914), p. 247: would substitute "meaning, purpose, and value" for "the soul as a substrate." H. U. Roop, *Christian Ethics* (1926), p. 70: "The term 'value' is used by Everett and others as a substitute for the older word 'good.'"

⁶ "Spiritual Values," *I. J. Eth.*, v. 33 (1922-3), p. 248.

⁷ *Ultimate Values* (1924), pp. 95-9; cf., F. C. S. Schiller, art. "Value," Hasting's *Encydpd. of Rel. and Eth.*, v. 12 (1922), p. 589: "Probably best to say that value is a personal attitude . . . towards an object of interest."

before Mr. Perry's "Value Construed in Terms of Interest"⁸ appeared, he had fastened upon "*bias or interest*" as at the heart of value and "broad and elastic enough" to embosom all views.⁹ A generous term, fluid, elastic, neutral. Accordingly, it is recommended.

Value thus so unidentifiable keeps step well with those expressions which make value as irresponsible as imagination itself.¹⁰ With Mr. Mackenzie and many another, value is sometimes synonymous with "good," "good and evil"¹¹: though conversely enough, Mr. E. Jordan finds that "our values are . . . determined by one principle, our goods by another."¹² With Mackenzie and many another, value is "a category or system of categories."¹³ Value is a feeling: "Values are primarily felt."¹⁴ "Do values then exist? Yes, if they are felt."¹⁵ Or values are "our Final Causes . . .

⁸ The sub-title of *General Theory of Value* (1926).

⁹ "The Definition of Value," *Jnl. of Philos.*, v. 11 (1914), p. 149. The word "interest" is said to cover self-realization, Beurtheilung, retributive emotions, valuation process, etc., etc.

¹⁰ This is the more disappointing in Mr. Mackenzie's *Ultimate Values*, since Part First, on Our Theoretical Outlook, is so good that one comes hopefully to Value and The Meaning of Value; then he is let down gently, till at the last he is sent away empty-handed.

¹¹ J. S. Mackenzie, *Manual of Ethics* (5th ed., New York, 1924), p. 266; *Ultimate Values* (1924), p. 15; cf., Bosanquet, *Some Suggestions in Ethics* (1918), p. 46: "Value, worth, and goodness seem all to be names for the same character of objects"; and p. 60: "Moral goodness will after all be the essence and center of value." J. Laird, *Problems of the Self* (London, 1917), p. 155: "Value or goodness." Rashdall, *Theory of Good and Evil* (2nd ed., Oxford, 1924), v. 1, p. 93: "'Good,' 'Ought' (when applied to end), 'Value,' 'the End' I regard as synonymous terms"; and p. 137: "Our moral judgments are ultimately judgments of value."

¹² *Forms of Individuality* (Indianapolis, 1927), p. 5.

¹³ *Elements of Constructive Philosophy* (1918), p. 61. Cf., Bosanquet, *op. cit.* (1918), p. 50: "In a word, good or value is a category, and not a datum of sense-perception."

¹⁴ Mackenzie, *Elements of Constructive Philosophy*, p. 178.

¹⁵ Sheldon, "An Empirical Definition of Value," *Jnl. of Philos.* v. 11, (1914), p. 123; cf., D. Drake, *Problems of Conduct* (1st ed., New York, 1914), p. 82: "The best life is the life which on the whole is *felt best*."

man's Chief End"; "Final Causes (i.e., Values)."¹⁶ "It is common to find the terms meaning, purpose, and value bracketed together, or used interchangeably."¹⁷ Values even are individuals who survive, "unvalues" those who fail and are eliminated.¹⁸

A vagrant term, indefinite, it is never or seldom narrowed, but encouraged to widen out. In its purview, value takes in all philosophy,¹⁹ and perhaps all religion.²⁰ A theory of "the nature of goodness or value," and another of its realization, says Mr. Perry, mean a philosophy of life.²¹ This is yet modest. Mr. G. A. Wilson says: "The world of values . . . is a manifold of universes."²²

Value is convertible with any term: "It is a matter of indifference whether we call external reality value or substance or energy or any other usable term."²³ We sought liberty, and here it is at last unbounded. Nor does R. E. F. Hoernlé very much narrow the limits: "Ideal is always a

¹⁶ Mackenzie, *Ultimate Values* (1924), pp. 25, 21; cf., Smuts, *op. cit.*, p. 259: "The realm of ends, as Kant called it, the realm of the great Values or Ideals is the destined home of mind." J. W. Krutch (*Atlantic Monthly*, Dec., 1927, p. 760): man proposes to himself ends or values."

¹⁷ Jared S. Moore, "Value in Its Relation to Meaning and Purpose," *Jnl. of Philos.* v. 11 (1914), p. 184.

¹⁸ S. Alexander, *op. cit.*, (1920), v. 2, pp. 307-8; cf., Israel Levine, *Reason and Morals* (Glasgow, 1924), p. 122: the source of attributing value is whatever "enhances or sustains life."

¹⁹ E.g., Sorley, "The Philosophical Attitude," *Int. Jnl. Eth.*, v. 20, (1910), p. 160: "Worth is as fundamental a conception as reality"; p. 159, "general theory of value might perhaps, by stretching the meaning of an old term, be called Ethics; or a new term, Axiology, might be used for it."

²⁰ H. W. Carr, *Changing Backgrounds in Religion and Ethics* (New York, 1927), p. 6.

²¹ *Present Philosophical Tendencies* (1921), p. 331; cf., Wm. P. Montague, *Ways of Knowing* (New York, 1925), p. 25: "Theory of value is concerned with the nature of ideals and with the way they may be made actual."

²² *The Self and Its World* (New York, 1926), pp. 181-2.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 178; cf., J. A. Leighton *Religion and the Mind of Today* (1924), p. 77: "The soul is the entelechy or meaning and value . . . of the body."

pattern, or standard, of excellence, perfection, or supreme value." ²⁴ Nor Münsterberg, in his day: "It is practically the same thing, whether we speak of the absolute existence of the valuations or the absolute validity of the values." ²⁵ It may be.

WHICH THEN ARE THE VALUES?

The old Spencerian doctrine lives. Says Israel Levine: "The ultimate source of value is seen to be none other than life itself." ²⁶ "Is not life itself a value," someone asks, "the very consummation of values?" ²⁷ Mr. Tufts answers: "Life is at least the raw material of all values." ²⁸ Now so much might, as we shall see, be pretty nearly granted. But values are not generally so centralized.

The true, the good, and the beautiful are also affirmed to be among the values, and by many are thought perhaps midmost points around which, or maybe within which, all particular values cluster. ²⁹ It is not surprising that truth is one of the innumerable values. ³⁰ Within "this rich empirical field," the universe—which is essentially a pluri-

²⁴ *Idealism: As a Philosophical Doctrine* (London, 1924), p. 16.

²⁵ *The Eternal Values* (1909), p. 114.

²⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 124; cf., Mackenzie, *Ultimate Values* (1924), p. 99: "What is valued is what *avails* in the struggle of life."

²⁷ E. A. Burtt, *I. J. Eth.*, v. 31, p. 435; cf., F. C. S. Schiller *op. cit.*, p. 154: "There are no eternal values . . . unless it be life—so long as that lasts." J. W. Hudson, *The Truths We Live By* (New York, 1921), pp. 106-7: That men want life "is an ultimate fact. . . . Grant that life is worth while, and you grant all else."

²⁸ J. H. Tufts, *Creative Intelligence* (New York, 1917), p. 358.

²⁹ S. Alexander, *op. cit.*, v. 2, pp. 236-7; cf. Mackenzie, *Elements of Constructive Philosophy*, p. 291: "provisionally" we may regard Truth, Goodness, Beauty as having intrinsic value.

³⁰ Mackenzie, *Ultimate Values*, p. 58: "Truth is essentially a mode of value." Sorley, "The Philosophical Attitude," *I. J. of Eth.*, v. 20 (1909-10), p. 161: "Truth itself falls within the system of worth; it has value for the rational being."

verse—all things, says Professor Perry, are values⁸¹ (there is delimitation here, by innuendo). The revolving year, day and night, ocean's voice, wisdom, mercy and service Professor Keyser finds among "the sacred values."⁸² Professor Dewey says: "Poignancy, humor, zest, tragedy, beauty, prosperity and bafflement . . . are gathered up into the realm of values, contradistinguished from the realm of existence."⁸³ Home, the fireside, friendship, parenthood are values.⁸⁴ Religion "becomes a member of the League of Values."⁸⁵ God and the Whole are sometimes within the League, sometimes above it.⁸⁶ Irony is "this subtle value."⁸⁷ Shakespeare, Tennyson's "Charge"—"without such work of the constructive imagination there could hardly be such a thing as intrinsic value" at all.⁸⁸

Consorting with this polytheism, it seems, will not aid us toward a definition or any circumscription of value; it

⁸¹ "The Definition of Value," *Jnl. of Philos.*, v. 11 (1914), p. 154.

⁸² C. J. Keyser, *Mole Philosophy and Other Essays* (New York, 1927), p. 55.

⁸³ *Experience and Nature* (1926), p. 394.

⁸⁴ Leighton, *The Individual and the Social Order* (New York, 1926), pp. 336-7.

⁸⁵ E. S. Brightman, *Religious Values* (New York, 1925), p. 18.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 217: "God is perfect goodness, perfect value." Mackenzie, *Elements of Constructive Philosophy* (1918), p. 293: The Whole must itself be regarded as containing value. Contrast Bosanquet, *Individuality and Value* (1912), p. 310: The Whole is standard of value, but value is not attributed to it.

⁸⁷ A. Weinberg, "Value-Interpretation: The Methodological Foundation of a Psychological Discipline," *I. J. Eth.*, v. 38 (1927), p. 51: "The complete analysis of this subtle value would involve, as the writer hopes to show in an ensuing study, a survey of almost the whole *Weltanschauung* of modernity."

⁸⁸ Mackenzie, *Ultimate Values* (1924), p. 148; *cf.*, p. 157: "The supreme Worth has to be regarded as containing the three aspects of Wisdom, Love, and the creative Power, which, acting in conjunction, produce Beauty." "Constructive Philosophy," in *Contemporary British Philosophy* (1924), v. 1, pp. 242-3: "I am now inclined to regard the good life as consisting in the effort to create and conserve what is beautiful"; *cf.*, E. Goblou, *La Logique des Jugements de Valeur* (1927, Paris), p. 8: "Voilà donc trois sortes de valeurs: A. les perfections; B. les moyens; C. les fins."

only illustrates how vague and large and illimitable is the field, or at least the term. We turn now to the more direct evidence.

ON DESCRIBING A CIRCLE

The definitions of value, which we have seen, aim at progress, and one goes with them altogether or in part, or he balks from the beginning; and his going or his sticking is also said to be the making of some kind of value. But when value is adequated with value, he were sophisticated indeed to cavil; though there is no advance, he may not but acquiesce.

A few years ago there was some ado about the concept and the term "value," and out of the proffered interpretations Professor Sheldon declared that not one could satisfy the first demand of logic. "None of them," he said, "contains, or is based upon, an unambiguous, non-circular definition."³⁹ And it must be confessed that under most captains the good ship Value is yet without the ballast of definition. Even Professor Alexander in his essay toward a summa says: "Value is . . . the satisfaction of the valuer."⁴⁰ One is not captious in urging that this, as definition, returns upon itself. So too of Professor Perry's saying that "an agreement of good wills . . . is better than anything else."⁴¹ This, noticeably like a famous definition, is static. Good and value perhaps are not definable; but plainly they are but treacherously defined in terms of better and valuer. And these are the mildest examples, serving only as prelude.

³⁹ "An Empirical Definition of Value," *Jnl. of Philos.*, v. 11 (1914), p.

113.

⁴⁰ *Space, Time and Deity* (1920), v. 2, p. 308.

⁴¹ *General Theory of Value* (1926), p. 682.

"By moral value," said Rashdall, "we generally mean the kind of value which we assign to a good character."⁴² Mr. Sellars is terse: "Values are objects valued." "That value is central in human living we soon realize when we grasp the fact that values are objects valued."⁴³ The definition given by E. C. Hayes, were it not earlier, might have seemed the echo: "Good is good human experience."⁴⁴ It seems so, unchallengeably: good is good, moral is moral, value is value.

And this kind of statement is the property of no school. So temperate a man as Mr. Prall yields. "Value is created by valuing," he notes.⁴⁵ And at least once upon a time Mr. Alexander said: "That which 'ought to be' represents the sentiments of good men."⁴⁶ Mr. Mackenzie says: "You ought to do what you find to be best."⁴⁷ Durant Drake inserts the claim of feeling: "The best life is that which, on the whole is *felt* best."⁴⁸ Sir Henry Jones, with a statement which is hardly contradictable, clings to the circle. "But the learning and practising of goodness," he says, "the active willing and doing of what is right, is, we maintain, the best possible life for man."⁴⁹ The author of *Human Values*, formulating the highest good, takes the same path; the chief good, he avers, is "appreciation of

⁴² *Theory of Good and Evil* (1924), v. 1, p. 138.

⁴³ R. W. Sellars, *Principles and Problems of Philosophy* (New York, 1926), pp. 451, 434.

⁴⁴ *Sociology and Ethics* (New York, 1921), pp. 204-5.

⁴⁵ D. W. Prall, *A Study in the Theory of Value* (1921), p. 268.

⁴⁶ S. Alexander, "The Idea of Value," *Mind*, v. 1 (1892), p. 40.

⁴⁷ *Manual of Ethics*, pp. 296-7.

⁴⁸ *Problems of Conduct* (1914), p. 82; *cf.*, *ibid.* (1921), p. 74: "To say that experiences are good or bad is equivalent to saying that they feel good or bad."

⁴⁹ *A Faith That Enquires* (New York, 1922), p. 190; *cf.*, p. 209: the right or moral act "is obedience to and realization of the absolute law of goodness."

what is good in man." ⁵⁰ C. Lloyd Morgan, also, and to our surprise, has chosen this goodly company: value, he says, looks to an end "for the attainment of which this or that is valuable or valued. It is of value as a means to that end." ⁵¹ And Professor Urban, even after his original definition had been battered a little by time, came back to a tautology. "Do values exist?" he asked. "The feeling of value exists . . . but value, as such, is simply valid . . . value itself is simply *valid*. That is its objectivity." ⁵²

One runs over these definitions, not punctiliously but carefully observing what is to be seen, but he arrives precisely where he started, he comes back, as the saying is, with one hand as long as the other. One was not looking for circles, but one discovered that he was finding nothing else. And yet other authors, not content with describing a circle, keep on going round and round.

"The better is the good," says John Dewey, "the best is not better than the good but is simply the discovered good." ⁵³ What is it about a circle that so fascinates? Everybody likes it. "To be good," says Mr. Flewelling, "is to grow in the comprehension of good. To be good means to go on to the better. It means to travel towards the best and to find it better than we thought." ⁵⁴ Mr. B. M. Laing wisely says that "the good" is not easily defined, and goes

⁵⁰ Henry Sturt, *Human Values* (Cambridge, 1923), p. 4. Mr. Sturt recognizes the circularity of his statement, and says it cannot be avoided.

⁵¹ *Life, Mind and Spirit* (New York, 1925), p. 261.

⁵² "Ontological Problems of Value," *Jnl. of Philos.*, 14 (1917), pp. 315-8.

⁵³ *Human Nature and Conduct* (New York, 1922), p. 278. Does Mr. Dewey here perhaps deny progress in any field or science? *cf.*, his *Experience and Nature* (1926), p. 62: "To be good is to be better than."

⁵⁴ *Creative Personality* (New York, 1926), p. 235; *cf.*, p. 233: "The character of goodness" is "an activity of self-realizing personality which chooses good as over against the evil or the less good"; *cf.*, Sturt, *Human Values* (1923), p. 7: "An agent is morally good when he appreciates human excellence, and human excellence consists largely in moral goodness."

on then to remark that "what is desired is the desirable; and the desirable is what is desired."⁵⁵ This statement might seem fairly obvious. Yet Professor Tufts reiterates his own view of the circle, and we put his definition last in the group as perhaps deserving this important position. "The only test for the rightness of an act," he says, "is that persons of good character approve it. The only test for goodness is that good persons on reflection approve and choose it—just as the test for good persons is that they choose and do the good."⁵⁶

A STUDY IN CONFUSION

We come now to a series of definitions or descriptions of value which raise or confirm the presumption against a value philosophy at all. Certainly they do not make for clarity.

First, an earlier definition of Mr. Alexander's. "Value is nothing but the efficiency of a conscious agent to promote the efficiency of society, to maintain the equilibrium of forces which society represents."⁵⁷ This value—any power which person or animal has to keep society going—is perhaps demoded by *Space, Time and Deity* through which Mr. Alexander would now prefer to speak. He writes: "On the level of life value exists as the persistence of adapted forms of living beings . . . The unvalues are those individuals or types which . . . fail in competition with the values and are eliminated." "Values emerge,"

⁵⁵ *A Study in Moral Problems* (London, 1922), pp. 208, 221.

⁵⁶ "The Moral Life and the Construction of Values and Standards," in *Creative Intelligence* (1917), p. 382. Mr. Perry (*I. J. Eth.* v. 28, p. 119) is amazed at this definition—as well he might be. A neighbor of ours says, "Circular? That is not circular: it is spiral!" Yet even this will not do; for "spiral" may mean "winding and advancing."

⁵⁷ "The Idea of Value," *Mind*, v. 1 (1892), p. 55.

though "the existence of emergent qualities admits of no explanation," but is "to be accepted with the 'natural piety' of the investigator." Valuation itself is one of the unexplained "a priori problems" which the author has not yet linked up with space-time.⁵⁸

This might seem ecstatic enough—value made by space-time, the great "matrix." But suppose that value, whatever it be, makes space-time itself! Suppose that value, though we grasp but sketchily what it is, be greater than being, prior to being, and that it make reality. This seems a little bold, yet it is countenanced and affirmed. We shall state these asseverations later in their place, but we may now at least suggest the mystification they afford for any fruitful comprehension of value.

Value then is productive of the highest good, and reality, and God. It makes these up as it goes. Mr. Perry for example seems to say that value is what after all makes God and a tolerable universe. At the very peak of man's reverence and worship, he says, are to stand communal values, i.e., the most intense valuations of the greatest number, and these, he says, are "sacred," worthy to be taken into our life "as standard and end."⁵⁹ Value, in such view, is the acme of all good, the greatest existent. In much the same tone Mr. Mackenzie, too, declares for the space-time concept of Deity, not as a present reality, but as a value which is to be: "the universe itself," he believes, "may have been created" by no power or intelligence, but "by the desire for the Supreme Value."⁶⁰ And in value literature it is a very famous passage indeed which allows value to

⁵⁸ V. 2, pp. 307-8, 310, 312, 46-7.

⁵⁹ *General Theory of Value* (1926), pp. 672-3, 682.

⁶⁰ *Ultimate Values* (1924), p. 52; cf., *idem*, on Fawcett's *Imagining; Mind*, v. 31 (1922), p. 536: "... this does not preclude a development in the divine towards a higher perfection . . . A view of this kind seems to me perfectly intelligible."

make a world. The world without value, said Münsterberg, would not merely lose its meaning for us, but would cease to be. From the beginning, he said, it was known and above all "willed" that "we should maintain" "the evaluating will" at any hazard, and the alternative was dire enough—"unless we were to abandon ourselves, or unless the world were to lose its meaning and reality."⁶¹

Value therefore is not so much—as is sometimes supposed—the contradictory of being,⁶² but it is the very stuff that existence and the real are made of; and whether God is also one of the values—a question we heard raised—is not the problem nor indeed the solution, since our everyday value perhaps is God. These views will later have a pertinence, and we only note now that they are not simplifiers of the philosophy of value.

Any of the following definitions we believe may hide bits of truth or perhaps of many truths; but the sorites—e.g., Professor Whitehead's—tends to prolongation, so that any germinal truth does not stand out in a luminous way. Mr. Leighton defines good: "Any activity is good which yields lasting satisfaction to the interests of the self in the direction which makes for the maximum harmonious energizing of his capacities as a member of a community of persons."⁶³ Mr. Urban in one paragraph speaks of "worth" and of a "ground for defining experience of worth as feeling," and of "worth feeling." He gives us also "the feeling of obligation" in its "simplest" form and in terms of value itself. The feeling of oughtness, he says, "is a specific form of the feeling of value . . . appreciatively described, it is

⁶¹ *The Eternal Values* (1909), p. 156. Value here, as making a world and reality, seems not Münsterberg's value (pp. 75-77) as appreciation, or as our human way of going beyond the "fleeting" fact.

⁶² E.g., J. Dewey, *Experience and Nature* (1926), p. 394: "The realm of values, contradistinguished from the realm of existence."

⁶³ *The Individual and the Social Order* (1926), p. 339.

an acquired modification of the general feeling of trans-gredient reference or of tension, and may be described as the Impellent Mode.”⁶⁴ Mr. J. E. Turner says that “the essential characteristic of value, as objectively real, is contributoriness to the completeness of some mode or other of organization or system; and this further involves, when taken in conjunction with the course of actual experience, the conception of an all-embracing and interrelated Whole.”⁶⁵ One waits for something more everyday than this. Nor does Mr. Whitehead clarify, though he employs the direct “is”:

The purpose of God is the attainment of value in the temporal world. An active purpose is the adjustment of the present for the sake of adjustment of value in the future, immediately or remotely.

Value is inherent in actuality itself. To be an actual entity is to have a self-interest. This self-interest is a feeling of self-valuation; it is an emotional tone. The value of other things, not one’s self, is the derivative of being elements contributing to this ultimate self-interest . . .

But the actuality is the enjoyment, and this enjoyment is the experiencing of value . . . The self-value is the unit which emerges . . . Each actual entity is an arrangement of the whole universe, actual and ideal, whereby there is constituted that self-value which is the entity itself. There is not “bare value,” but “specific value,” which is the created unit of feeling arising out of the specific mode of concretion of the diverse elements. These different specific value-feelings are comparable amid their differences; and the ground for their comparability is what is here termed “value.”⁶⁶

⁶⁴ W. H. Urban, *Valuation: Its Nature and Its Laws* (1909), pp. 82, 209, 68.

⁶⁵ *The Philosophia Basis of Moral Obligation* (New York, 1924), p. 212.

⁶⁶ *Religion in the Making* (New York, 1926), pp. 100-1, 103; cf., Whitehead’s *Science and the Modern World* (1924), p. 136: “‘Value’ is the word I use for the intrinsic reality of an event. Value is an element which pervades through and through the poetic view of nature. We

This might perhaps express truth in places, and it might be progressively true. But the complication is too great. In the end one must push aside such passages; and one does, without any reluctance. They are not even a tortuous way to a definition or to a convincing lucid description; they leave value inaccessible.

"COMPLETELY IRRATIONAL"

We have heard it said that the best life is the life "felt" best, that values are "primarily felt," and that self-interest, a half brother of value's, is "an emotional tone." From such points of view one sees value as anti-intellectual. It is yet a long day before value puts on for you an irrational vesture. It is so clothed, however. "All valuation," Mr. Santayana says simply, "rests on an irrational bias."⁸⁷ Horace M. Kallen aims to be more emphatic, and final. "Value is, in origin and character, completely irrational," he says. "... In sum, fundamental values are relations, responses, attitudes, immediate, simple, subjectively obvious and irrational."⁸⁸ So true is this, so evanescent and literally intangible are the values that the attempt to stay them

have only to transfer to the very texture of realization in itself that value which we recognize so readily in terms of human life . . . Realization therefore is itself the attainment of value. But there is no such thing as mere value. Value is the outcome of limitation." (*Event* means "transitoriness combined with limitation.")

⁸⁷ *The Life of Reason* (2nd ed., New York, 1922), v. 1, p. 43; cf., *Idem*, *The Sense of Beauty* (New York, 1896), p. 19: "Values spring from the immediate and inexplicable reaction of vital impulse, and from the irrational part of our nature."

⁸⁸ "Value and Existence in Philosophy, Art and Religion," in *Creative Intelligence* (1917), pp. 413-4; cf., N. Blechman, *The Philosophic Function of Value* (Boston, 1918), p. 48: "What is value? It is an ideal, created by cognition; it is motor, actualized by will; it is need or desire, energized by feeling. It is thus a complex of idealized desire. . . . In its essence it is an inner self-retroactive realization."

within rational bounds "is very dangerous,"⁶⁹ like touching a live wire. (We suggest, even now, that value is not rational or irrational, but that the valuer may or may not be rational.)

We have yet one other description of values or of the value problem which, we think, outruns all the foregoing; it sums up and combines circularity with elemental confusion. Professor Albert Weinberg is the author. "Values simply *are*," Mr. Dashiell had said.⁷⁰ "Values are values," says Mr. Dewey. "Of them as values there is accordingly nothing to be said; they are what they are."⁷¹ Mr. Weinberg surpasses this fideism. He is concerned with fixing, nay, with identifying the problem of value—surely a laudable enterprise for research and thought. He remarks at the outset that "valuation," though so often thought to be, is not the problem of value. The problem of value, he says, is "why values are valued." And the really simple solution is, we value values "for values."⁷²

This is simplicity in everyday dress, but the freshness and charm of it will almost surely be lost on those who have labored to state the problem, let alone to solve it. Yet some naïve persons might ask: If the problem of values is, Why do we value values? and the answer, We value values for values; then what are these values, for which we

⁶⁹ J. F. Dashiell, *The Philosophic Status of Value* (New York, 1913), p. 50.

⁷⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 28. *Cf.*, p. 43: "We may say that *value is a category fundamental to all others.*"

⁷¹ *Experience and Nature* (1926), p. 396; *cf.*, p. 403: "Of immediate values as such, values which occur and which are possessed and enjoyed, there is no theory at all; they just occur, are enjoyed, possessed; and that is all."

⁷² "Value-Interpretation: The Methodological Foundation of a Psychological Discipline," *I. J. Eth.*, v. 38 (1927-28), pp. 46-7. (A friend of ours traveling in the mountains asked a native why a riverside there was called Turkey Bottom, and was told: "That is its name, you see.")

value values, themselves valued for? And they could always be answered, in a way, by another revolution of the circle.⁷³

SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER

And yet something may be said for the circle. It is the most perfect line. Because it comes back upon and ever repeats itself it has at once a finish and a possibility of renewal which the straight line never approaches.

We sum up now what it seems may justly be concluded from these circular, confused and vague definitions of value.

1. This way of defining seems to furnish presumptive argument against a philosophy of value altogether. It is at least premonitory of much thought on "values."

2. It seems, too, a real and powerful confirmation of Professor Moore's contention that in spite of spades and shovels value must remain within the circle.⁷⁴

For our part we shall attempt to show in due time that, because of particular experiences, constructing a philosophy of value is a valid enterprise, and we accept and shall try to maintain the position—it may be a middle way—that the very stuff at the bottom of value, i.e., being, is itself not definable; for every definition must turn somewhere on the concept "is." As Aquinas remarks, being cannot be catalogued in any particular genus or species; and the description of *substance*, for instance, as "what is per se," is

⁷³ Cf., G. A. Tawney, "Purposive Consistency: the Outline of a Classification of Values," in *Essays Philosophical and Psychological in Honor of William James* (New York, 1908), p. 403: "Thus some nine varieties of value arise when the original cycle of immediate experience becomes the objective arc of another experience."

⁷⁴ G. E. Moore, *Principia Ethica* (Cambridge, 1922), pp. 6ff.

more a circumlocution than a strict definition.⁷⁵ Hence being itself is definable only in terms of being, or in a circle—which is not a definition. But being as such is not value; and even pure being, if it can be conceived as without a pull on some derived being, is in an important sense not possessed of value. Accordingly, value may be definable; but, whether definable or not, it may have its place in philosophy.

The presumptive argument, then, is not against any philosophy of value at all, but against some of its current expression. And he who takes to a philosophy of value may delimit it and denominate it as he will, i.e., as any pertinent value problem or human experience making for such problem will allow; for the *auctores* may not claim to have preëmpted the field. Indeed, whatever we may say of the recurrent note of many philosophical problems, the value land—rich though it be—is, much of it, yet virgin soil. Who will may turn his yoke this way.

⁷⁵ *Quodlibet*, 9, a.5, ad 2.

CHAPTER III

CURRENT DOCTRINES ON VALUE

The present chapter is concerned with saying of what, in current philosophical literature, value is thought to be made, and also asks who hammers it into shape. With some light on these subjects we may be able, toward the end of the chapter, to say where value is located and how it is described or defined. These definitions and doctrines will require critical study at the proper time, whereas we consider that those detailed in the last chapter are a sufficient commentary on themselves.

It is perhaps unfortunate that with ordinary existents we have to begin with them as facts, for we can but poorly and ambiguously discover their origin and observe their genesis. But of value it is currently said that this is not so. Value is created by valuing. This should give us opportunity to see the mooted process, creation, under our own eyes. It would seem to be enough, if we but watched the valuation process; for, roughly, this is what is comprised in "valuing." Or again it is said, "consciousness of an object's value . . . constitutes" its whole worth. This, too, should let us in on the very genesis of value. For every day we become aware of the value of objects, though even their existence was not cognized by us before. And if we could—elsewhere in this work—with Mr. Perry or another, know that values and valuations look toward a democratic consummation, that bit of knowledge would be a great treasure. We should then know who in every in-

stance makes values, how he goes about it, and why on a far view he is concerned with them.

We wish to take up only the doctrines which are just now to the fore in value theory, for these, whatever other good points they may claim, have the one inestimable advantage of being alive. To be sure, they raise questions which they do not always solve. And, judging from abundant evidence, we may say that value will furnish problems for many a day to come. The metaphysics of value is a world for labor, the psychological description of it is anything but settled, and classifications of values, so far as these have at all been made, have no finality about them.¹ The current doctrines which we wish to review in this chapter have grown out of the heat of discussion and out of the making of theories of value. The doctrines, none of them unimportant, are these:

A first and very general teaching, nearly pervasive in modern thought, is that value is in the valuer and not in the thing valued; and by some it is said that value need not be the accompaniment of any object. Value floats; existences perhaps are more settled. If you value, you create value. To become conscious of value, is to "constitute" value. We shall, of course, criticize this view.

Second, value may be an individual creation, but more ordinarily it is a social product (as is everything else). And no matter whose creation, its measure is sociality only. Whence its prestige, if not from "a communion of consciousnesses"? Are not two more than one? The question is asked, and the asking might seem to contain the answer;

¹ R. B. Perry's *General Theory of Value* (1926) aims at psychological description. This seems to be the tenor of the work, and so Mr. Schiller has summarized it (in *Mind*, v. 37, 1928, p. 99); yet Mr. Perry himself in his preface says he aims also at interpretation, and that a classification of values is on the stocks and he has it already entitled "Realms of Value."

yet the boyish saying that "Two crows are blacker than one" seems now unlikely and immature. This is a question of standards, however, and is not precisely our field.

Third, not all agree that value is created by valuing; and the dissidents should be heard. Some also who have said that it is so created have, though inadvertently, said that it is not; and this is not without significance.

With these three dominant views stated, we shall call attention to value as a substitute; value stands for substance, truth, reality, and is opposed to fact, science, intelligence. Afterwards, we shall adduce definitions that are much more plausible and important than those stated in the preceding chapter.

AWARENESS OF VALUE MAKES VALUE

"There can be no value," said Bosanquet, "in anything less than a personal consciousness."² One might think the meaning: no valuation or valuing. But Bosanquet did not say this. Now Bosanquet's, as is well known, is rather an extreme idealistic view. But realists likewise have taken it up; and something like this is the opinion of perhaps a majority of current writers on value. The *esse* of value is not its *percipi*, though this is said too; but the *esse* of value is *desiderari*. If one values anything or desires it or appreciates it, this action of his is not a mere demonstration of the object's value: it is its very creation. "If a man does not value fame," Mr. Santayana asks, "what value has it?"³ The simple, relevant answer is, For him none. But this answer is seldom if ever given.

The opinion of Bosanquet on value is of a piece with his theory of reality. Nor is this theory uncommon. It is

² *The Principle of Individuality and Value* (London, 1912), p. 312.

³ *The Life of Reason*, v. 1, p. 246.

briefly this. Reality must correspond with thought. Our concepts are such and such. Let reality come round. This was the conclusion of F. H. Bradley to his greatest work,⁴ and there are more recent expressions of it.⁵ Bosanquet made such view his very method for theory of value. What is "most important" or valuable "in man's experience," he said, is also "most certain" and true: "because importance and reality are sides of the same characteristic."⁶

Mr. Santayana, it seems, has had no difficulty in digesting this theory of the nature and genesis of value. Our desire of anything *lends to it a real value*. It might be a very silly desire, and unfounded. That would not matter; it lends a real value. His exact expression is this: "No doubt any desire, however capricious, represents some momentary partial interest, which lends to its objects a certain real and inalienable value." If this were not so, he adds, then we might say that whiskey is "intoxication in itself" and that it "stands dead drunk in its bottle."⁷ The figure of course is striking but not plainly relevant, and it may be that it misses the precise point; for whiskey, even when taken copiously, is itself never "dead drunk," but it does seem to have an "inherent" intoxicating power. It has that capacity.

And Mr. Santayana has stated his position on value as yet more radical. Desire "lends" value to the thing. And even our awareness of an object's value is the making of

⁴ *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 550f.

⁵ Leonard J. Russell, "Value and Existence," *Proc. of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy*, 1926; p. 305 et passim.

⁶ *Principle of Individuality and Value*, preface, p. v. Cf., H. Rickert, "Zwei Wege der Erkenntnistheorie," *Kant-Studien*, v. 14 (1909), p. 203: "Wir brauchen dieses Wort (Wert), das einen Begriff bezeichnet, der sich ebensowenig wie der des Seins weiter definieren lässt, hier zunächst für alles das, was nicht ist und doch zum Etwas und nicht zum Nichts gehört."

⁷ *Winds of Doctrine* (New York, 1926), p. 146.

its value. This might seem a contradiction; but it is stated so. "Our consciousness of an object's value, while it declares the blind disposition to pursue that object, constitutes its whole worth."⁸ The object, he says, is already possessed of value, and yet our becoming conscious of that value constitutes the object's whole worth, which, we believe, is to say that we can make a thing after it already is.

VALUE IS MADE BY VALUING

This is not the famous thesis of Professor Weinberg, that values are "for values."⁹ And it is something stronger than the theory that valuing lends value. As Professor Santayana has just gone on to explain, it is the view that valuing makes value and that the whiskey becomes intoxicated and dead drunk in the drinking.

"Value is created by valuing." This saying of Mr. Prall¹⁰ is the most laconic expression ever given to the thesis, except perhaps Mr. Sellars': "Values are objects valued."¹¹

Mr. Prall, we believe, puts the matter simply and entirely in so few words. Now the theory concretely is as follows. This old gray book on my desk has or has not value according as I value it. No one else knows of its existence. Yesterday I passed it by obliviously, and a fortiori set no store by it. It was therefore valueless. To-day I take it up because of some old memories, and as I do I give it value. I have not discovered any value in it; I could not, for there is none natively in it. It has "acquired" value now by my doing—not a mere conceptual value, but what-

⁸ *The Life of Reason* (1922), v. 1, p. 221; *cf.*, v. 3, pp. 11, 82.

⁹ "Value-Interpretation: The Methodological Foundation of a Psychological Discipline," *Int. Jnl. of Eth.*, v. 38 (1927), pp. 46-7. The question is, "why values are valued"; and the answer, for "other values."

¹⁰ *Study in the Theory of Value*, p. 268.

¹¹ *Principles and Problems of Philosophy*, p. 431; again, p. 454.

ever value it has. It is "invested" now with value, I have "endowed" it with value, I have "created and conferred" value.

I determine value and confer it. And the theory can go farther. I need no existent, real or mental, to which to attach value when I have created it; I can call value out of the blue or the void, and according to many writers I can leave value in this pure, non-existential vacuum and yet stake my life upon it.

This is not caricature at all, but accepted doctrine. Now of all those who allow valuing and the valuer to make up value, quite independently of any object, Mr. Bertrand Russell is perhaps most emphatic. Our valuation, he says, because it is "our valuation" is never wrong. "We ourselves are the ultimate and irrefutable arbiters of value." And more than arbiters. We make value from the ground up. "It is we who create value, and our desires which confer value. In this realm we are kings."¹² And Mr. Russell's is not a lonely voice.

In the earlier days of his concern with theory of value, Ralph Barton Perry took "desire" as the touchstone: if and in so far as any agent desired, it conferred value. But soon and in all these later times Mr. Perry fastened upon the word "interest" as central, and as in some important sense a determinant. Interest here means "affective-motor attitude."¹³ To be for or against something—"It is to this all-pervasive characteristic of the motor-affective life, this

¹² *What I Believe* (New York, 1925), p. 16-7; *cf.*, pp. 32-3: "Outside human desires there is no moral standard": but "large sections of mankind" must concurrently desire. That is, Everybody's doing it: it is thereby good. There is no more popular and saleable doctrine.

This doctrine was not always held by Mr. Russell, though the cause of his changing views is not noted; *cf.*, his *Philosophical Essays* (New York, 1910), p. 11: "Thus good and bad are qualities which belong to objects independently of our opinions, just as *round* and *square* do."

¹³ "The Definition of Value," *Jnl. of Philosophy*, v. 11 (1914), p. 149.

state, act, attitude or disposition of favor or disfavor, to which we propose to give the name 'interest.'" ¹⁴ Again: "By interest, however, is meant dynamic expectation, in which expectation qualifies the act and determines its performance." ¹⁵

We do not know whether motor-affective attitude is a choicer term than mere desire. But the theory itself comes to the same end: value seems to be the result of valuing. Mr. Perry has pretty well avoided, at all times, the extreme idealistic, almost solipsistic view that value moors and shapes reality and that the object, not the valuing or the valuer, must correspond. Yet the valuer, or desire or bias, has always had the primal position, not only in all valuing, but in all value. This is not better, certainly not more simply, stated now than a dozen years ago. "The central fact for this view," he said then, "is the polarity of affective-motor attitudes." ¹⁶ Until some agent experiences this "dynamic expectation," or these "anticipatory responses," toward an object, the object is not possessed of value. The article value begins to be only when interest begins to be.

Professor Perry goes on to wind his definition around this word "interest," and he makes the definition itself the very center of his theory of value; and, it seems to us, he makes value pivotal for all philosophy. ¹⁷ "This, then," he says, "we may take to be the original source and constant

¹⁴ *General Theory of Value* (1926), pp. 115-6.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 264; cf., p. 209: "Interested or purposive action is action adopted because the anticipatory responses which it arouses coincide with the unfulfilled or implicit phase of a governing propensity"; and (p. 183) "the governing propensity" includes "whatever is necessary to initiate effort." Cf., "The Definition of Value," *Jnl. of Philosophy*, v. 11, pp. 149-50: interest is a "general type of reaction," a "subject's liking or disliking."

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 149.

¹⁷ We show this elsewhere: Philosophy of nature and of "mind," in Mr. Perry's theory, lead up to philosophy of value, and philosophy of

feature of all value. That which is an object of interest is *eo ipso* invested with value. Any object, whatever it be, acquires value when any interest, whatever it be, is taken in it." Value thus has its "original source" in anyone's or anything's interest in anything. "This is value *simpliciter*,—value in the elementary, primordial and generic sense." And this he puts down as the "center of reference and point of departure" for the theory of value.¹⁸

Interest, bias or desire calls value into existence. However gracious this is of it, it is no new doctrine with Mr. Perry. "To like or dislike an object is to create that object's value."¹⁹ *General Theory of Value* is more elaborate than this, but it could not be less equivocal. "As value arises from a relation to interest, so moral value arises from the complexity and mutual relations of interest."²⁰ The object, in this theory, is seldom left out; but it is our liking that creates and confers value. "It is the primary relation of desire that endows a thing with value."²¹

It is with an exact justness that Mr. Maurice Picard has said that "both consciousness and environment are factors in the experiencing of values."²² This is pointed, and there is no confusion in it of value and the experience of value.²³ Mr. Perry has well observed too that "value in the generic sense has to do with a certain constant that we

conduct and of religion follow. Theory of value, perhaps, is all philosophy in this system.

¹⁸ *General Theory of Value*, pp. 115-6.

¹⁹ *The Moral Economy* (New York, 1909), p. 15; cf., "The Definition of Value," *Jnl. of Philosophy*, v. 11, pp. 157, 153.

²⁰ *Present Philosophical Tendencies* (New York, 1921), p. 333.

²¹ *The New Realism* (New York, 1912), p. 141; cf., p. 148: "In order that a thing shall be valuable, it must be object of desire."

²² *Values: Immediate and Contributory* (New York, 1920), p. 119.

²³ This is perhaps what Bosanquet meant when he loosely said (*Individuality and Value*, p. 135) that presence in a consciousness is a "sine qua non of all values"; or at least it seems to be what he should have said and meant: a sine qua non of valuing or the experience of value.

may call *bias or interest*.”²⁴ “Has to do with” is the important phrase here; and it should never be jumbled with “is” or “is made by.” Still, we must note that this has constantly been done in current theory of value; “has to do with” too easily goes over into “is.” And such view seems unreasoning enough when one considers that though I have to do with the President or the moon or Buenos Ayres, I am none of these and am made by none of these. We may remark that Mr. Perry’s entire theory is possible only because he has forgotten this wise early statement of his. And Mr. Picard, in explication of the truth just expressed by him, goes on to say: because “values are relations of interests between conscious activity and environment.”

Here, as is repeatedly the case, valuation or valuing or the experience of value is confounded with value. Of this we shall learn more in a later chapter.

The saying of Dr. Schiller,²⁵ that value is a question of what is good or bad, or thought so, for the chooser, the agent, for me, illustrates the theory that value never exists independently of present choice and a present valuer. So does the oft-made statement that value lies essentially in a selection, or Mr. Brogan’s statement that value hinges upon a preference.²⁶ So too of Mr. Leighton’s claim that the person is “the source and bearer of all values”;²⁷ Mr. E. Jordan’s, that all values are grounded on the “will-life” of “the human individual”;²⁸ and Mr. Montague’s, that theory of cognitive value, if it is to live, needs existence as

²⁴ “The Definition of Value,” *Jnl. of Philosophy*, v. 11 (1914), p. 149.

²⁵ “Value,” Hastings’ *Encyclopedia*, v. 12, p. 586.

²⁶ A. P. Brogan, “The Fundamental Value Universal,” *Jnl. of Philosophy*, v. 16 (1919), pp. 96-7: when we deal with “any value characteristic, we are at bottom dealing with the relation better”: or “worse.”

²⁷ *The Individual and the Social Order*, p. 350.

²⁸ *Forms of Individuality* (1927), p. v.

the breath of its nostrils, yet that theory of conative value needs not this but only "the nature of the conscious individual."²⁹

The upshot of this review of current philosophy of value is that the *esse* of value *est desiderari*. Mr. Santayana for instance has, again in these days, said so. The All of Hegel, he says, has no value: because it is "responsive to no living desire."³⁰ I may judge that Leonardo did a picture: this is judgment of fact. Yet I may like the picture; and "this," says Mr. Perry, "is the central fact. . . . It constitutes the value."³¹ "Man creates his values and is the maker of his truth."³²

There is value nowhere, unless someone values. "I do not find worth in others or in myself, I *attribute* it to them and to myself." Felix Adler says this, although he has explained that "value is subjective" and "worth is objective."³³

This subjectivistic opinion, as stated by the authors quoted in this section and especially as stated by Mr. Perry, will be criticized below.³⁴ Meanwhile, it is exceedingly im-

²⁹ "The Neo-Realistic Conception of Value," *Ph'phcl Review*, v. 23, p. 186.

³⁰ *Soliloquies in England and Later Soliloquies* (1922), p. 207. We do not know how this statement and the whole of Mr. Santayana's philosophy of value are to be housed with a seeming correction of his (*ibid.*, p. 248). We return to this.

³¹ "The Definition of Value," *Jnl. of Philosophy*, v. 11, p. 161; cf., D. S. Robinson, *The God of the Liberal Christian* (New York, 1926), p. 103: "It is admittedly true that whatever value objects in nature have comes from the fact that we want them." W. K. Wright, "The Evolution of Values from Instincts," *Ph'phcl. Review*, v. 25 (1915), pp. 166-7: "The roots of value are to be found in the primary instincts": the roots, not of valuing, but of value.

³² H. O. Taylor, *Human Values and Verities*, p. 36.

³³ *An Ethical Philosophy of Life* (New York, 1918), pp. 125, 117; cf., p. 125: "I create the ethical manifold," which is "a total manifold and a total identification," and seems to be a closed if cosmic system.

³⁴ See, in Chapter Six, the sections entitled "Centrality of the Agent" and "Criticism of the Subjectivistic Position."

portant to keep in mind the difference between valuation and value: the former is in the agent, the latter is in the object. The two must be kept distinct.

VALUE AS SATISFACTION

Value satisfies a liking. That anyone who has studied the question or who observes, or takes a look at his own experience, will deny this we very much doubt. Yet it is less precise and scientific to say that value is satisfaction. "Value," Mr. Alexander has said, "is not mere pleasure, or the capacity of giving pleasure; but it is the satisfaction of the valuer. It satisfies the liking for knowledge, or for doing, or producing."⁸⁵ That is, value satisfies a liking (at least, it sometimes does). Therefore, value is satisfaction. Now this, we should say, is unwarranted. Beer satisfies a liking, so do sunsets. Still, it is hurried and inexact to conclude that beer and sunsets are satisfactions; it is juster to say simply that they are objects which satisfy. Mr. Adler has noted this with precision: "That has value which satisfies our needs or wants." Ever so much better also than Alexander's dictum is Bosanquet's identification of value with "satisfactoriness."⁸⁶

VALUE A SOCIAL PRODUCT

Whence else the prestige of values, we are asked, if they are not "products of a sort of synthesis of consciousness"? Says M. Bouglé: "I rest my judgment upon a certain number of habits, a certain ensemble of rules, certain ideal forms which are not my personal achievement. I discover them in the society in which I live." "But if they impose them-

⁸⁵ *Space, Time and Deity*, v. 2, p. 308.

⁸⁶ *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, pp. 297, 317.

selves in this fashion, is it not because they are, in a sense, the work of this same society?" And "if they are imperative, is it not because they are collective? Where could they obtain the compelling prestige . . . if not from the special force which emanates from the coming together of consciousnesses?" The author then gives the stages in the evolution of this collective imperative—the mob, the revival, the regiment, the nation, society: and this is "to arrive at collective consciousness."³⁷

It is true that M. Bouglé afterwards tries to introduce human liberty "against all collective authority," and from the efforts he makes and the difficulties he has, we may judge that perhaps the deification of sociality has set him a false problem.³⁸

For Professor Perry, the motor-affective attitude is the "central fact" in value; but a sheer sociality, so very good as to be hypothetical and never to have been on land or sea, is the final aim, the "standard and end" of all values.³⁹ Durkheim combined these views of Mr. Perry and M. Bouglé, and set up society as the first maker of values, the standard and measure of values and the final purpose of them.⁴⁰ And this is the conclusion, it seems, of Mr. Sellars. He says: "The basic principle is that values are objective because imperative and imperative because collective. It is society that creates values. They express social aspirations or ideals."⁴¹ Mr. S. Alexander's central values or "these

³⁷ C. C. A. Bouglé, *The Evolution of Values* (tr., by Helen Sellars, New York, 1926), pp. 14-16, 27, 31, 37.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 149-50, 182, 250-1, 256-7.

³⁹ *General Theory of Value*, pp. 659, 688-9, 682.

⁴⁰ *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (tr. by Swain, London and New York), pp. 440-447: Society is "the finis naturae—the ultimate creation of nature."

⁴¹ R. W. Sellars, Introduction to Mrs. Sellars' translation of Bouglé's *Evolution of Values*, p. xxxv; cf., p. xxxii: "Now at certain intense moments society creates ideals which influence and control the lives of individuals."

experiences of apprehending truth or error, goodness or evil, beauty or ugliness, are the culmination and the most potent variety of the experiences of coöperation and helpfulness, or conflict and dissidence." The values "involve relation to the collective mind, and what is true, good or beautiful is not true or good or beautiful except as so combined with the collective mind. . . . The mind which appreciates value judges it coherently with other such minds and is a standard mind"; "values are therefore mental (and the tertiary qualities are even human) inventions": they depend on mind "and are its creation through social intercourse."⁴²

We do not enter upon the social-individual problem in this work. Yet we may note that Spencer's unmitigated individualism is as lopsided and unlivable as Comte's and Durkheim's mere sociality. Description, as surely as interpretation—which always depends on description—counsels the remanding and even the scrapping of both these views. Man is individual, and as Saint Thomas says, also social; he needs social life in order to live and especially in order to live well.⁴³ The individuality of human life, however, can now bear some stress. As Sir Henry Jones so well says: The good "cannot be willed except privately" and "we cannot commit one another's right and wrong actions."⁴⁴

VALUE AS OPPOSED TO SOMETHING

In our day Mr. Perry has said, in the Huxleyan fashion, that to be moral we must attack the cosmos, be mordant

⁴² *Space, Time and Deity*, v. 2, pp. 240-5; cf., *Idem*, in *Mind* (1892), p. 55: "Value is nothing but the efficiency of a conscious agent to promote the efficiency of society"; cf., C. L. Morgan, *Life, Mind and Spirit* (1925), p. 261: all value—as Alexander says—is social.

⁴³ In I *Ethic.* lec. 1: "*juvatur homo a multitudine, ad vitae sufficientiam perfectam; scilicet ut homo non solum vivat, sed et bene vivat.*"

⁴⁴ *A Faith That Enquires*, pp. 68-9, 118-9.

upon it: "Morality is *the massing of interests against a reluctant cosmos.*"⁴⁵ Huxley of course said and felt that evolution of nature was against values, it does seem so indifferent to them; and what he advised and pleaded for was a counter evolution (as if that could really be!).⁴⁶ And Mr. Perry now seems to say that we are effecting this, that we are taking things pretty well into our own hands, that man—through science—holds the reins of destiny. This, he says, is largely what the coming of theory of value "reflects."⁴⁷

The point is that value seems to oppose something, to be a substitute for something. As to what this something might be, there are various opinions. Mr. Perry proceeds to suggest that value is put in place of "the hope of a life to come." Mr. Sellars says that values ought to take the place of God.⁴⁸ J. S. Mackenzie has substituted value for almost any of the stock terms in philosophy: for end, good,

⁴⁵ *The Moral Economy* (1909), p. 14.

⁴⁶ *Evolution and Ethics*. A good statement of Huxley's famous thesis is in Laing's *Study in Moral Problems*, pp. 147-8. Dewey, *The Quest of Certainty* (1929), pp. 18, 41, thinks the bearing of things valued on things known is the most urgent of all practical problems.

⁴⁷ *General Theory of Value*, pp. 11-16; *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, pp. 331-340; cf., H. W. Carr, *Changing Backgrounds in Religion and Ethics* (1927), p. 221: Man, the outcome of the ages, finds himself—he knows not how or why—"awakened to the consciousness that his destiny is somehow placed in his own hands."

Lewis Mumford, *The Golden Dawn* (New York, 1926), pp. 15-8: This choice of immediate value began—not fifty years ago as Perry says—but in the Thirteenth Century: "Immersed in traffic," the citizen "began to forget his awful fate in eternity; instead" he watched the clock, and "accepted tomorrow as a substitute" (pp. 185-6): "I am not sure but that this search for anæsthetics may prove in the long run the clue to the Nineteenth Century."

For our part, we neither accept nor reject one theory or the other; we cite both as interesting. We may say that it is at the bottom of our theory of value that every limited thing looks perpetually for immediate satisfaction: this isn't an affair of today or yesterday, but of time; for us to fail of this pursuing for an instant were to perish—just as for one, in walking, not to put out a foot is to fall.

⁴⁸ *The Next Step in Religion* (New York, 1918), pp. 7, 10, 213.

purpose, ideal.⁴⁹ George Arthur Wilson says that value equals external world, equals energy, equals substance, "or any other usable term."⁵⁰

Value opposes science, Mr. Urban has pretty plainly said.⁵¹ Or in every instance it flouts intelligence and rationality.⁵² It is a what ought-to-be. "Values are what 'ought to be.'" ⁵³ The business of valuing hides "an element of Beyond and Not-Yet."⁵⁴ "'Good,' 'Ought' (when applied to ends), 'Value,' 'the End,' I regard as synonymous terms," said Rashdall. "It is implied in the idea of 'good' that it ought to be promoted."⁵⁵

Nor need value be stayed by existence and truth. Perhaps these are forms of value, and this is the prior stuff; perhaps value and valuing are independent of mere existence.⁵⁶ Of this doctrine—of value as prior to existence and father of existence—we say more elsewhere; but it seems proper to remark here that the doctrine of desire or interest as making value, is a step toward value as making reality, or at least as independent of existence; it leans that way. We learn for instance that "reality in the external

⁴⁹ See any of his more recent works: e.g., *Ultimate Values* (1924), pp. 15, 21, 25, 175; *Manual of Ethics* (1922), p. 266; and so on.

⁵⁰ *The Self and Its World*, p. 178.

⁵¹ *Valuation: Its Nature and Laws*, p. viii.

⁵² *Ibid.*; cf., Kallen, "Value and Existence in Philosophy, Art and Religion," *Creative Intelligence*, pp. 413-4; Santayana, *The Life of Reason*, v. 1, p. 43, and *The Sense of Beauty*, p. 19; Dashiell, *The Philosophic Status of Value*, pp. 28, 50; Walker, *The Construction of the World in Terms of Fact and Value*, p. vi; Unamuno, *Soliloquies*, p. 200.

⁵³ Laing, *A Study in Moral Problems*, p. 197; cf., p. 208, "What is a good is the bearer of value."

⁵⁴ Tsanoff, *The Problem of Immortality: Studies in Personality and Value* (1924), p. 345.

⁵⁵ *Theory of Good and Evil* (1924), v. 1, pp. 135, 138.

⁵⁶ W. M. Urban, "Value and Existence," and "Knowledge of Value and the Value-Judgment," *Jnl. of Philosophy*, v. 13 (1916), p. 464, 679, 687; cf., J. S. Mackenzie, *Ultimate Values*, p. 58: "Truth is essentially a mode of value and nothing more."

world is value." "The outside world exists for us only as long as we are interested in it. Its reality is value."⁵⁷

It is also said in an article on Value that "philosophical thought has recently consciously been moving from being to value."⁵⁸ Mr. Urban elsewhere says that he cannot accept Meinong's view that value presupposes the existing object, or that feeling of value follows the judgment of existence. To us, nothing is psychologically sounder; and Mr. Urban pretty nearly concedes the point when he admits that "the assumption" of existence or the "Acknowledgment of a Presupposition of Reality" suffices.⁵⁹ Nor are we sure that Mr. Perry though he rejects this objectless value, quite escapes it at all times. He says that some things "are valuable despite their non-existence. We do not wait to be assured of the existence of a thing before we deem it valuable."⁶⁰ Still, it would seem that Mr. Perry means by "non-existent objects" only conceptual or mental objects and not non-existents.⁶¹ And even Mr. Santayana, who at various times has let value play loosely with existence,⁶² has now in these later days seemed to rescind such view. He had often enough said that existence is irrelevant to

⁵⁷ G. A. Wilson, *The Self and Its World*, pp. 170, vi.

⁵⁸ Urban, "Ontological Problems of Value," *Jnl. of Philosophy*, v. 14 (1917), p. 309.

⁵⁹ *Valuation: Its Nature and Laws*, pp. 38-48. To us, it is not at all plain that Mr. Urban, in this extended passage, has made his point; it seems to remain true that as Meinong said, valuing presupposes an existent. The test, as we note elsewhere, is not Meinong's or anyone's word, but the experience. Bosanquet's saying, *Individuality and Value*, p. 300, that "where we have interest, and so far as we have it, we have implication in reality," of course makes reality hinge upon valuing (and upon our concept).

⁶⁰ *General Theory of Value*, p. 24.

⁶¹ *Ibid.* See also "The Definition of Value," *Jnl. of Philosophy*, v. 11 (1914), pp. 154, 159.

⁶² *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion* (1900); *The Sense of Beauty* (1896); *Life of Reason* (1922); *Winds of Doctrine* (1926).

values, but an old criticism by William James comes but now (it seems) to his attention, and it makes him reconsider. James had said: "How fantastic a philosophy! as if the 'world of values' *were* independent of existence. It is only as *being*, that one thing is better than another."⁶³ Mr. Santayana now, though not infrequently in the interim he had said otherwise, says that he had in mind only the *idea* of things, and that the idea of one thing is as good as another, if its effects are; he had "mildly" protested that "the existence of God," for instance, would "have a considerable value in itself"; and he asks, "Is it I who am indifferent to the being of light?"⁶⁴

We put these down as interesting revisions. But we must say with regret that Durkheim seems to have died impenitent. He said that the "world of values" is independent of the world of existence, and for this reason:

*"Toutes (les théories) supposent également que la valeur est dans les choses et exprime leur nature. Or ce postulat est contraire aux faits. Il y a nombre de cas où il n'existe, pour ainsi dire, aucun rapport entre les propriétés de l'objet et la valeur qui lui est attribué. Une idole est une chose très sainte et la sainteté est la valeur la plus élevée que les hommes aient jamais reconnue. Or une idole n'est très souvent qu'une masse de pierres ou un pièce de bois qui, par elle-même, est dénuée de toute espèce de valeur . . . une même chose peut ou perdre la valeur qu'elle a ou en acquérir une différente sans changer sa nature: il suffit que l'idéal change."*⁶⁵

⁶³ *The Letters of William James* (ed., Henry James; Boston, 1920), v. 2, pp. 122-4. The letter is dated April 2, 1900, to G. H. Palmer, and criticizes Santayana's *Interpretations*; cf., William James, *Some Problems of Philosophy: a Beginning of an Introduction to Philosophy* (New York, 1921), pp. 44-5: in all philosophy, one begs or assumes being: "You are the same beggar whatever you pretend. You leave the riddle untouched, of how the coming of whatever is, came it all at once, or came it piecemeal, can be intellectually understood."

⁶⁴ *Soliloquies in England and Later Soliloquies* (1922), pp. 247-8, 259.

⁶⁵ E. Durkheim, "*Jugements de Valeur et Jugements de Réalité*," *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, v. 19 (1911), pp. 442-4.

Value, he concludes, cannot in any sense go along with the object, but is made by valuing. The evidence, he says, is empiric and historical. How many peoples—not persons, of course—have laid their days and their lives at the foot of some wooden god or divinized pile of stone! And yet doesn't anyone know that such object will not bear the weight of so great worship? Therefore, value is seen to be independent of the existent and to hang upon the valuer: the valuation makes the value.

It is proper, even now, to note the primal misapprehension on which this subjectivistic theory of value leans. The real object of course could not bear up so great a value, but the persons—or peoples—did not adore the real object. For will-action can tend toward either what is truly good or what appears to be good.⁶⁶ Such is the just explanation, because it is the whole answer taken out of the experience and out of observation. Did Durkheim fail to see this everyday truth which he failed to express? At any rate, we may hope that the prowess of Durkheim's name does not rest upon his view of value which, historically and psychologically, is mistaken.

AMONG THE DISSIDENTS

It would seem then that for some an object is a *sine qua non* of value, but that an assumed object, or an "if-object," or a "non-existent object" would serve. Yet you might, they believe, have objects interminably and have never an ounce of value. Others, as Durkheim, wish to say that value has no need of any sort of object: our philosophizing "infuses

⁶⁶ I-2, q.8, a.1, c.: "*quod voluntas in aliquid tendat, non requiritur quod sit bonum in rei veritate, sed quod apprehendatur in ratione boni.*"

existence with value,"⁶⁷ or man's "vision reveals *value* as the key to existence."⁶⁸

In an extraordinarily pointed article on Value, Mr. O. C. Quick has said that reality "for the mind" is always essentially conjoined with value, because it must possess some "importance" to be noticed at all. "Still," he says, "it is psychologically false to say that this importance *constitutes* the reality; for the mind is always and immediately aware that the importance is *derived* from the nature of reality as such—otherwise it completely vanishes."⁶⁹ We may with good reason notice a statement of Dean Inge's. "A value-judgment," he says, "which is not also a judgment of existence is in the air. Existence itself is a value, and an ingredient in every valuation; that which has no existence has no value."⁷⁰ Mr. James Lindsay asks us to "remember what a unique form of objectivity value is. We must beware of predicating value of value, as sometimes happens, without any being or reality to which value belongs. Reality is the support of value, and all these values must be grounded in a supreme objective Reality. Value does not hang in the air."⁷¹

Other writers seem to correct themselves unwittingly and to be unable to maintain the view that value is in every

⁶⁷ Kallen, "Value and Existence in Philosophy, Art and Religion," *Creative Intelligence* (1917), p. 467.

⁶⁸ Nathan Blechman, *The Philosophic Function of Value* (Boston, 1918), p. vi.

⁶⁹ "The Humanist Theory of Value: a Criticism," *Mind*, v. 19 (1910), pp. 227-9; cf., Münsterberg, *The Eternal Values*, p. 45: (a) we must take "immediate experience as a starting-point" (which seems likely enough) but strangely, (b) "we must recognize the human will as the centre of every search for reality," and (c) "yet we must recognize that this will is bound by absolute and necessary eternal values."

⁷⁰ *Outspoken Essays* (New York, 1921), p. 271; cf., pp. 270, 277, 21, 29. If we may judge from these passages, it is curiously said that Inge puts value above existence. Yet it is said: cf., Sellars, *Principles and Problems of Philosophy* (1926), p. 444.

⁷¹ *Great Philosophical Problems* (1922), p. 35.

instance made by valuing. Thus Mr. Picard defines values as "relations of interest between conscious activity and environment," and he makes out that "it is when the living creature reacts to its environment in a roundabout way, when some factor appears within the organism and overcomes opposition, that we can first say that a contributory" or objective "value is present"; though he has said that "contributory values have a measure of independence of any one individual." And yet his entire view of such values is that they are in the objects waiting to be tapped: an apple, he says, is of value as food and a pen as an instrument for writing when and if anyone should ever have need of them.⁷²

The saying that "value is created by valuing" is Mr. Prall's and he keeps pretty well to this point of view, following Mr. Perry. And it is hard to keep to. He says that since "we are interested in living at all, we impute value to life"; and "that anything properly is said to have value in case, and only in case, it is the object of the motor-affective response which we call in general liking or disliking, or which we call being *interested* in." "The being liked or disliked of the object is its value."⁷³ However, he plainly and laudably says: "Until *some* subject like the object, the object has only potential value, and it has potential value only so far as it is *capable* of being liked."⁷⁴

An extreme example of the real difficulty of keeping to the subjective view—the view of value as "exclusively located in desire—" is contained in a recent article by Mr. Dewitt Parker on "The Notion of Value."⁷⁵ In a very few

⁷² *Values: Immediate and Contributory, and Their Interrelations* (1920), pp. 119, 39-40, 8-13.

⁷³ *A Study in the Theory of Value* (1921), pp. 268, 179, 215, 227.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 245; cf., p. 243: "Actual value would then imply the relation; potential value would simply be the possibility of the relation."

⁷⁵ *Philosophical Review*, v. 38 (1929), pp. 304-310. Cf., p. 305: "We

pages he intertwines at least two very different opinions, the objective and the subjective. The object as "either serving or capable of serving conscious desire or need," he says, has value; "the value of bread corresponds to a certain chemical composition which makes it fit for food." These statements certainly say that value is *located in* the object, and unless we misread them they say that value *is* the capacity or fitness of the object to serve desire. But from other statements, this objective view would seem almost to be inadvertent. For Mr. Parker says: "Values belong wholly to the inner world, to the world of mind"; "value resides in the mind"; it has "its exclusive location in desire"; "value itself does not appear until desire is being satisfied." Value is "any interest in any object"; "value is always an experience, never a thing or object"; "value is the complete experience of satisfying desire."

DEFINITIONS OF VALUE

Value is beyond and not-yet. "Value is what ought to be," an Ideal. This is to explain the obscure by the equally obscure, and is not more plainly to the point than to say that values are values or that what ought to be is what ought to be.⁷⁶ We cannot see that it helps toward intelligibility, though this is the desideratum.

Value is therefore defined by some other word. "Attitude," Dr. Schiller has said, will cover it. Value is "an attitude assumed toward fact, a weighing of fact in relation

should, therefore, distinguish between value as an attribute and value as an experience, with the understanding, however, that the experience is primary and the attribute a projected derivation."

⁷⁶ Cf., John A. Ryan, *Distributive Justice* (New York, 1927), p. 292: The words "value" and "what ought to be" do not explain each other, or anything. J. Lindsay, *Great Philosophical Problems*, p. 4: To explain Sollen through another Sollen "seems to me a case of *obscurum per obscurius*."

to an agent, and his feelings, desires, interests, purposes, needs, and acts"; and it expresses his approbation or his depreciation.⁷⁷ Mr. Walker of course stood by this attitudinal theory. "Our prevailing attitude to any fact," he said, "is thus the value which we attach to it, its value for us." But it is not at all clear that value is our attitude toward things when Mr. Walker farther remarks, "Value is something of ourselves, which we impose upon things"; for it can hardly be said that we impose our attitude upon things when we select them, entertain them, favor or disfavor them. And indeed the author sums up very well what an attitude toward anything is explicative of: "When the mind begins to value it takes an attitude."⁷⁸ This, we should say, is entirely true. But it does not plainly tell us what value is. Valuing always supposes a relation or an attitude toward what I value; yet it is a little severe on language and experience to say that my relation or attitude to a friend or an enemy is value. And were it true that relation or attitude is value, to say so is but to exchange words; it is, even on the supposition, no revelation, it lets in no great light. "Value is value" or "value is what ought to be" specifies nearly as much.

Among others, Mr. Urban has in one word justly castigated value as attitude or relation. "We are really confusing value," he lately said, "with the relation of value to a sentient subject."⁷⁹

We are not sure that Mr. Urban's own earlier definition of value is not as good as has ever been given. He had said: "An object has worth in so far as it is either desired

⁷⁷ F. C. S. Schiller, "Value," *Hastings' Encyclopedia*, v. 12 (1922), p. 584.

⁷⁸ C. T. J. Walker, *The Construction of the World in Terms of Fact and Value* (Oxford, 1919), pp. 60-65.

⁷⁹ "Value, Logic and Reality," *Proceedings of Sixth International Congress of Philosophy* (1927), p. 290.

or has the capacity of calling out desire." And he more exactly defined value as "funded affective-volitional meaning," having said that "the funded meaning of an object is its desirability, its capacity, under certain circumstances, of calling out desire." "The worth of an object therefore is its affective-volitional meaning, and is given in feeling-attitudes in which there is always an element, transgredient or immanental, of conation."⁸⁰ But whatever the justness of this definition, Professor Urban has abandoned it in favor of value as what-ought-to-be. He now contrasts "the ought and the is—value and existence." And he seems to say that the value of anything is "*worth existing* or ought to be,"⁸¹ and that values or "ideals" in general have the characteristic that *they are* not, but *ought to be*." "Value is not a 'what' at all. . . . It is a 'that'": and the value-judgment says "that a thing ought to be or ought not to be." He believes that a "round square" may be "more or less" valuable, and that "impossible objects, inherently contradictory," such as "changeless or unmixed happiness," have "a value connotation."⁸²

Value thus turns out to be what ought to be, and this—as we noted—is a lamp which, even more than value as relation or attitude, needs trimming before it will flood the problem with light.

So what we have left in current expression is value as "interest," "relation of interest," "object of interest." Mr. Picard has said that "values are relations of interests between conscious activity and environment"; and he also has said—what is perhaps another thing—that value is "a

⁸⁰ *Valuation: Its Nature and Laws* (1909), pp. 39, 53, 36, 95.

⁸¹ "Value, Logic and Reality," pp. 286, 293.

⁸² "Value and Existence," *Jnl. of Philosophy*, v. 13 (1916), p. 464; "Knowledge of Value and the Value-Judgment," *ibid.*, p. 679; and "Ontological Problems of Value," *ibid.*, v. 14 (1917), pp. 314-5.

situation" "marked by interest."⁸³ Mr. Prall too, it would seem, tangles value up with relation, liking and interest. He says (and we underscore): "What is liked or disliked *has* value"; "the being liked, or disliked, of the object *is* its value"; and he finds it "fairly adequate to define value as constituted in a relation which occurs only where there is a motor-affective attitude"; and at last he says "just what value is, in fact . . . it is *the existence of an interest relation* between a subject and its object."⁸⁴

We are inclined to think that value is not here plainly and indubitably defined. Which statement of Mr. Prall's are we to take? Or are we to take all of them and make value several very different things at the same time?

Mr. Perry's object of interest is *eo ipso* invested with value; at times, as we saw, liking or disliking an object, did "create that object's value"; and liking "constitutes the value." Also, he had said, "the primary relation of desire" endows "a thing with value."⁸⁵

And after all, we may fairly ask, what is Mr. Perry's definition of value? Does the object *acquire* value when any interest is taken in it? Does the liking *endow* the object with value? If so, how can the object which has acquired value or been endowed with value, be value? Mr. Perry has lately said that "any object of any interest is *eo ipso* invested with value"; and yet the chapter in which this defining appears is entitled "Value as Any Object of Any Interest."⁸⁶ The object of interest is value and at the

⁸³ *Values: Immediate and Contributory* (1920), pp. 119, 39.

⁸⁴ *A Study in the Theory of Value* (1921), pp. 242, 227, 250, 254; cf., p. 213: "Value is fulfilment of interest." "Interest would seem to name the attitude of a conscious organism towards that part of its environment that it selects to react upon," p. 207.

⁸⁵ *General Theory of Value*, pp. 115-6, *The New Realism*, pp. 141, 147-8.

⁸⁶ *General Theory of Value* (1926), ch. 8; "Value as Any Object of Any Interest"; the other quotations are from this chapter, pp. 115-6.

same time is invested with value, it is value and it "acquires" value. We are what we acquire, or what we are "invested with." This will not do. I am never that with which I am clothed, nor is anything that with which it is clothed.

If the object is invested or endowed with value, it is not value. In no instance are you that with which you are invested, and in no instance is anything that with which it is invested. "Is" must not be equated with "is invested with." The terminology is unscientific and inexact, and not plainly unambiguous. If Mr. Perry meant to say that the object of interest is invested with value, he could not have meant to say that the object of interest *is* value, and if he meant to say that it is value he could not have meant to say that it is merely invested with value. Yet he did say both. He put value down "as any object of any interest"; and yet he also said, "That which is an object of interest is *eo ipso* invested with value," and that any object "acquires value when any interest . . . is taken in it."

If Mr. Perry possibly means, as the chapter heading announces, that value is any object of any interest he goes on throughout the chapter to disregard this and thereby to dispute it. The chapter heading itself is not accidentally as it is: it is integral with the volume, and worded so as to be of a piece with thirteen other chapters. And as he goes along elaborating (a footnote⁸⁷ is the best part of this) he only locates value and tells when, in his view, it appears: any object under these circumstances is garmented with value, value under these circumstances is round about the shoulders of the object, and the object acquires value when interest is taken in it. This may indicate exactly where

⁸⁷ Note 3, p. 115.

value is and exactly when it appears, but it does not define value.⁸⁸

The phraseology is not precise and beyond question. We wait for the definition of value. Perhaps it is "any object of any interest." But for the present, Professor Perry has compromised this.

And this is not all. Professor Perry goes on to give a third definition or equation for value, and it is not like either of these two. Value, he says, is a relation, "Value is thus a specific relation into which things possessing any ontological status whatsoever, whether real or imaginary, may enter with interested subjects."⁸⁹ This may be quite true. But if so, then the other stated definitions are false. A relation is not the object, that is, one terminus of itself; nor is it anything investing that terminus. Relation of interest is not the object of interest, and it is not any character of that object. Yet Mr. Perry has said that value equals object of interest equals relation of interest equals acquired character of interest-object. He has said that the object of any interest "acquires value," is value, "takes on a certain value," is "invested with" value; that value is "the peculiar relation between any interest and its object; or"—strange "or"!—"that special character of the object which consists in the fact that an interest is taken in it"; that "value might be defined as *the relation of any object* to a valuing subject"; and that "values are held to be functions of certain

⁸⁸ Professor Perry has begun by saying, p. 17: "The fundamental problem of theory of value is to define the *concept* of value"; *cf.*, p. 118: "Theory of value has asked a new question . . . : In what consists value in the generic sense?" With this we have never agreed. The fundamental problem for us has been to isolate the experience of value and to account for it; afterwards, if possible and feasible, it is in order to define: or, if definition be impossible, to locate value.

⁸⁹ *General Theory of Value*, p. 116.

acts of living minds to which we have given the name of interest." ⁹⁰

Some one of these statements may be true; all of them cannot be.⁹¹ Professor Perry has overcharged the category of "interest."

We shall in time question and wonder whether the object puts on a "special character" because interest is taken in it, or whether interest is taken in it because of a special character. This will lead us into a Study of the Value Relation. At present, we only note that common sense would say that I take an interest in this old book—have a "motor-affective attitude" toward it, if you will—because of some character or quality of the book, and that in reality the book takes on no new and special character because of my interest in it. And we also remark that Mr. Perry's equation will have to be negatived right through: object does not equal interest-character of object and does not equal relation to object. For "the nature of relation," as Aquinas says, "lies strictly in this, that it is *ad alterum*," ⁹² that is to say, relation is not in either term, but is between term and term; the value relation being between agent and object. And relation, he says, is not a character or quality inhering in one of the terms. It is a different thing, "and the difference is this: that quality and quantity are certain accidents which remain in the subject; but relation, as Boetius says, does not mean anything as remaining in one of the terms,

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 116, 125, 115, 124, 139; *cf.*, p. 124, interest is "constitutive of value in the basic sense."

⁹¹ It must be that Mr. Perry uses "object," as well as "value," in varying senses. It is defensible, certainly, that the object or objective, that for which I act, is not ten dollars a day or an education, but the value of these things. In this stricter sense, as we shall see, value is one end of action: it is one term of the value relation.

⁹² C.G., 4, c.14: "*Propria relationis ratio consistit in eo quod est ad alterum.*"

but something in a kind of transition to the other."⁹⁸

What we now say, whether we like to say it or not, is that value has not been surely defined. We have just examined the best proffered definitions, and they do not answer. And of course we shall have to abandon as inconsequential the several "definitions" and descriptions of value adduced in the second chapter. Some of these are so confused and wandering as to show no compelling nexus with reality, and others are so evidently circular as to make no progress. Those writers also who oppose value to existence might quite justly be dealt summarily with, for the reason, advanced by themselves, that their philosophy of value is not in any real or existential realm. These facts indeed make us the more loath to renounce the definitions reviewed in the last few pages. But whatever we may like or dislike in the matter, we must say that, whether definable or not, value has not been profitably and surely defined. The doctrines and definitions of the present chapter will continue to receive attention throughout our study.

We turn now to the ways of going from "values" to God, not because we consider it precisely a part of the problem but because some philosophers of our times do.

⁹⁸ *De Potentia*, q.7, a.8, c.: "Relation in hoc differt a quantitate et qualitate: quia quantitas et qualitas sunt quaedam accidentia in subjecto manentia; relatio autem non significat, ut Boetius dicit, ut in subjecto manens, sed ut in transitu quodam ad aliud."

CHAPTER IV

FROM VALUES TO GOD

IMPORTANCE OF THE QUESTION

We shall see that it may be said with something like wisdom that the greatest thing in our universe is its functioning, perfect as this may be.¹ Yet this is an imperfect perfection, destined, science and rational thought are fairly well agreed, to go up in smoke, to have come and gone like sunstarts on a stream.

What man ever wants to know is whether there is not something imperishable even among the things that perish. It is a day's work, admittedly, to keep going, and the great question becomes whether we or anything about us shall in the end be able in any way or measure to survive. This is indeed a poignant question for philosophy of value. For all our hunger for cosmic perfection, let us say, and all our striving, for all conation under the sun and the little bit of energy which the sun so nobly expends, shall nothing "be better or be worse" when taps sound? At our best we get so far along in an anxious building up of Good and Beautiful and True, and then we stop short with "values brokenly realized."²

¹ I, q. 103, a. 2, ad 3: "*Finis quidem universi est aliquod bonum in ipso existens, scilicet ordo ipsius universi. . . .*"

² All the world asks these questions. We note at present that Lord Balfour made them part of a challenge (*Foundations of Belief*, ch. 1, "Naturalism and Ethics," 1st edition, New York, 1895) which, we believe, has not been well answered. Other references run through this chapter.

This great question has its own various answers to-day—much as it has always had; and a summary of them is apropos in an expository view of the status of philosophy of value. And we may remark at once that as integral to such philosophy they seem to us out of place.

Mr. Santayana only wishes to say on this subject—and he says it with wistfulness—that Spirit flouts its father and mother, which in the contextual instance seem to be materiality, and that it “refuses to be caught in a vise.”³ Bernard Shaw notes that the Superman is not yet and he is hardly loath to grant that perhaps he never will be, though he is, of all things, the desiderate.⁴ The author of the *Outline of History* says that the immortal stuff is not yet, that maybe God is trying to be born; and he is journalistically hopeful.⁵ Miguel de Unamuno says that he *wants* God and immortality to be.⁶ And Bertrand Russell,⁷ as eloquent as any of them, pens something very like, Woe! Woe!—but by way of compensation he adds, Gather ye rosebuds while ye may.

Now whether any of these or any contrasting view is at

³ E.g., *Soliloquies in England and Later Soliloquies* (New York, 1922), p. 2; *Winds of Doctrine* (2nd edition, New York, 1926), p. vi.

⁴ *Man and Superman* (New York, 1903), p. 114: “The ideal individual being . . . in short, a god.” However (p. 137), the Superman has not appeared; cf., *Misalliance* (New York, 1914), p. 60: “Creatures are experiments. The precise formula for the Superman, *ci-devant*, The Just Man Made Perfect, has not yet been discovered. Until it is, every birth is an experiment in the Great Research which is being conducted by the Life Force.”

⁵ *Marriage* (New York, 1913), p. 478: “Suppose the immortal stuff isn’t yet, isn’t being but struggling to be. . . . Just confused birth-cries.”

⁶ *Essays and Soliloquies* (New York, 1925), p. 157: “I wish that God may exist”; and (p. 200) “it is a question of affective value, and against affective values reasons do not avail.”

⁷ “A Free Man’s Worship,” *Mysticism and Logic* (New York, 1925); printed also in *Philosophical Essays* (1910). Of science itself as savior Mr. Russell has his doubts. *Icarus: or, the Future of Science* (London, 1925), pp. 62-3, 6-7: it gives “men more power to indulge their collective passions,” and it may “prove to have been a blessing or a curse to mankind.”

every point just, philosophy of value—as we conceive it in these pages—does not say. Whether immortal things and God are, and indeed whether anything is, other philosophical sciences will have to tell. Study of value takes existents for granted and as it finds them.

Yet the quotations cited are enough to show that if the more lasting and greater things exist and in such way as they may exist, they are objects of avid concern; and thus, if they exist and in such way as they may exist, they enter philosophy of value.⁸

How heavily dare we lean on “values brokenly realized”? There is empiric evidence, of course, so far as it goes, that a man gets along pretty well in the valuing game, for a time, and then the curtain falls. And it is of no great relevance to say that “the ego-plasm” carries on.⁹ One answer therefore currently given takes the following form. Man is on top of the world to-day, tasting good, capable of a knowledge of many things and of truth, taking in realms of beauty; to-morrow, he yields. It cannot be, say many modern thinkers. They accordingly postulate an immortality, so that no value shall perish out of this world.

Such is one form. Another is this. I *want* immortality; therefore immortality is also a datum. To round out my desire and best craving and aspiration, God and freedom and immortality are demanded; and it may thus be said that they exist. It is “a moral demand that the universe

⁸ This is our view. It is borne in mind, however, that the saying, “Value is created by valuing,” fits into current theory.

⁹ Robert Williams Gibson, *The Morality of Nature* (New York, 1923), pp. 5, 404-6: “The fact that every new life is but the continuing part of the old germ-plasm” is a “discovery” of “amazing import”; “the egg or germ . . . began the life evolution of its race in the far remote past” and will continue “in the equally remote future”—a “potential immortality.”

should prove friendly to human values.”¹⁰ This, as is well known, is the Kantian groundwork.

These are the ordinary approaches to immortality and God through value or values, and they ordinarily—though not always—suppose that God’s existence antedates our valuing Him. Yet it is not at all plain that to approach God in this way is to discover God; often it is to make God. If we did not want God, if our values—such as they are—were not abbreviated, then we should not know God, and perhaps God would not exist. On the whole, said the author of *Appearance and Reality*, our concepts are the measure: reality must correspond. We force our *a priori* forms upon reality, says a writer of our generation, in spite of the facts to the contrary.

The strength of the argument that anything exists because you want it, plainly is not great. One need not cite instances. And will the brute survive? He makes a stand for life quite as readily and strongly as we do, and on this ground the one significant difference between him and us is that he has no concept of an immortality or, for that matter, of a day after to-morrow.¹¹ But he practically declares for perpetuity. The infant, too—will it be immortal? It has experienced no great taste for life itself, and its aspiration has been null. And it is at least a hysteron-proteron to say, with Mr. D. S. Robinson, for example, that we are “rightly” to emphasize now, not God’s existence, but “His function in human experience.”¹²

¹⁰ Cavendish Moxon, “Modernism and Immortality,” *Int. Jnl. Eth.*, v. 31 (1921), p. 309.

¹¹ Each thing, in its measure and so far as it is able, strives to conserve its being.—C.G., 2, c.79. And to every thing, according to its nature and in its measure, it belongs to seek perfection and self-preservation.—C.G., 1, c.72.

¹² *The God of the Liberal Christian* (New York and London, 1926), pp. 118-9.

Of the argument from our knowledge of good and truth and beauty something better may certainly be said. And even so, we sincerely believe that it is seldom well said in modern thought. Man must continue in order, it is generally urged, to build upon his present higher valuations and in order that values shall not perish or be wasted. If this is the whole of the argument, the child again has little or no chance.¹³ But we do not pursue the point. We only say that when the matter shall be well put in modern tongues, this argument for immortality from values brokenly realized will come back fully to that for immortality from the nature and working of man's spirit.

The argument, briefly, runs thus. Man can at one leap go beyond the space-time bounds, beyond the matter-energy constant, can drink in all beauty from a tiny cup, taste good as good and truth as good, by force of intellect take in all things and in an important sense be all things. This is because everything, so far as it has being, is knowable; hence the saying that mind in some sense is all things.¹⁴ Man grasps the very nature of the good;¹⁵ through force of intellect he gets a hold of the universal nature of the good, and through his will he is moved to the universal good;¹⁶ he knows evil as evil;¹⁷ and he grasps knowledge itself

¹³ Tsanoff, *Immortality: Studies in Personality and Value* (New York, 1924), pp. 243-5, summarizes current thought on this point.

¹⁴ I, q.26, a.2, c.: "*Quod est perfectissimum in qualibet intellectuali natura, est intellectualis operatio, secundum quam capit quodammodo omnia.*"

I, q.16, a.3, c.: "*Unumquodque autem inquantum habet de esse, intantum est cognoscibile. Et propter hoc dicitur in III de Anima, quod anima est quodammodo omnia secundum sensum et intellectum.*"

¹⁵ I, q.59, a.1, c.: "*Quaedam vero inclinatur ad bonum cum cognitione qua congoscunt ipsam boni rationem; quod est proprium intellectus.*"

¹⁶ De Malo, q.1, a.4, c.: "*Intellectualis autem natura sola apprehendit ipsam naturam boni per intellectum, et in bonum commune movetur per appetitum voluntatis.*"

¹⁷ C.G., 3, c.3: "*Omnia autem inveniuntur malum fugere: nam agentia*

as a good.¹⁸ Such kind of creature does not wholly die.¹⁹

It is just, though hardly necessary, to note that the animal has not these experiences. You cannot feed the animal's soul. He fits down into his environment, but he stops in every instance with sense satisfaction.²⁰ And this, properly speaking, is where man begins.²¹

We pass by these most engaging points. For whether man is immortal, bare philosophy of value does not say. It would like to know; it is profoundly interested in the findings of the other philosophical sciences on this point. It takes seriously the datum that our highest experiences seem to be rudely broken off, but whether after all they are not indeed broken off or are knit again or are transcended—this is not for philosophy of value to decide.

Plainly, there are here three conceivabilities. (1) After our several finest experiences in time, comes a blank. (2) After the great turning-point which we call death, the experience runs on. (3) Human experience, high as it is at present, is quite transcended. Now in a blank, philosophy of value can have no interest; but it is intensely interested in a continued experience of such *bona* as we now taste, or in the transcending of them. However, bridging from the experience to the blank, or taking the corner marked

per intellectum hac ratione aliquid fugiunt, quia apprehendunt illud ut malum."

¹⁸ I-2, q.31, a.6, c.: "*Apprehendere ipsam congitionem tanquam bonum quoddam, proprium est hominis.*"

¹⁹ Flewelling, *Creative Personality* (New York, 1925), p. 252, has pointedly said this. "The capacity to function according to a spiritual order, to set his own activities to a higher note, is eloquent of survival."

²⁰ Kolbe, *A Catholic View of Holism* (New York, 1928), p. 37: "Sense is added to responsiveness, and characterises the whole animal world."

²¹ For man's place in nature see Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of God*, pp. 91-108, 210, 237; Sheen, *God and Intelligence* (New York, 1925), pp. 83-86, and "Religion and Values," *The New Scholasticism*, v. 2 (1928), pp. 39-47.

death round which lies the same or other experience, or going, perhaps being taken, powerfully beyond this experience even at its best—with none of these is it precisely the business of philosophy of value to deal. God, undying life, freedom—these are objects of great value, if they exist. Do trees exist? Do we exist? Philosophy of value is the last science in the world (we should say) to tell you whether anything exists. But if things are found to exist and to be wanted, then it begins to be concerned with them.

The present chapter therefore raises problems which philosophy of value, standing by itself, does not and cannot answer. A *summa* would take them in, and conceivably a philosophy of mind and a philosophy of religion would dispose of them. A later chapter—on Values and Disvalues—will consider constructively the relation of value to God.

Theory of value only says, very simply: Furnish me the objects and I will consider the valuing of them and their value; I wish to say how great value each possibly has, why any of them has value to anything and—if it may be—what is value.

Yet because our enterprise in part is to outline philosophy of value as it stands in current thought, we indicate the pervasive, but to us illicit, way that such philosophy has of making up objects by valuing. Objects, it is said, may or may not exist, it is irrelevant whether they do.²² But we value, and this intimate experience of ours is by many thought to have a kind of mandatory effect on reality: we

²² E.g., Santayana, *Winds of Doctrine* (1926), p. 146; Durkheim, "Jugements de Valeur et Jugements de Réalité," *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, v. 19 (1911), p. 443; Perry, "The Definition of Value," *Jnl. of Philos.*, v. 11 (1914), pp. 141ff.; F. H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality* (2nd edition, 1902), conclusion; Unamuno, *Soliloquies* (1915), pp. 200, 207-8, 219; L. J. Russell, "Value and Existence," *Proc. of Sixth Inter. Congress of Philos.*, 1926, pp. 310f.

The exact quotations appear in another context.

make the gesture and existence leaps into view or, to say the least, reality wriggles uneasily and comes to its feet.

For our part, we have submitted that theory of value has nothing to do with proving the validity of existents. Some modern philosophies, however, say that value need not prove the existence of anything, value makes things and establishes their existence. What, more precisely, does value bring into existence? At its boldest reach, it goes beyond the mere postulation of God: our everyday values either improve God, or they are God. From values, accordingly, you may take any of three roads to God:

1. Values demand that God and Immortality be.
2. Values add to the stature of God.
3. Valuation, at its emergent tiptop, is God; and is to be worshipped.

We indicate these paths now, as interesting products of current philosophy of value. But, as we have said, convinced that they are problems which belong to other fields of thought, we shall detail no criticism of them. Of the first and of its possible validity and force we have already said something.²³ We shall now ask the others to state

²³ The argument for Immortality from values and ethical life is well stated by Schiller, *Humanism: Philosophical Essays* (1903), pp. 252ff. "We try to look upon reality as realizing our ideals of Knowledge, Beauty, Goodness and Happiness; and thereby constitute it a cosmos" (p. 259); "life must show itself congruous with our ideals" (p. 260). The argument from values, to God and Immortality, is simple, popular and strong in Jay Wm. Hudson, *The Truths We Live By* (New York, 1921), p. 143: without immortality, "life is a mockery, a contradiction, whose values are shattered and made vain." "And now again, *how much* goodness will satisfy the human spirit?" *how much* truth? or beauty (pp. 145-150)?

The completest and best up-to-date study of immortality is Tsanoff's *The Problem of Immortality: Studies in Personality and Value* (New York, 1924). The best combined study—of value, God and immortality—is, we should say, Pringle-Pattison's *The Idea of God* (1920). Incidentally, it is this author who is concerned (pp. 238-9) about the values "revealed" in our experience, "and brokenly realized there."

themselves. They do this in the two most impellent words of modern times, Progress and Sociality.

THE IMPROVEMENT OF GOD

The Doctrine of Progress

This whole scheme, of God as value or as added to by our values, requires a plastic God. The world yet moves, and why then should not God move? What is or may be is interpreted in *Terms of Fact and Value*.²⁴ And values change with our moods and with the weather. Accordingly, "I see no reason to deny to God the same progressive enjoyment of changing values which is needed to constitute value itself in the long run."²⁵ This had to come. If change is the one eternal and unvarying note of all things and if our valuations go into the making of things, it seems plain enough that change and our valuing had at last to invade God.

It is not a question with us now whether theories of progress have possibly gone too far. We are concerned only with the status of this point in modern philosophy of value.²⁶ Of course, we may note in passing that the doctrines of origination and immortality, banished for a season, return now arm in arm, and with pretty full force, as the doctrine of creativity.

The whole doctrine of progress awaits a competent pen. For the present, as Mr. Santayana remarks with lucidity, "the stream is mighty, and we must swim with the stream."²⁷ Professor Perry, too, who even says that any

²⁴ C. T. H. Walker, *The Construction of the World in Terms of Fact and Value* (Oxford, 1919).

²⁵ A. K. Rogers, *What is Truth?* (New Haven and Oxford, 1923), p. 176.

²⁶ The doctrine of a plastic God is summarized and critically examined by Fulton J. Sheen, *God and Intelligence* (1925), pp. 49-61, 242ff.

²⁷ *Winds of Doctrine*, p. 17.

organism somehow "so acts as to bring itself into existence" and that man through science is responsible for his own destiny, goes on then to admit that the imperative of progress rests largely on an act of faith.²⁸ And Bertrand Russell, when he has asserted that "there must be no fixed goal," for this would be "too dead and static," can only promise that the future will be better.²⁹

Dean Inge puts the dogma of progress into churchly terms. Of "this myth," he says, "we can only say that secularism, like other religions, needs an escatology, and has produced one."³⁰ And with the greatest justness Mr. C. C. H. Williamson, in an article on "Progress," has said: "Of all modern ideas the belief in progress is perhaps the one which has come nearest to the strength of a religion."³¹

There is nothing particularly astounding then in the saying that as man is a "rope" or a "bridge" for the advent of the Superman,³² so God too should be but a stage and

²⁸ *General Theory of Value* (1926), p. 157; *Present Philosophical Tendencies* (1921), pp. 47, 87.

²⁹ *Scientific Method in Philosophy*, pp. 12-15.

Mr. Chesterton has outlined "progress." It implies, first, *something fixed*: "that we have a definite vision, and that we wish to make the world like that vision"; and, second, *something changing*: reform implies form. It needs a *composite ideal*: we must be "humble enough to wonder, and haughty enough to defy."—*Orthodoxy* (New York, 1909), pp. 193-6, 209-10.

³⁰ *Outspoken Essays* (1921), p. 26.

³¹ *Int. Jnl. Eth.*, v. 31 (1921), p. 394; cf., R. B. Perry, *Present Conflict of Ideals* (New York, 1918), p. 60: "Of all the pre-war-time creeds of Europe this is perhaps the one which has been most disturbed by the war."

For the question of evolution, science, progress, as satisfying aim, see Thomas Verner Moore, *Historical Introduction to Ethics* (New York, 1915), pp. 127-9. The problem of progress arises, in part, from our having lost historical sense and a sense of race continuity. Or as Dr. Foerster has said, from the "belief of the modern man that all true wisdom began with him."—*Marriage and the Sex Problem* (New York, 1912), p. 190. It arises, in part too, from the fact that in these times we have in some ways made unprecedented progress.

³² Nietzsche, *Thus Spake Zarathustra* (tr., New York, 1925), p. 29: "Man is a rope stretched between the animal and the Superman"

should ever be in the process of growing up. For our part, progress is our duty: "more than a privilege; it is a duty, to be actively pursued."⁸³ James Bury has noted that the duty of progress has not yet got into the texts on ethics (this might be disputed) but that it belongs there.⁸⁴ Thus it is quite plain that our values are the greatest existents, are—as we shall hear—"sacred," and to be worshiped.

Values Enrich God

Our valuing, we have remarked, is tangled up with our doing. And we shall continue to urge this doctrine; indeed, we have made it our point of departure: in a sense which is certainly important for us, valuing is not separable from doing but is a verifiable phase in all doing. Yet it is something more radical to say that values develop God, bring God out, make God up as they go. This, as part of progress, is "a retail job"; thoroughly pragmatic and workaday.

The "cosmic order . . . is developing through the co-operative contributions (conscious and unconscious) of all creatures. Or to use sharply the older terminology, the God of the world is a growing God."⁸⁵ Man needs to improve the world, said Royce, and he added, even God is in need of "my help."⁸⁶ As our universe grows, we grow; and God grows too. The more one attains personality, spirituality, freedom, "the more profound is the religious feeling of God's reality, the sense of co-warriorship with God and of

What is great about man is that he is a bridge." (Repeated on p. 204).

Felix Adler well asks (*The Reconstruction of the Religious Ideal*, 1924, p. 21): "Why should I be a mere stepping-stone over which the crowd is to pass to its earthly Elysium?"

⁸³ Gibson, *The Morality of Nature* (1923), pp. 198-201.

⁸⁴ *The Idea of Progress* (London, 1921), p. 347.

⁸⁵ H. A. Overstreet, "God and the Common Will," *Hibbert Journal*, v. 13 (1914), p. 172.

⁸⁶ *The World and the Individual* (New York, 1901), v. 2, p. 340.

attainment with Him and in Him.”³⁷ “The purpose of God,” Mr. Whitehead thinks, “is the attainment of value in the temporal world.”³⁸ A friend of Sir Henry Jones says of the latter’s teaching: Man’s “mortal life *is* a real contribution to the nature of things . . . through him the Absolute moves to a higher perfection of its own being, which without him it could not reach. Through his progress, God himself progresses.”³⁹

This seems very likely, since Sir Henry has God “moving from perfection to perfection.” God is in process, though “perfect in process.” He wanted this kind of God, in order that God might be something in the way of a treasury of all our deeds and values: “the realisation of the ideals of goodness in human history.”⁴⁰ And James urged that God could “draw vital strength and increase of very being” from our goodness.⁴¹

Seeing to the Character of God

Sir Henry Jones had some doubts, it seems, about his own God: religion was but an “hypothesis,” “the experiment—the Grand Perhaps of the Universe.”⁴² With Mr. Alexander it need lean on no such supposition. For, Alexander’s Deity is out “in front,” clear of any disaster within the process, yet part of the process.

³⁷ R. Tsanoff, *The Problem of Immortality: Studies in Personality and Value*, p. 379.

³⁸ *Religion in the Making* (New York, 1926), p. 136.

³⁹ H. J. W. Hetherington, “Sir Henry Jones: 1852-1922,” *Int. Jnl. Eth.*, v. 33 (1923), p. 184.

⁴⁰ *A Faith That Enquires* (New York, 1922), pp. 358-60.

⁴¹ *The Will to Believe* (New York, 1912), p. 61.

⁴² *A Faith That Enquires*, p. 79; *cf.*, p. 197: “And the hypothesis with which philosophy is engaged . . . is the Absolute.” P. 113: “Once grant the reality of the moral world . . .”: it might seem that the thing to do were not to grant it. And (p. 78) if God “is perfect in love and power, then the whole realm of things . . . illustrate and establish these truths” (if they are truths). Jones was, of all men, hypothetical.

It is very well known now what kind of creature Mr. Alexander's God is. God is "the being, if any, which possesses deity or the divine quality"; or, perhaps, the beings. It is of some importance then to note that "Deity is an empirical quality like mind or life. . . . Deity is subject to the same law as other empirical qualities, and is the next number in the series." "Deity is thus the next higher empirical quality to mind, which the universe is engaged in bringing to birth." The "series" is: matter, life, conscious life, human life, "angels," Deity, which last quality is possessed by God. When in the series, mind was where deity is now—i.e., on "in front"—mind was deity; and so too matter was deity in its day. Space-Time is back of all this, the great "matrix"; of these, Time is the more primal, a "kind of cosmic *gendarme*" which keeps things moving.⁴³

Now we should not be presently concerned about this being which possesses deity or the divine quality, only that we are said to be responsible for the character of Mr. Alexander's God. God is "an ideal, is always becoming"; is the whole universe in travail, and in such sense "does exist." For, "As an actual existent, God is the infinite world with its" struggling and conation, or its "nisus towards deity."⁴⁴ It is evident accordingly that our choices and lives have to do with the making of God.

Mr. Alexander says this, very plainly. We bear up God,

⁴³ Alexander, *Space, Time and Deity*, the Gifford Lectures, 1916-8 (New York, 1920), v. 2, pp. 347-8, 365, 47.

It is notable, indeed, that Lloyd Morgan, the greatest proponent of Mr. Alexander's metaphysical pyramid, says it runs up excellently, as a pyramid, but that it lacks base, apex, and reinforcement (nisus). *Emergent Evolution* (New York, 1922), p. 14. That is to say, "the chief difficulties" arise in connection with (a) the whence, or a *quo*, (b) the whither, or *ad quod*, and (c) the how, or *per quem*.

⁴⁴ Alexander, "Some Explanations," *Mind*, v. 30 (1921), p. 428, *Space, Time and Deity*, v. 2, p. 353.

he says; we "help to sustain the nature of God"; and God "is involved in our acts and their issues."⁴⁵

Whether General Smuts goes so far as to make God of our doing and our valuing, is not clear. Perhaps he does. "The groaning and travailing of the universe is never aimless." Its "labors mean new creation, the slow painful birth of wholes. . . . The holistic *nisus*" "rises like a fountain out of the depths of the universe."⁴⁶ (This "*nisus*," conceivably, is either from God or to God, though, much more likely, it has nothing to do with God.)

God is thus a result. And the doctrine goes farther. We ought, Mr. Alexander says, to see to the character of God. Beauty, goodness, truth, as he makes them out, are products—of culmination, coherence, coöperation.⁴⁷ God is like this too, a product. We have our responsibility, then: "To do our duty with the consciousness of helping to create his deity." For example, theism does not explain suffering. But "the case is changed if deity is the outcome of the world's movement and in particular, to the extent of their value, of the efforts of human beings. It is not God then who allows the struggle, but the struggle which is to determine, it may not be at once but in the end, what deity is to be." "God is then not responsible for our miseries . . . but rather we are responsible for our acts, seeing that on the issue of them depends in their measure the character of God."⁴⁸

These statements seem clear enough. Mr. Alexander, however, when questioned by Mr. Broad,⁴⁹ answered: I do

⁴⁵ *Space, Time and Deity*, v. 2, p. 398; cf., H. W. Carr, *Changing Backgrounds in Religion and Ethics* (New York, 1927), p. 86: "The idea of God which emerges from the conception of creative evolution is vague and formless."

⁴⁶ J. C. Smuts, *Holism and Evolution* (New York, 1926), pp. 344-5.

⁴⁷ *Space, Time and Deity*, v. 2, p. 240.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 399-400.

⁴⁹ C. D. Broad, "Mr. Alexander's Gifford Lectures," *Mind*, v. 30 (1921),

not say we "ought" to regard the ever-emergent qualities, with deity always at the top, with religious reverence, but that such is the way we do regard them: "no ought but a fact."⁵⁰

It seems in any event that God is a product of our values. Pure Creativeness is God; and man "is morally responsible to the race for assisting in the movement of spiritual creative activity"; he "should assist the quest of creative freedom."⁵¹ We achieve some good; therefore, God is allowed—is accepted "under acknowledgement."⁵² By our experience, we postulate God; and our experience should be such that in the end we may be proud of the God we produce. The tenor of our everyday choices pretty well foretells what the God of the next stage will be like.

We sort out our experiences making God what we will of them. Mr. J. S. Mackenzie is "inclined" "to define the highest good as a perfectly ordered universe apprehended and chosen as such."⁵³ Is our creating beauty and enjoying it the "only ultimate value? In a large sense of the term, I think this may fairly be maintained."⁵⁴ And at the last,

pp. 25f., 129f.: It seems (first) that space-time will go on producing ever higher complexes "with new and wonderful qualities," and (second) "that we ought to regard these . . . with something of the reverence which religious people feel for their God. But . . . the main relations of" plant to animal as its god, "is that the latter eats the former when it can"; cf., H. F. Hallett, *Mind*, v. 31, pp. 221-3: "Why should I love infinite Space-Time with its *nisus* to Deity?" Such a God lacks "responsiveness."

⁵⁰ "Some Explanations," *Mind*, v. 30, p. 428; cf., p. 430: We know not why qualities emerge—we may only "note the facts and be grateful."

⁵¹ J. W. T. Mason, *Creative Freedom* (New York, 1926), pp. 15, 225-6.

⁵² C. Lloyd Morgan, *Emergent Evolution*, p. 9.

⁵³ *Manual of Ethics* (1922), p. 270; cf., *Idem*, "Constructive Philosophy," in *Contemporary British Philosophy*, v. 1, pp. 242-3: the "good life" consists "essentially in the effort to create and conserve what is beautiful."

⁵⁴ *Idem*, *Ultimate Values*, p. 141.

J. W. Scott (*Int. Jnl. Eth.*, v. 35, 1925, pp. 437-9): If creative imagination and its objects are not values to be vindicated, but "*themselves the vindication* of our higher values," the valuable hardly has a "standing

Mr. Mackenzie has a great deal of uncertainty about God. "Professor Alexander may be right in thinking of Deity as at the end." Mr. Fawcett may be right in his deity "as present and active from the beginning; though this does not preclude a development in the divine."⁵⁵ He believes in creation of creators, too;⁵⁶ and this is perhaps more significant for philosophy of value.

God then must fit in with the "democratic urge." He must be made up of our valuing, of the choice of the majority, or He is not God. In fact, God is "the social will."⁵⁷ Or, at least, "The God of the future must be a democratic God."⁵⁸ And not God or anything else must be fixed, frozen hard at the back of beyond,⁵⁹ but thoroughly pragmatic, made up while you wait.

GOD AS SOCIETAL VALUES

Progress, then, is God. But suppose that Society, or "the social will," were God. The greatest existent plainly is God; no one will dispute this. And society is the greatest existent.

"Not the idea of God as an individual," says Felix Adler; "... we have replaced the God-idea by that of a universe of spiritual beings interacting in infinite har-

in the domain of 'what is.'" This, he notes, is not the road to where Mr. Mackenzie wants to go. Yet Mr. Mackenzie has trod it before. See his *Elements of Constructive Philosophy* (1918), p. 291.

⁵⁵ *Ultimate Values*, p. 52; also in *Mind*, v. 30 (1921), pp. 455f., and v. 31, p. 536.

⁵⁶ *Contemporary British Philosophy*, v. 1, p. 246.

⁵⁷ E. S. Ames, "The Validity of the Idea of God," *Journal of Religion*, v. 1 (1921), p. 480; *idem*, *Religion* (New York, 1929), pp. 132-4.

⁵⁸ J. R. Geiger, *Some Religious Implications of Pragmatism* (Chicago, 1919), p. 48; *cf.*, p. 54: theology is "a science of social values."

Sellars, *The Next Step in Religion* (1918), p. 162, declares against any "monarch."

⁵⁹ Douglass Fawcett, *Divine Imagining* (New York and London, 1921), p. 95.

mony.”⁶⁰ M. Levy-Bruhl makes this clearer and more direct. “In the religions of the past, salvation lay in union with God; in the positive religion salvation is to be found in union with humanity.”⁶¹ A “communion of consciousness,” says M. Bouglé, is the last inch he can reach; and plainly he must rest there.⁶² Kropotkin declared for “solidarity,” and he gave the reason: “regarding all nature as the result of . . . physical forces.”⁶³ This also is plain.

That “society be in equilibrium with itself”—this is the desiderate, so Mr. Alexander has said.⁶⁴ And when Mr. Mackenzie asked why, particularly, this should be and what the moral force of it,⁶⁵ Mr. Israel Levine answering for Alexander said that this is one of the patterns, and that we can but “trace and reconstruct the patterns.”⁶⁶ Mr. Alexander too had more recently explained that “Value depends on adaptation, and adaptation is an a priori character.”⁶⁷

Religion is devotion to the highest values, and the best and greatest aim is to be a “loyal member of the Beloved Community.”⁶⁸ Or it is our “first-hand reaction . . . to the whole of reality, the expression of the reality and supremacy of the Highest Values.”⁶⁹ Our values, says Mr. Sellars, are to be worshiped. We have been loyal to God long enough. The next step is loyalty to human values. “The very attitude and implications of worship,” he says,

⁶⁰ *An Ethical Philosophy of Life* (1918), p. 126. As a youth, Mr. Adler thought “of the Moral Law as that which answers to and should replace the God-idea,” p. 10.

⁶¹ *La Philosophie d'Auguste Comte* (Paris, 1900), p. 392.

⁶² *Evolution of Values* (1926), pp. 27-37.

⁶³ *Ethics: Origin and Development* (tr., New York, 1924), pp. xiv-xv, 288.

⁶⁴ *Moral Order and Progress* (1899), pp. 18, 142-3.

⁶⁵ *Manual of Ethics* (1922), p. 252.

⁶⁶ *Reason and Morals* (Glasgow, 1924), p. 120.

⁶⁷ *Space, Time and Deity* (1920), v. 2, p. 312.

⁶⁸ Leighton, *The Individual and the Social Order* (New York, 1926), p. 347.

⁶⁹ *Idem, Religion and the Mind of Today* (New York, 1924), p. 200.

"must be given up. In their place must be put the spiritually founded virtue of loyalty to those efforts and values which elevate human beings." "*Religion is loyalty to the values of life.*" Salvation, in the new Humanist's Religion, will be man's "loyal and intelligent union with those values and possibilities which have come within his ken." Mr. Sellars speaks with the earnestness of a true American, or reformer: "What the world needs today is a rational enthusiasm for human values."⁷⁰ Curtis W. Reese and others take up this theme and affirm their view "with great passion." Humanism, they say, "takes evolution seriously and finds in creative synthesis an explanation of moral and spiritual matters." They name the values, which are as "an army with banners": medicine, education and economics. And they define worship: "a wistful, hopeful, expectant attitude of mind."⁷¹

PROFESSOR PERRY'S STATEMENT

It is the saying of Mr. Alexander that by our being "good," i.e., by our acting with the compact majority, we make God good: we see to "the character of God." We might reasonably ask, of course, But how if many "concurred" in what we now call "evil" acts, as indeed they could and sometimes do concur? Would God, who is a variable, then be a monster? No, that could not be; for our acts, by falling in with the acts of many, would *eo ipso* be good, and the resultant God would be of "good character."

⁷⁰ R. W. Sellars, *The Next Step in Religion* (New York, 1918), pp. 7, 10, 215; cf., E. S. Ames, "Religious Values and the Practical Absolute," *Int. Jnl. Eth.*, v. 32 (1922), p. 359: "New and vital movements in religion . . . make the values of a democratic-scientific order the genuine and dominant values of a new religious faith and hope."

⁷¹ *Humanism* (Chicago, 1926), p. 36; *Humanist Sermons* (Chicago, 1927), pp. viii, x, vii.

For the point with Mr. Alexander is that God is only made better by our good acts. Professor Perry is more fundamental than this. He makes God from the ground up out of our everyday acts.

Mr. Perry says with Mr. Alexander that the only test of greater values is the doing and choice of the greater number. Other tests there might be, such as greater intensity in the doing. But the numerical test, the touchstone of "inclusiveness," is final. And it points to God. Even, it is God. The greatest values of the greatest number—this is God. The will of the majority—Mr. Perry suggests a two-thirds majority—is "sacred"; it may be taken as standard: "An agreement of good wills . . . is better than anything else, and may be taken as standard and end." And it is on the strength of this, that Mr. Perry lays the whole weight of a categorical imperative.⁷²

This aggregative valuation or democratic choice—this is God. There is no greatest good, no "culminating satisfaction" unless for the poetic spirit.⁷³ Yet at least greater than "anything else" is harmonious goodwill. And even so, Mr. Perry seems to define a greatest good: the all-inclusive and harmonious system of interests, "an all-benevolent will, or a benevolence of which all persons are the object . . . a will resulting from the catalytic action of universal benevolence within the chemism of that complexus of appetites and desires that is rooted in the organism."⁷⁴

⁷² R. B. Perry, *General Theory of Value* (1926), pp. 615-6, 659, 672-3. The categorical appears on p. 682: "Cultivate that kind of will that is qualified to bring harmony by its universal adoption."

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 85.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 659.

Sidgwick, *Methods of Ethics*, p. 32, declared that he knew no justification for the transference of chemistry to psychology. Nor (we may say) to value.

The measuring of good by addition or multiplication—which gives, said Bradley (*Ethical Studies*, New York, 1911; p. 145), "a futile and bastard product"—has troubled Mr. Perry himself. As early as 1914,

This is standard and end, and sacred. "The demand that God shall be a person is only the last of the anthropomorphisms. . . . When persons live in accord the total result is something more than a person." Mr. Alexander is said to be quite right "in insisting that deity shall be conceived as a type of emergence which is *founded* on personal life."⁷⁵

"God is the totality of values," Mr. Spaulding has said.⁷⁶ This is Mr. Perry's position, and in a sense it is irrefutable. If our values, our everyday choices, are the greatest existent, then they are God. Such argument is not pregnable so long as you grant the "if" clause. It amounts to the principle of identity: the greatest thing that is, is the greatest thing that is. It is true, however, (1) that Mr. Perry's God is not a person, (2) that he is not one pervasive God but many tribal gods, often at war with one another, and (3) that he is essentially a time-server and provisional. Yet it is not quite just to say that such God is not actual, but

seeking "a criterion by which superiority and inferiority can be assigned to values," he saw "but one way . . . without abandoning our present definition of value."—*Jnl. of Philos.*, v. 11, p. 155.

This is clearer and more pointed than *General Theory of Value*. It was better also in *Present Philosophical Tendencies* (1912 and 1921), pp. 334-5: "if the fulfilment of one interest is good, the fulfilment of two is better; and the fulfilment of *all* interests is best." Also, in *The Moral Economy* (1909), p. 56: "In two of a given unit of goodness there is more of goodness than in one."

Brightman (Wilm's *Studies in Philosophy*, 1922, p. 56) questions this measure: "Two dinners, or wives, or inches on the end of one's nose, or millions of dollars?"—Are two crows blacker than one?

⁷⁵ *General Theory of Value*, pp. 685-686; cf., E. G. Spaulding, *The New Rationalism* (New York, 1918), p. 517: "If God is personality, He is also more than personality even as the moral situation among men is more than personality."

⁷⁶ *Ibid.* This seems not to agree with the statement (p. 514) that "there is an efficient agent or power to produce all values." God, as the totality of values and yet the producer of all values, lifts himself by his own bootstraps—a very common doctrine but not meant (we think) by Mr. Spaulding.

an *als-ob*.⁷⁷ He is by no means the Anselmian conceptual God or Vaihinger's fiction. He is an actual God—actual so far as he goes, but he has a way of ever going and for that reason is not more than a potential-actual God, like ourselves. He is ourselves in an important sense, for he is what the greater number of us happen at any time to choose.

Mr. Perry thus outdoes Bertrand Russell, in a way. It is the doctrine of the latter philosopher that with our own hands we have raised up the temple at which we worship, but the temple is tenanted of no God, he says.⁷⁸ Mr. Perry cares less for temples; he is concerned about the God, and this, he says, we make with our daily valuing.⁷⁹

This co-created God of Mr. Perry's, we may remark, is a kind of synthesis of current metaphysics. He will do for the pragmatist, whose God (if any) is the product of the day's work; for the more rapacious idealist whose God is woven of desire and to whose concepts reality must conform; for the emergentist, for whom God is coming by intermittent but decisive steps; and for the creativist, for whom God is lifting himself, imperceptibly but really, by his own efforts.

Mr. Flewelling's excellent conclusion urges itself upon us out of all this. "Either God is a" (transcendent) "person," he says, "or that lonely and solitary pilgrim of the spirit, man—alone of all created things known to possess the consciousness of freedom and of moral self-direction,

⁷⁷ Dr. Sheen (*The New Scholasticism*, v. 1, 1927, pp. 189-191) suggests this. It is true, Mr. Perry says (pp. 659, 688) that "the greatest good" or the "all-benevolent will" is "hypothetical and not an historical fact"; but his greatest good is only "better than anything else," "or placed above all other values," and this it is which is "a standard and end" for him, and "sacred" (pp. 659, 682, 672-3).

⁷⁸ "A Free Man's Worship," *Mysticism and Logic* (1925), pp. 56-7.

⁷⁹ Cf., Flewelling, *Creative Personality*, p. 264: God cannot be demonstrated, *because* "he abides within the field of values."

but with the sense of failure mingled with undying hope—is the greatest God there is.”⁸⁰ God is whatever greatest thing there is, whether this be a Supreme Person, or evolution, or poetry, an ensemble of persons and things, or even society or progress.⁸¹ Nietzsche’s question might well be asked by many a one, but his answer is strange and is accepted by no one: “If there were Gods, how could I endure to be no God! *Therefore* there are no Gods.”⁸² It seems that “We are experiments of cosmic forces.”⁸³

CONCLUSION TO FIRST PART

By the test of the introductory statement of the Value Situation and Problem, we may put down now what seems to be the status quo of thought on value. We shall then proceed to a more constructive view.

1. The term “value” has quickly degenerated and become as vague as any in the language. It is irresponsible, not amenable to plain and strict logic.

2. Value has not been well defined. We think this our sturdiest present conclusion. And in the most elaborate current work on the subject, value is not unambiguously defined. One suspects therefore that the value situation has not been precisely apprehended. And at the best, these loose and equivocal definings afford a poor basis for building, or for advance.

3. Many, and even most, recent thinkers allow no defensible sense in which value is not made by valuing. It

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 270-1.

⁸¹ Cf., Durkheim, *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (tr. by J. W. Swain) p. 444: society is this greatest existent, and is therefore God: “The collective consciousness is the highest form of the psychic life, since it is the consciousness of consciousnesses.”

⁸² *Thus Spake Zarathustra* (tr., New York, 1925), ch. 24, p. 98.

⁸³ Earl F. Cook, “The Universe of Humanism,” *Humanist Sermons* (edited by Reese, 1927), p. 130.

will be necessary to examine their attitude. The centrality of the agent, what the object "acquires," the latitude of the terms "value" and "values," even the situation again, and the whole value relation—these are problems set indeed by the primary value datum itself, as well as by current thought on value, and they will therefore form the point of departure and a kind of guide for our constructive study. Above all, the experience of acting calls for analysis.

4. That value, as we experientially know it, points to God is the conclusion of nearly all modern thinkers. The significance of such thinking will hinge upon the God in the case. If this God—as with several writers whom we have just met—is limited and in the long run incompetent like ourselves, then he takes us but a little way toward explaining value or anything else. Yet not all find the God of value, or of "values," so circumscribed. For, as we have remarked early in the present chapter, some thinkers look in a convincing way from value to God, and we are thus very far from throwing their view out wholesale;⁸⁴ but the best way to signify our acceptance or part acceptance of it will be to go on now to a constructive formulation of thought on value in general and in due time⁸⁵ to come to what we conceive to be the just statement of the relation of value to God.

⁸⁴ Among these writers we mention: Brightman, Flewelling, A. C. Knudson, Leighton, J. Lindsay, Pringle-Pattison, L. A. Reid, W. K. Wright.

⁸⁵ See the final chapter.

PART II
OUTLINE OF CONSTRUCTIVE THEORY

CHAPTER V

WHY WE ACT AT ALL

Action and value, action and being, being and value: whatever these conceivably have to do with anything else, they have intimately to do with one another. Values "occur," Mr. Dewey says, "whenever any object is welcomed or lingered over."¹ One perhaps has views about values "occurring," but the statement points to object, action, value. Of the fellowship of these we saw something in the first chapter. Action is fact, and quite as empiric as being itself. Like being, too, it is so close to hand and so common as perhaps to go at times underestimated.

One observing action wants to know what it is for, why there is action. We cannot, in any field of philosophic study, accept lightly the logical despair of Professor Keyser, for instance, who says: "The ethical sentiments are what they are . . . Such why-'questions' are not questions, they are pseudo-questions."² Philosophy and science want to know both the how and the why. "The *how* of a process never dispenses with the explanation of the *why*."³ We accept this latter statement just as it stands and we only remark that if action is the general and even

¹ *Experience and Nature*, p. 400.

² *Mole Philosophy and Other Essays* (1927), p. 117; cf., G. H. Lewis, *Problems of Life and Mind* (New York and Boston, 1875), v. 1, pp. 164-5: "When we know the *how*, it is idle to ask the *why* . . . to ask *why* the molecules repel according to this law, is irrational." Lewis' formula would, if accepted, put a stop to progress in science. Besides, the current advance or retreat of the scientists into metaphysics, indicates that human beings look to the what, the how, and the why.

³ Sheen, *God and Intelligence*, p. 237.

the universal word, then, in philosophy of value, "action" should be used for "process." Of course we are so accustomed to action that we are slow to attend to it and to take it as point of departure in any field of philosophy. Yet these two—action and value—though for æons they rub human shoulders constantly, are the primary data for theory of value. Taking existence now as presupposed, we proceed to look rather closely into action as a bare fact, first of all, and then in its implications.

ACTION AS OBSERVED FACT

We may well have our opinions about *devenir créatrix* and its adequacy, and about a machine that recurrently renews its own motion. But action is observed and continual fact, it is almost the commonest fact. Forces or energies, however constant in sum, are poured here and there piecemeal in monotonous and orderly flux. Motion is not our universe, but ours is a universe in motion.

We begin therefore with action as empiric fact. The philosophic and human question is, Why action? This is a question for philosophy of value to answer—perhaps it is *the* question. Why vital action, for instance? Why conscious action? These are everyman's adventures, maybe too close-up to challenge inquiry. There they are, these kinds of action, and we take them, fideistically, for granted. The animal, let us say, goes prowling through the night seeking whom or what he may devour. What drives him out into the night and the sleet? And what does he bring home with him to store away in his lair? Is there anything in his coming and going to feed philosophy? The quest is certainly an element or factor observable in all life. To call it the Struggle for Existence or the Will to Life or the Evolutionary Appetite is, at most, to name it. The

philosophical mind wants to know, Why? What does action mean? We maintain existence at some hazard and at a perpetual high cost. Why do this? Why not let existence sink? And yet, we cannot!

This is problem enough, then: Why action? Why do things act? I think that any boy might nonplus and vex us with so empiric and simple a question. Is any tenable philosophy to be built on this solid foundation? Or is description—such as we have of it—to be the last word?

Philosophy of value then takes as point of departure observed action. And it may be well to indicate here the ribs of any answer we may make to the questions raised or likely to be raised.

Action as empiric fact is never aimless, it is pointed toward something, i.e., it looks to a particular end.⁴ This end is good and suitable for this agent, and in some important measure is the agent. Moral action is human action. Wherever there is any conation, moral or other, there is an objective on the horizon, an "ad" or relation between agent and object, and there is dynamic value somewhere in the situation. Value therefore is pragmatically demonstrated as often as any conscious thing—perhaps any thing—acts; and action is always observable.

Such *schema*, if we can carry it through, will help toward locating value and, conceivably, toward defining or describing it.

Some things act, says Aquinas, and some are acted upon, some move themselves and some are moved.⁵ Movement

⁴ The value-relation—we shall insist—points in a particular direction. This makes a difference. As Aristotle remarks, it is the self-same road whether you go from Athens to Thebes, or from Thebes to Athens; but you go the other way, I, q.28, a.4.

⁵ I-2, q.6 a.1, c.

(Textual citation is omitted when it is of minor importance or would be repetition or very prolix.)

is thus on the program for all. All things—not men merely or living things, but all in their measure—stand foursquare against disintegration;⁶ in other words, they affirm being. This is necessary to continuity of existence. Certainly, if any empiric thing lives, action is a rigid necessity; and this is true, unless all observation has gone awry. Man we likely thought free. He is free, yet he must act. "Man's will must of necessity will something."⁷ Not man alone; but if anything live, there is no escaping this primal adventure. Everything in nature is on quest for something; for what, we do not now indicate. A native "inclination is the accompaniment of every existent you can think of."⁸ And the will of man, "inasmuch as it is a natural thing," does of necessity go out after something.⁹ "The will wills," says M. Mèrsch. "The necessity of willing is so fatal, that it formulates itself into a truism; it is so perpetual, that we get used to it and never notice it."¹⁰ The penalty of our not willing, or of anything's not willing, were heavy. For "willing" is here referable to more than man's free activity; it includes any inclination of any living thing toward the good things of its environment. It is a propensity, nay, a kind of propulsion toward the *bona* which to this thing are suitable.

The plant when it takes in the air or the moisture may be said to exercise this kind of willing. Such movement therefore is better called by the generic term "appetition," which is a going after, a seeking out, a feeling for, a pur-

⁶ C.G., I, ch. 37: "*Omnia autem appetunt esse actu secundum modum suum; quod patet ex hoc quod unumquodque secundum naturam suam repugnat corruptioni.*"

⁷ *De Malo*, q.6, a.1, c.

⁸ I, q.80, a.1, c.: "*Quamlibet formam sequitur aliqua inclinatio.*"

⁹ I, q.41, a.2, ad 3: "*voluntas, inquantum est natura quaedam, aliquid naturaliter vult.*"

¹⁰ *L'Obligation Morale* (1927), p. 8.

posing or a quest of.¹¹ Such natural appetite is as widespread as individualized being; it is a taste for good, and belongs to every conceivable thing—*cuiuslibet rei*. And of this appetite the will of man in its simplest expression is a particular kind.¹² "To will is a kind of action or change."¹³

Yet perhaps it should even now be noted that the thing desired is not thereby moved, i.e., changed, but any movement is in the subject desiring or in his appetite.¹⁴

Anything, we may say, tends to its own welfare and maintenance, and leans upon the environing good things for the support which these afford, or may seem to afford. All empiric things must do so. There is nothing stagey or forced about their doing this; such behavior is precisely as ineluctable for them as their own being.

That action is empiric fact is not the sum of the observation. Action begins and leaves off under our very eyes. Our present concern, of course, is not with how action begins, but only with why action begins and why it ceases; if any action, why not unvarying action? and if any action cease, why not simultaneously all action? However, the facts are headed another way. As Saint Thomas notes, "It is patent fact that the will begins to will something

¹¹ I, q.78, a.1, ad 3: "*Appetitus naturalis est inclinatio cuiuslibet rei in aliquid ex natura sua.*"

¹² I, q.82, a.1, c.: "*Ipse autem motus voluntatis est inclinatio quaedam in aliquid.*"—I-2, q.8, a.1, c.: "*Voluntas est appetitus quidam rationalis; appetitus nihil aliud est quam quaedam inclinatio appetentis in aliquid.*"

¹³ I, q.59, a.1, ad 3: "*Velle est motus quidam, et intelligere.*"

¹⁴ I, q.80, a.2, c.: "*Appetibile apprehensum est movens non motum; appetitus autem, movens motum.*"

The word *motus* is from *movere*, which in philosophy may mean to change or affect; hence the noun is a very wide generic term taking in volition or the act of the will and intellection or the act of knowing, both of which actions cause real changes in the subject.

which it did not will before."¹⁵ And what is here true of will is true of any inclination or propensity of any living thing whatsoever. Action then is empiric fact: varied action, inchoate, accelerated, retarded, dying action, and action which was real and present but is now only a memory. Action starts and stops, and is ever with us.

ACTION IS AIMED

That we act is a *sine qua non* of our living, and a *sine qua non* of our action or of any acting is that it be for something. Things act and are acted upon, "but always for an end."¹⁶ *Appetitus est inclinatio in aliquid.*¹⁷ The *aliquid* is significant and decisive; without it, the *in* or *ad* means nothing, the inclination or appetition has no relevance and indeed no existence. In every action the "being for which" is as radical as the "being which," that for which an action is performed as critical as the agent.

Man for his part is under the necessity of willing, and therefore of willing something. The will of man, as well as the inclination native to any lower form of life, is born for action, and it needs very little in the way of object to draw out its activity. It is quite possible of course for the inclination, especially in man, to be at any time in the willy-nilly stage with regard to these or those particular goods; but a mere velleity with regard to all things and all the time cannot be maintained. Nay, with regard to all things even for a trice it cannot be reached. The will or the natural inclination is a potential-actual power: just now it is potential toward this or that, but

¹⁵ I-2, q.9, a.4, c.: "*Manifestum autem est quod voluntas incipit velle aliquid, cum hoc prius non vellet.*"

¹⁶ I-2, q.6, a.1, c.: "*Cum enim omne agens seu motum agat seu moveatur propter finem . . .*"

¹⁷ I, q.78, a.1, ad 3.

always and necessarily it is of its nature going over into act. Some persons or peoples are perhaps chiefly "against," that is, they mainly protest. But this cannot mean that they are inactive, unconcerned, devoid of enterprise, and partialities¹⁸: they too, like all of us and like all empiric things are out for some good, some thing, and this they would bring home as, at least immediately, the making of their lives. It would seem then that the living being, by a condition of its existence, must choose good after good—just to keep going at all and alive; though for his part man can also fix upon some more lasting end of action.¹⁹

One does not know anything more everyday and plebeian than action and actors, and that is a good reason why they make an extraordinary and first claim upon rational thought. "And whatever acts," says Saint Thomas, "acts for an end."²⁰ This is plain necessity; on any other terms, movement, action, change cannot be. You may try your hand at acting without a purpose; you thus have a purpose and so far can act. Action without aim, however, is not possible. No one does act or can act except for something; and this is the end. This is the "propter quod," that on account of which anything is done, any first or last step taken. Action itself may be the end of acting, but no one says that this is not a bona fide objective; and thus God is not without an aim in acting and in pouring out His goodness, though He gains nothing by it.²¹

As for man, he must by will hold on to the end or

¹⁸ Cf., Dewey, *Experience and Nature* (1926), p. 437: "Carelessness and routine, Olympian aloofness, secluded contemplation are themselves choices." Santayana, *The Life of Reason* (1922), v. 1, p. 92: "Even the critics are disguised enthusiasts."

¹⁹ *De Div. Nom.*, 7, lec.2; 1-2, q.28, a.6, c.

²⁰ *De Malo*, q.6, a.1, c.: "Movens autem agit propter finem."

²¹ *C.G.*, 3, c.97: "Quod Deus suam bonitatem amet, hoc necessarium est: sed hoc non necessario sequitur, quod per creaturas representetur, cum sine hoc divina bonitas sit perfecta."

forego his nature: his will is under this kind of necessity, just as his intellect must cling to first principles. "For the end is to action what first principles are to thought."²² In thought the essential purchase is the "*forma*" or "that which in any way is"; and in action this is the end.²³ The very first thing which the intellect lays hold of is an existent, whereas the practical reason, which aims at doing something, looks first to good or the end.²⁴

This is true of man and likewise of all things. Everything that acts has in view an object or end, either faces or is faced in that direction. "*Omne igitur agens agit propter finem.*" This is universal law claiming as its subjects both the blind or "natural" agent and the most deliberate. "And it does not matter," Saint Thomas proceeds, "whether the agent know the end or not: for as the target is end for the archer, so it is also the end of the shaft's motion."²⁵ Also

²² I, q.82, a.1, c.: "*Nec necessitas naturalis repugnat voluntati. Quinimmo necesse est quod, sicut intellectus ex necessitate inhaeret primis principiis, ita voluntas ex necessitate inhaereat ultimo finis, qui est beatitudo: finis enim habet se in operativis sicut principium in speculativis.*"

"*Finis in appetibilibus, sicut principium in intelligibilibus.*"—I-2, q.9, a.3, c.

²³ "*Principium autem in speculativis est forma et quod quid est: in operativis vero finis.*" C.G., 3, c.97.

Cf., Gillet, *La Morale et Les Morales* (Paris, 1925), p. 212: "End, from the dynamic point of view of becoming, is what the *forma* is from the static point of view of being: it is only the *forma* transposed from the order of being to that of action; between a nature destined to act for its perfection and its acts which perfect it, there can be no break of continuity."

Cf., J. Ward, *Psychological Principles*, pp. 389-90: "Theory starts from fixed *data*, 'what is,' practice starts from the *agenda* to which these prompt."

²⁴ "*Sicut autem ens est primum quod cadit in apprehensione simpliciter, ita bonum est primum quod cadit in apprehensione practicae rationis, quae ordinatur ad opus: Omne enim agens agit propter finem, qui habet rationem boni. Et ideo primum principium in ratione practica est quod fundatur supra rationem boni, quae est, Bonum est quod omnia appetunt.*" I-2, q.94, a.2, c.

²⁵ "*Omne agens in agendo intendit aliquem finem. . . . Nec differt, quantum ad hoc, utrum quod tendit in finem sit cognoscens, vel non:*

as Saint Thomas says, the effect works both ways at once: on agent and objective: for "the identical effect which the agent aims to produce, the recipient aims to admit."²⁶

And though the governing mind may be remote, the effect is always intended. When I stir up a bit of dust as I drive along, it may not be said that I direct the particles to take up a new and scattered position; for, with regard to them, I intend nothing. Yet it is necessary that any quite insensate mass "be directed to the end of its motion by an intelligence." And "it is not difficult to see how natural bodies, though they have no knowledge, are driven toward and drive toward an end. For they tend to an end as directed to the end by an intelligence, in the sense that the arrow, sent by the bowman, goes to the mark; for as the arrow gets, from the aim of the archer, a propulsion toward a determined end, so natural bodies from the natural movers, from whom they receive their forms and powers and motions, are given an inclination to their natural ends. Whence it is also evident that every work of nature is the work of an intellectual substance: for "the operations of nature are found to proceed in an orderly way to their end, as do actions of a wise man."²⁷

sicut enim signum est finis sagittantis, ita est finis motus sagittae." C.G., 3, c. 2.

²⁶ I q.44, a.4, c.: "Unum enim et idem est quod agens intendit imprimere, et quod patiens intendit recipere."

²⁷ "Omne quod movetur ab aliquo per se, non secundum accidens, dirigitur ab eo in finem sui motus. . . .

"Sic igitur non est difficile videre qualiter naturalia corpora cognitione carentia moveantur et agant propter finem. Tendunt enim in finem sicut directa in finem a substantia intelligente, per modum quo sagitta tendit ad signum directa a sagittante. Sicut enim sagitta consequitur inclinationem ad finem determinatum, ex impulsione sagittantis, ita corpora naturalia consequuntur inclinationem in fines naturales ex moventibus naturalibus, ex quibus sortiuntur suas formas et virtutes et motus. Unde etiam patet quod quodlibet opus naturae est opus substantiae intelligentis . . . et . . . operationes naturae inveniuntur ordinate procedere ad finem, sicut operationes sapientis." C.G., 3, c.24.

It is of some importance to remark that the two ways in which an action may be aimed at an effect or end are these:

1. By the doer himself, as a man directs himself to the place he is going to;

2. By another, as the arrow shot at a determined mark.

Now the one directing must have a knowledge of that to which he directs; and knowing the effect intended, he directs in either of two senses: (1) He can direct wholly from without, as the bowman impels the arrow: and such impulsion "is violent." Or, (2) he perhaps gives to the thing a form, or principle of being, which becomes as native to it as is its own existence; and in this way all empiric things, not having will, have an inclination from within, so that they fit down naturally into their environment.²⁸

Action thus is aimed at an end. But it must be for some determined end. "A man's purpose," says Aquinas, "is some particular good: or no action follows. For the spring of action is not universals, but particular things."²⁹ This is quite as true of other agents as it is of man: "any agent whatsoever reaches out toward some determined thing."³⁰

If this were not so, there would be no agents properly at all, but at most only frozen immobile things. If there were no definite end, and all action were haphazard and chance, man might depend upon nothing and the sciences would become impossibilities, every calculation going awry. Then there would be regularity nowhere, and "this

²⁸ *De Veritate*, q.22, a.1.

²⁹ "In agentibus autem voluntariis intentio est ad bonum aliquod particulare, si debet sequi actio: nam universalis non movent, sed particularia, in quibus est actus." *C.G.*, 3, c.6; cf., H. W. Schneider, "The Values of Pragmatic Theory," *Jnl. of Philosophy*, v. 14 (1917), p. 708: "Objects always function specifically, not in general."

³⁰ *C.G.*, 3, c.3. "Manifestum est omne agens agere propter finem, quia quodlibet agens tendit ad aliquod determinatum."

rather than that would not follow" from any action.³¹ Yet in point of fact we know that this, and not that, follows, and repeatedly follows, even from the action of the most senseless things. With what persistency the moon rides into her place; new moon, half moon, last quarter. Depend upon it, when the times comes the moon will be there waiting, more constant than devotee, or lover, or poet. "If the agent were not in quest of some determined effect, all effects would be indifferent to him" and action itself would be an impossibility. This seeking of a definite end is the solution of the problem of getting off dead center. Looking indifferently upon several contingencies, we do precisely nothing.³²

Now and then we meet one who cannot make up his mind; he starts for the door at last but draws back, with the result that he never gets out into the open air. He has no determination, we say; he is bound hand and foot where he is. He is no doer of deeds. He is drawn in two ways, and so is on short tether and can do nothing. Until he loose himself by deciding, he effects no more than did the hero who jumped on his horse and rode off in all directions. "It is necessary therefore that the agent's conation be pointed toward some determined thing."³³

It is of course *a propos* to note that we may not expect every conceivable effect from every kind of agent. You are such and such agent, you produce such and such effects; but you soon reach the limits of your versatility and

³¹ I, q.44, a.4, c.: "Omne agens agit propter finem; alioquin ex actione agentis non magis sequeretur hoc quam illud, nisi a casu."

³² C.G., 3, c.2. "Si agens non tenderet ad aliquem effectum determinatum, omnes effectus essent ei indifferentes. Quod autem indifferenter se habet ad multa, non magis unum eorum operatur quam aliud: unde a contingente ad utrumque non sequitur aliquis effectus, nisi per aliquid quod determinetur ad unum. Impossibile igitur esset quod ageret."

³³ C.G., 3, c.2: "Necesse est igitur quod conatus agentis sit ad aliquod determinatum."

power. "Such as any agent is, such objective seems good for it."³⁴ This is only to say: Tell me what you are and I'll tell you what you do, or the kind of thing you do is the kind of thing you are. The style, as we all know very well, is a close relative of the man; but so is the matter also. We can sharpen tools to do finer work and turn the plowshare into a sword, but it is by violence that the pen-knife is used for a razor and only the giant, it is said, picks his teeth with the forks of the road. What is meant for any end is shaped according to the exigencies of that end.³⁵

ACTION IS AIMED AT GOOD

Every movement is toward an objective, and this latter is an *ens*, a being of some kind, though perhaps shadowy and unreal. And of *ens* it may always be said that without any real change *bonum* may take its place.³⁶ This truth is more legible when *ens*, as it so often does, has become *finis*: for then it is a dynamic bonum or an urger to action. For good or bonum, in its more general sense, is that which is in any way desirable; and good as functional is that which is sought or wanted in any measure by anything.³⁷

³⁴ 2-2 q.24, a.11 c.: "*Qualis unusquisque est, talis finis videtur ei.*"

³⁵ 3 *Sent.*, d.33, q.1, a.1: "*Unumquodque quod est ad finem, determinetur secundum exigentiam finis.*"

A habit gives you a penchant for doing things in a certain way, for good or for bad; and this it does because "it makes that seem good" which fits in with the habit, and makes that seem bad which is at war with it. Besides, you find a different savor in your breakfast according as you get up with a brown taste in your mouth or with a song on your lips. And much deeper does your *habitual temper* enter into your way of judging. (*Ibid.*)

³⁶ "*Bonum et ens sunt idem secundum rem, sed differunt secundum rationem tantum.*" 1, q.5, a.1, c.

³⁷ "*Ratio enim boni in hoc consistit, quod aliquid sit appetibile.*" *Ibid.*

Ens, finis, bonum—these are, at least in some sense, convertible terms. What is, is good or desirable; and when it is desired, it becomes an actual end or an effective sort of good.

Thus wherever there is action, there is finis or an objective, and there is ens with its accompanying character of bonum. Of these three the last two, ens and bonum, are always fellows, and as often as finis makes its appearance ens stands holding it up, with bonum written across its face, before the agent's eyes.

Now the end is that in which the appetite of agent and mover, or of that which is moved, comes to rest. And the very nature of good is that it be terminus of appetite. Action and movement then in every instance is for good.³⁸ If an agent act at all, we say that he aims at an objective: "which has the nature of good."³⁹ For "good is the proper object of appetite, as sound is the proper object of hearing: so that, as sound is what one hears when one hears anything, it is necessary that good be that at which appetite always aims."⁴⁰ And man's peculiar kind of conation—i.e., will, or "a taste for a foreknown end—tends to anything only as good, and this is its object."⁴¹

Yet indeed an agent can be mistaken. It may act for what

Mr. Perry (*General Theory of Value*, p. 116) wishes to settle the old question whether an object is "good" because wanted, or wanted because "good." Now what is relevant in this matter for theory of value is (a) that things exist, at least conceptually and (b) that I act for them; that is to say, they are the ends of action.

³⁸ C.G., 3, c.3: "*Finis est in quo quiescit appetitus agentis vel moventis, et eius quod movetur. Hoc autem est de ratione boni, ut terminet appetitum: nam bonum est quod omnia appetunt. Omnis ergo actio et motus est propter bonum.*"

³⁹ "*Omne enim agens agit propter finem, qui habet rationem boni.*" I-2, q.94, a.2, c.

⁴⁰ *Opusc.* 62, c.3; cf., I-2, q.10, a.2, c.: "*Sicut autem coloratum in actu est objectum visus, ita bonum est objectum voluntatis.*"

⁴¹ C.G., 3, c.16: "*Nam voluntas, quae est appetitus finis praecogniti, non tendit in aliquid nisi sub ratione boni, quod est eius objectum.*"

seems a good, and is not such; it is enough that the objective appear *sub ratione boni*.⁴² For "every activity is for the sake of something which is good either truly or in appearance."⁴³

Without an end, a particular effect to be achieved, the agent becomes and remains a statue. His dependence on good is precisely the same. If there be no good, there is no tending toward, no conation, no action. "Any conceivable thing," says Saint Thomas, "in its conation and performance makes toward the good only."⁴⁴ "It is of the very essence of will," remarks M. Gilson, "that it does not go into action except for a good"; and this follows, he says, from the very definition of will as a kind of appetite and the definition of good as that which anything desires.⁴⁵

Appetition, which is father of any movement more evident than itself,⁴⁶ does not die but never begins to be unless the subject envisage good. No appetite gets under way or ever takes off, except for a good.⁴⁷

There is no let-up: "all things in the whole world," says Saint Thomas, "are acted upon"; except, of course, the *Primum Agens*.⁴⁸ "They at once act and are acted upon

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ I q.105, a.5, c.: "*Cum enim omnis operatio sit propter aliquod bonum verum vel apparens; nihil autem est vel apparet bonum, nisi secundum quod participat aliquem similitudinem summi boni. . . .*"

⁴⁴ "*Unaquaeque res in sua operatione et conatu non tendit nisi ad bonum.*" I, q.93, a.8, c.

⁴⁵ Étienne Gilson, *Saint Thomas d'Aquin* (2nd ed., Paris, 1925), p. 75.

⁴⁶ Appetition, of which willing is one kind, is a movement: "*Voluntas dicitur movens motum, secundum quod velle est motus quidam, et intelligere,*" I, q.59, a.1, ad 3.

⁴⁷ "*Omnis autem appetitus non est nisi boni.*" I-2, q.8, a.1, c.

⁴⁸ "*Omnia quae sunt in toto mundo, aguntur ab aliquo, praeter primum agens.*" I, q.60, a.1, ad 2.

by something," and are therefore imperfect agents: they aim to acquire something in acting.⁴⁹

All of us and all things are perpetually in quest of good. "All things in their measures are inclined through appetition towards good, but in different ways: (1) Plants and lifeless bodies are inclined toward good by a natural disposition but without any knowledge"; (2) Animals by a sense knowledge and a sense appetition go after a particular good, yet they lay hold of no general principle of good;⁵⁰ and (3) Men reach out for good with a knowledge that grasps the very nature of good; and men therefore "are perfectly (*perfectissime*) inclined toward good . . . not to a particular good merely but are inclined *in a kind of way* to the universal good itself: and this inclination is called will."⁵¹

⁴⁹ I, q.44, a.4, c.: "*Sunt autem quaedam quae simul agunt et patiuntur, quae sunt agentia imperfecta: et his convenit quod etiam in agendo intendunt aliquid acquirere. Sed primo agenti, qui est agens tantum, non convenit agere propter acquisitionem alicuius finis, sed solum communicare. . . .*"

⁵⁰ Cf., Hobhouse, *Mind in Evolution* (2nd ed., London, 1915), pp. 314-7.

⁵¹ "*Omnia suo modo per appetitum inclinantur in bonum, sed diversi modo . . . per solam naturalem habitudinem, absque cognitione . . . cum aliqua cognitione . . . cum cognitione, qua cognoscunt ipsam boni rationem. . . .*" I, q.59, a.1, c.

One *knows* the universal nature of good; but we believe that only the adding here that creatures possessed of will are "quasi," or in a kind of way inclined to the universal good, saves the passage from contradiction to the saying (C.G., 3, c.6) "*In agentibus autem voluntariis intentio est ad bonum aliquod particulare, si debet sequi actio; nam universalis non movent, sed particularia.*"

Aquinas himself, however, stated the whole matter earlier and better, thus: rational appetite goes after things (a) one by one, but (b) according to some universal nature, "as when it desires anything *because it is good.*" (I, q.80, a.2, c). The animal never does this. Besides, it is quite true that we hate the whole class or tribe of robbers (*Ibid.*, ad 2).

That we want particular good things is the experience. Working for the general good of all humanity, or making the world safe for democracy, may do as pulpiteering; but we doubt its efficacy in the day's work.

It is appropriate to ask how the end can be a cause. "For the first principle of action is the end, which moves the agent."⁵² It seems that at least in some instances the end does not yet really exist, and one wants to know how in such cases it can influence activity.⁵³

This question loses just the least bit of its pointedness when we remember that the end is a specific end and a specific good. But the problem remains, and is this: How can anything, though specific and good, be a cause until it really exist? Does the end initially exist as real? These are questions of importance, and we believe they are not to be answered lightly or in a word. Accordingly, we shall answer them; but for the present, we assume what indeed the practical intellect persuades us of, namely, that the end does exercise a pull on the agent. In a concluding chapter we shall look farther to a solution of the whole matter. We may say, however, that it goes toward explaining this point to note—as we now proceed to do—that action affirms life and being, that it is an expression and that it is for the good of the agent.

ACTION IS AIMED AT WELL-BEING

One acts, and of necessity one acts for *finis* and *bonum*. Yet these are broad terms. What, more particularly, is action for? Many good things lie around me, but I pass

The shiboloth sounds good; but practically you go to work for a specific end and good. The man who laid his axe to the heart of the tree to make the world safe (as he understood) for autocracy, probably had more determinate, immediate and tangible goods in sight.

⁵² I, q. 105, a. 5, c.: "*Nam primo quidem, principium actionis est finis, qui movet agentem.*"

The agent itself has a second place as a principle of action, the tools or instruments used have a third (*ibid.*).

⁵³ Hobhouse, *Development and Purpose* (1913), p. 314: "Does the non-existent cause the existent?"

some of these by and perhaps never have a mind to them. I may on advertence admit their goodness, though just to-day at any rate they do not touch me. I admit them as good; useful, as whaling or skiing, let us say, or delectable, as tasting certain wines, or good to the core, as certain acts of kindness. And I leave them as I find them, undone: I revert to an easy posture.

For one thing, of course, I am more or less rigid. My versatility, my scope and capacity have their limits. I know that mountain climbing is good—yes, but for some one else; it is out of my reach. An arduous bonum may beget hope, but if the grade is too steep and the going too rough effort sinks down into despair.⁵⁴ Any desire works out into action only if the objective wear a wreath of possibility: if you are convinced that you can take nothing, you will never join the chase.⁵⁵

I can act up to my capacity, I can act below but never above it.⁵⁶ I am strictly a limited creature—that is why I must act for things, to acquire things.⁵⁷ “Beings would not act *for* an end,” says M. Gillet, “if from the fact of their existence they found in themselves the actual and rounded fulfilment of their appetitions.”⁵⁸

And I do not act for anything which is alien to me. So long as it is such, I can make no move toward it.

⁵⁴ 2-2, q.161, a.1, c.: “Bonum arduum habet aliquid unde attrahit appetitum, scilicet ipsam rationem boni, et habet aliquid retrahens, scilicet ipsam difficultatem adipiscendi: secundum quorum primum insurgit motus spei, et secundum aliud motus desperationis.”

⁵⁵ 1-2, q.40, a.1, ad 3. “Nam appetitis est principium motionis: nihil autem movetur ad aliquid nisi sub ratione possibilis; nullus enim movetur ad id quod existimat impossibile adipisci.”

⁵⁶ “Non est impossibile aliquid agens agere secundum suam speciem vel infra; sed supra suam speciem nihil agere potest.” De Veritate, q.22, a.3, ad 22.

⁵⁷ “Agere propter indigentiam non est nisi agentis imperfecti, quod natum est agere et pati.” 1, q.44, a.4, ad 1.

⁵⁸ La Morale et Les Morales, p. 274.

It is not enough that the thing be and that it be seen to be good. It must, besides, be *conveniens*, good for me.⁵⁹ The agent raises never a hand or foot for anything unless he finds in it a suitableness to himself.⁶⁰ A jaundiced person, for instance, sees everything as a dead yellow and is capable of little action; and even Keats spent much time and maneuvering before Homer spoke out loud and bold to him. For though it is quite primal that the object be or be thought to be, if it is to engender action, and that it be or appear to be good, it must also harmonize with the acting subject. "Appetition is of the good only. . . . But the agent goes out only toward things like itself and suitable to it."⁶¹ And everything has an inborn taste for things fitting to itself.⁶²

The object which is good and suitable to me, must also be like me. "*Omne tendit ad suum simile.*" The point is that no agent aims to defeat himself.⁶⁴

Every empiric thing must act, and act for a good suitable to it and like it; must therefore stand for its own good. It is true that particular goods might lie around me interminably and I never reach for them. Yet necessarily, if I live, I must clutch something; life itself is a kind of center of aggregation or assimilation. And the one good which I must ever seek is my own welfare. If there is put

⁵⁹ *De Malo*, q.6, a.1, c.: "*si aliquod bonum proponatur quod apprehendatur in ratione boni, non autem in ratione convenientis, non movebit voluntatem.*"

⁶⁰ C.G. 3. c.3: "*Id autem ad quod agens determinate tendit, oportet esse conveniens ei: non enim tenderet in ipsum nisi propter aliquam convenientiam ad ipsum.*"

⁶¹ "*Omnis autem appetitus non est nisi boni. . . . Nihil autem inclinatur nisi in aliquid simile et conveniens.*"—I-2, q.8, a.1, c.

⁶² "*Naturali appetitu quaelibet potentia desiderat sibi conveniens.*" I, q.78, a.1, ad 3.

⁶³ *Opusc.* 63, c.3.

⁶⁴ "*Nihil tendit ad suum contrarium: unumquodque enim appetit quod est sibi simile et conveniens.*" C.G. 3, c.7.

before any appetite an object which is good universally or from every point of view, that appetite necessarily wills it: "it could not will the contrary."⁶⁵ Well-being or welfare is such good.

Man sees the particular good "*ut eligible, vel fugibile*": he takes it or leaves it; but the perfect good—i.e., happiness or well-being—"reason cannot apprehend under the aspect of evil or of any defect; and therefore of necessity man wills happiness."⁶⁶ In one sense "we are lords of our actions," in another we plainly are not; among goods which we think lead to the end we exercise power of choice, but from seeking welfare or well-being itself we never let up or swerve, and we cannot.⁶⁷ Where the Law of Contradiction stands in our intellectual life, there stands end or finis in our volitional enterprise. Good, unlike olives, is not an acquired taste. "And from this natural volition all others are caused, for whatever a man wills he wills for the sake of the end. Therefore, love of good, which man naturally seeks as end, is a natural love; and only the love derived from this is elective love."⁶⁸

⁶⁵ "*Si proponatur aliquod objectum voluntati quod sit universaliter bonum et secundum omnem considerationem, ex necessitate voluntas in illud tendit, si aliquid velit: non enim poterit velle oppositum.*" 1-2, q.10, a.2, c.

⁶⁶ "*In omnibus particularibus bonis potest considerare rationem boni alicuius, et defectum alicuius boni . . . et secundum hoc, potest unumquodque huiusmodi bonorum apprehendere ut eligibile, vel fugibile. Solum autem perfectum bonum, quod est beatitudo, non potest ratio apprehendere sub ratione mali, aut alicuius defectus. Et ideo ex necessitate beatitudinem homo vult.*" 1-2, q.13, a.6, c.

⁶⁷ "*Electio autem non est de fine, sed de his quae sunt ad finem.*" 1, q.82, a.1, ad 3.

⁶⁸ "*Omnis enim homo naturaliter vult beatitudinem. Et ex hac naturali voluntate causantur omnes aliae voluntates: cum quidquid homo vult, velit propter finem. Dilectio igitur boni quod homo naturaliter vult sicut finem, est dilectio naturalis: dilectio autem ab hac derivata, quae est boni quod diligitur propter finem, est dilectio electiva.*"—1, q.60, a.2, c.

Cf., *De Malo*, q.6, a.1, ad 20: Intellect, knowing first principles, reduces itself to act "*quantum ad conclusiones*"; and so will, inasmuch

Man's loving a particular good then follows from his love and pursuit of good. His freedom, as Professor DeWulf says, is effective only on goods along the way; he proceeds as best he can on a journey which in its larger outlines was not mapped out by himself.⁶⁹

Persons indeed seem on occasion to sit down and be happy over their miseries, to gloat over them and to nurse them. (The animal perhaps never does this.) But a man is able to hug wretchedness precisely because for the time he has somehow identified dolors with happiness or the one great good. In reality, however, he does not will unhappiness: he cannot. "No man can will to be unhappy, or to be wretched."⁷⁰

The will "is naturally aimed at good," and "cannot but fasten upon it."⁷¹ And "it seems that the will is of necessity moved to nothing which has not (at least) an apparent link with happiness, which is naturally willed."⁷²

The important truth that man or other agent never seeks unalloyed evil we shall consider in a later chapter. But we may now note that evil cannot stand alone, and at its summation is yet a parasite on the good. "If it were integral," Saint Thomas goes on, "it would destroy itself."⁷³

as it wills the end, reduces itself to act "*quantum ad has quae sunt ad finem.*"

⁶⁹ *Mediæval Philosophy: Illustrated from the System of Thomas Aquinas* (1922), p. 108: "Moral obligation consists in the necessity of willing our supreme good, combined with the liberty of choosing the concrete objects wherein it is in fact realized"; cf., *Idem, History of Mediæval Philosophy* (tr. by Mesenger, 1925) v.1, p. 304.

⁷⁰ I-2, q.13, a.6, c.: "*Ex necessitate beatitudinem homo vult, nec potest velle non esse beatus, aut miser.*"

⁷¹ I, q.62, a.8, ad 2: "*Voluntas non potest non adhaerere bono inquantum est bonum, quia in bonum naturaliter ordinatur.*"

⁷² *De Malo*, q.3, a.3, c.: "*Videtur et circa voluntatem, quod voluntas ad nihilum ex necessitate movetur quod non appareat habere necessariam connexionem cum beatitudine, quae est naturaliter volita.*"

⁷³ I, q.49, a.3, c.: "*si malum integrum sit, seipsum destruet: quia destructo omni bono (quod requiritur ad integritatem mali), subtrahitur etiam ipsum malum, cuius subiectum est bonum.*"

We act to preserve what we have or to acquire something.⁷⁴ The firebell clangs this morning, and men saddle flying horses to fight fire. Their action is not a result of a wish merely to extinguish flame, but it is an effort to protect positively good things. We move to save our lives and our property.⁷⁵

ACTION IS AFFIRMATION

The end of ethical science, says Saint Thomas, is human life: *cognito et actio*.⁷⁶ And it would seem beyond peradventure that the living thing declares for, and perpetually declares for, life. The living thing loves life, the conscious being loves living and knowing, the mere existent ever affirms existence.

Being then or existence is a good for all.⁷⁷ The one pervasive good is well-being, and the substrate of this is being, not life or intelligence.⁷⁸ Yet if as agent I have life and consciousness there is no good for me except in the integration of these three; indeed, the very "being of everything consists in undividedness; and so everything that

⁷⁴ "*Omnis actio et motus ad esse aliquo modo ordinari videtur: vel ut conservetur secundum speciem vel individuum; vel ut de novo acquiratur.*" C.G., 3, c.3.

⁷⁵ A man throws a cargo overboard, "not because he wishes *simpliciter* to throw things away, but to save himself." C.G., 3, c.6; cf., Wallace Craig, "Why Do Animals Fight?" (*Int. Jnl. of Ethics*, v. 31, p. 264f.): To protect their own interests, and to be rid of the aggressor; but not, necessarily, to destroy.

⁷⁶ In I *Ethic.*, lec.3; cf., H. C. Neumann, "The Teaching of Ethics," in Klapper's *College Teaching* (New York, 1920) pp.320, 328: "The business of right living" is the aim of teaching ethics; "a truer understanding of life as the result of interpreting it in terms of the obligation to create right human adjustments."

⁷⁷ "*Esse, quia hoc est unicuique bonum.*" C.G., 1, c.96; cf., 1-2, q.94, a.2, c.: Conservation of itself is a good proper to all things.

⁷⁸ "*Semper autem id quod substernitur in rebus, invenitur communius quam id quod informat et restringit ipsum, sicut esse quam vivere, et vivere quam intelligere.*" 1, q.65, a.3, c.

is, as it is vigilant for its being, watches likewise over its unitedness."⁷⁹ And thus "being, life and knowledge are desideratives for all."⁸⁰ So it was a mistake for the poet to think himself "half in love with easeful death."

We all in every move declare for being; and this own good of any thing at all (Aquinas says) may be understood in different senses:

First, in the sense that it is its proper good as an individual; and so an animal seeks its own good when it hunts food whereby it is kept alive.

Secondly, in the sense that anything is the good of the species; and so an animal stands for its proper good in so far as it desires the fathering of offspring or the shielding and protection of individuals within the species.

Thirdly, in a generic sense; and thus an equivocal agent, such as the rain, seeks the own good of those things which it affects.

And fourthly, in an analogical sense of likeness of the originated to its origin: and thus God, who is outside any genus, does on account of His own good give being to all things.⁸¹

This is perhaps better and more tersely stated earlier in *Contra Gentes*, thus: "What all things want is actuality of being, each in its own measure; the evidence for which is that everything fights against disintegration. Actuality of being, therefore, lies at the very heart of the good."⁸²

And this is only to say that we are militant against col-

⁷⁹ The simple being is undivided actually; the composite really has not being until the parts in some fashion come together. "*Unde manifestum est quod esse cuiuslibet rei consistit in indivisione; et inde est quod unumquodque, sicut custodit suum esse, ita custodit suam unitatem.*" I, q. II, a. I, c.

⁸⁰ 2-2, q. 34, a. I, c.

⁸¹ C.G., 3, c. 24, *me*; cf., God is outside any genus, because He is "*principium omnis generis, et sic comparatur ad alia per excessum, et huiusmodi comparationem importat summum bonum.*" I, q. 6, a. 2, ad 3.

⁸² C.G., I, c. 37: "*Omnia autem appetunt esse actu secundum modum suum: quod patet ex hoc quod unumquodque secundum naturam suam repugnat corruptioni. Esse igitur actu boni rationem constituit.*"

lapse, as universal evil. Denial, pure negation, evil is the one ineffective principle.⁸³

For better or for worse—and it cannot be for worse—every action affirms existence. “Every action and movement seems aimed in some way at *esse*: to conserve the individual or the species, or to acquire something *de novo*. And being as such is good.”⁸⁴ It is a conclusion from experience and not a “postulate” that all action is for being: for enhancing oneself or another, or for holding one’s own. And now that we have an unvarying measure of it, we may say that we should know progress if we saw it and that it is unmistakably good.

Therefore, it seems that, though perhaps circuitously, we come to this one point: that *we are endowed* with a power and a necessity *to affirm* actuality. (a) “Endowed,” because it cannot be well maintained either that we always existed with this power and necessity or that, when we were not, we gave them to ourselves. (b) “To affirm”; the power is proved from our use of it, and the necessity from the fact that we ever keep on affirming actuality.

⁸³ “*Omnia autem inveniuntur malum fugere: nam agentia per intellectum hac ratione aliquid fugiunt, quia apprehendunt illud ut malum; omnia autem agentia naturalia, quantum habent de virtute, tantum resistunt corruptioni, quae est malum uniuscujusque. Omnia igitur agunt propter bonum.*” C.G., 3, c.3.

⁸⁴ C.G., 3, c.3: “*Omnis actio et motus ad esse aliquo modo ordinari videtur: vel ut conservetur secundum speciem vel individuum; vel ut de novo acquiratur. Hoc autem ipsum quod est esse, bonum est. Et ideo omnia appetunt esse. Omnis igitur actus et motus est propter bonum.*”

Cf., C.G., 1, c.72: “To every being it is native to seek its perfection and the preservation of itself, yet to each in its own measure; to intellectual natures, through will; to animals, through sense appetite; and to senseless creatures, by a natural appetite.” None of these has an “appetitive power *sui generis*,” and they therefore all “tend by desire to acquire what is wanting to them.”

Cf., Goblot, *La Logique des Jugements de Valeur* (1927), p. 25: “*Ainsi il est bon, pour tout ce qui est, de se conserver et de croître, c’est-à-dire d’être davantage, et il est mauvais de décroître et de périr.*”

ACTION IS AIMED AT THE AGENT

Aquinas views man and every creature as in an elemental sense looking backward and forward to God. Of the reasoning which premisses such conclusion we shall see something in a later chapter. Just now another really basal thought is apropos. It is this: though with unvarying necessity an agent seek well-being and perfection, actuality of being and even God, it also with an equal necessity seeks its own self.

The end of action accordingly is expressible in one word—*ipsemet*. The agent himself is the end of his action.

This statement really need astonish no one. What the agent looks to in his effects is that his own likeness be shared and get abroad.⁸⁵ It is only necessary to recall that every agent as agent declares through and through for actuality of being, and stands persistently for its own welfare and maintenance. Now to collate data saying that everything always acts to intrench itself, to keep what it has or to grow in being, this seems precisely to say that the aim and purpose of the agent's doings is somehow the agent himself. Besides, a small part of this doctrine is a large part of accepted modern educational doctrine: you learn only by association, that is, by linking the new with something that already is yours: "You do not understand what is quite alien to the total complex of your views and wishes which form your nature at that moment. Your nature will not—to speak both literally and metaphorically—take it in."⁸⁶

Saint Thomas begins quite moderately about this point. But he is specific. "The ultimate end of anyone who acts,

⁸⁵ "*Perfectio autem et forma effectus est quaedam similitudo agentis: cum omne agens agat sibi simile.*" I, q.6, a.1, c.

⁸⁶ H. O. Taylor, *Human Values and Verities* (1928), pp.127-8.

in as far as he does act, is himself." This only says: "The end of your every action is you, the doer."

Aquinas does not stop here, however; he runs directly on. "For things made by us we use for ourselves." This is explicative. "And if a man sometimes does something for any other thing, this too he refers to his own good, as useful, or pleasant, or worthy."⁸⁷ Such assertion seems perhaps peremptory. One finds the proof of it only in experience and in the careful observation of every type of agent.

Whether this tenet be right, there cannot be any doubt that it is Saint Thomas's own. For what he is engaged in proving is that God is the consummatory cause of all things, and he elucidates this from the more evident or experimental truth that "the ultimate end of any doer as a doer is the agent himself."

Another statement of this thought, of inductive force too and invoked in precisely the same situation, is this, which is also from *Contra Gentes*: "That which is found in all active creatures naturally, is found necessarily and principally in the first agent. Now all agents do, each in its own measure, love their own works, as parents their children, poets their verses, artisans their handiwork. Much more therefore does God hate nothing, for He is cause of all things."⁸⁸ We seek our own good, our own perfection

⁸⁷ C.G., 3, c.17: "*Finis ultimus cuiuslibet facientis, in quantum est faciens, est ipsemet: utimur enim factis a nobis propter nos; et si aliquid aliquando propter aliud homo faciat, hoc refertur in bonum suum vel utile vel delectabile vel honestum.*"

It should be remembered that the useful may be also the natively good, and that the natively good never crushes the useful, but is its guardian and guarantee. 2 *Sent.*, 21, q.1, a.3, c.; 2-2, q.145, a.3, c., et ad 3.

⁸⁸ C.G., 1, c.96.; cf., Santayana, *Soliloquies in England and Later Soliloquies* (1922), p. 246: "That I am conceited, it would be folly to deny: What artist, what thinker, what parent does not overestimate his own offspring?" James Lindsay, *Great Philosophical Problems* (1922), p.82: "It has been said that Herder, for example, made everything he learned, whether as philosopher, historian or poet, *Herder*."

and accordingly our own selves. We think this a truth legible to any who have well opened their eyes within or without. "Every will naturally wills the proper good of the one willing, i.e., that it be perfect, and it cannot will the contrary."⁸⁹

We all prize the fruits of our toil. Are not they miniatures of ourselves? Act by act, the agent is the end; and if several acts have additive effect, the agent is yet the end. We identify ourselves with nothing but ourselves, and other persons and things also we identify with ourselves. The veriest heeler, turned up almost as an accident on a political machine, does not identify himself with the machine but the party with himself. The lad who chases the superb player up and down the country, does not even in his moments of exhilaration identify himself with that player but that player with himself. Chauvin, though he was brought down, stood one day on the top of the world; and the Queen of Sheba who came from afar to see the king, not improbably beheld a shadow of herself.⁹⁰ The saying therefore that not self-preservation but altruism is the first law of nature seems far removed from experience;⁹¹ and there would seem to be little, if any, empiric or psychological backing for General Smuts' "Impersonal Endeavor Towards the Good."⁹²

One must "find oneself." Negation, ascetism is livable only as some kind of affirmation.⁹³ And one finds oneself

⁸⁹ C.G., 3, c.109.

⁹⁰ Cf., Taylor, *Human Values and Verities* (1928), p. 267: "The adorableness of his beloved (or hers) is a functioning of his own qualities (or hers); a realization of the lover's self."

⁹¹ G. B. Cutten, *Mind: Its Origin and Goal* (New Haven, 1925), pp. 37-8, 111, makes altruistic law "axiomatic"; cf., Kropotkin, *op. cit.*, pp. 16, 50.

⁹² *Holism and Evolution* (1926), pp. 242-3.

⁹³ "The self . . . must fasten itself to the larger world by some attachment that gives a man a reason for continued existence . . . there

only in an object, real or conceptual, but definite and in some way existing before he acts. One acts for a "determined" good, says Aquinas.⁹⁴ The "good of all future generations" is large, but it is also a little loose; and it is doubtful whether anyone ever acts for it, though he may use it as a conceptual entity to coddle and salve his everyday self-seeking. Contrarily, the family is and historically has been the close-up objective in which normal persons may with least danger of delusion express themselves and find their welfare.⁹⁵

The agent of course can and does act for the good of others. My neighbor and me—I can include both of these in my doing, but I cannot exclude the second; and there are all degrees of including my neighbor—so long as I never exclude myself. A man may act for home and club and country, but he must act for himself. The name of Meredith's famous hero in *The Egoist* is indicated by the article "the," since in a relative sense all are egoists; and charity indeed has its first turn at home and, though this seems paradoxical, even when it goes abroad it remains at home.⁹⁶

One may in circumstances advisedly act for the good of others; as it is said that in human affairs the good of the

is nothing complete without love." Hobhouse, *The Rational Good*, pp. 162-3.

⁹⁴ "Quodlibet agens tendit ad aliquod determinatum." C.G., 3, c.3.

⁹⁵ In I *Ethic.*, lec.1: cf., Hobhouse, *op. cit.*

⁹⁶ Cf., John A. Ryan, *Distributive Justice* (1927), p. 146: "Neither legislation nor education can make men love their neighbors more than themselves"; A. LeRoy, *The Religion of the Primitive* (tr., New York, 1922), p. 142: the primitive Bantu "seems to have no other care than to draw from life whatever good it can furnish him and to avoid whatever can bring him harm."

"From this present tense and protective point of view, the primitive directs his acts and fulfills what he believes to be his duty."

Santayana, *The Life of Reason*, v. 5, pp. 246-7: "We are not less autonomous for this assimilation (of others' interests), since we assimilate only what is intelligible and congruous with our own mind."

many is "a thing more divine" than the good of one.⁹⁷ To pour one's self out for others—this is high motivation; for, as we shall see, love thrives upon giving. "For we want a world" says a recent writer, "in which there is such a thing as devotion, loyalty, self-forgetfulness, a direct interest in others, a direct interest *in us*, and the capacity for self-sacrifice."⁹⁸

Yet it remains that you may give all your goods to feed the poor and your body to the strikers and to be burned, and after all prevail not wholly against your own good: for this, from the beginning and throughout, whatever else it be, is your own self. Though you act (as we shall see) always for God, you cannot act for God or any other unless concurrently you act for yourself. The *ipsemet* is your invariable companion, for it is yourself; and though you should run away into caverns so as to leave your shadow behind, the *ipsemet* would go with your every subterranean step. And if this be true, it gives force and novel application to a saying of Baron von Hügel's: You cannot get out of your skin!⁹⁹

The one person whom you can never neglect and whom you ever defend is yourself. Every time I act, I so far declare my justification. This is so even when I deprecate my poor abilities to do or to keep from doing. And if I some-

⁹⁷ "In rebus humanis bonum gentis est divinius quam bonum unius."—C.G., I, c.42.

Cf., In I *Ethic.*, lec. I: "Sciendum est . . . quod homo naturaliter sit pars alicuius multitudinis, per quam praestetur sibi auxilium ad bene vivendum . . . scilicet ut homo non solum vivat, sed et bene vivat."

⁹⁸ F. C. Sharp, *Ethics* (New York and London, 1928), pp. 166-7.

⁹⁹ Friedrich von Hügel, *The German Soul: Its Attitude Towards Ethics* (New York, 1915) p. 72: "We cannot, indeed, get out of our skins; but, within those skins, lie intimations and implications of more than just merely human, or subhuman, realities."

It would seem that H. G. Wells's current prophecy of an absolute altruism as the next step in evolution rests upon a psychological impossibility. See his *Meanwhile* (1927).

times retract or repent, this too is an act, and so far a justification.¹⁰⁰ "All the world seems queer to me but me and thee," said the old woman to the old man; "and sometimes even thee seems queer to me!" But never *me*.

To ask us to express ourselves seems, in a profounder sense, quite superfluous. One cannot live and act without expressing himself. Action is an expression. "Morality, if you please," says Mr. Fite, "is expression."¹⁰¹ So it is. And so is life, and for that matter so is existence. Repression after all is an affirmation: because all action is such. A man, as Mr. Dewey remarks, "never is called upon to judge whether he shall act, but simply how he shall act."¹⁰² "Olympian aloofness" is a choice, and the critics are "dis-guised enthusiasts."

And yet the primal philosophic question remains. Where does this moving universe get its shove and "go"?¹⁰³ How do the individual things of this pluriverse come into existence and begin to act?

I act, for an object, a bonum which is "conveniēns" to me; I act for myself. Yet it is quite traceable that I did not always exist to act thus or otherwise. Consequently, there is no answer to this question unless the inferential step be taken that *finite things are moved,—are in the first instance not agentia but patientia*. As limited agents, though we aim, we are primordially aimed; we are imperfect agents: we act and are acted upon.¹⁰⁴ Our first impulsion

¹⁰⁰ Cf., Mèrsch, *L'Obligation Morale* (Paris and Louvain, 1927), pp. 9-10: Quickly or slowly, I justify my actions; "but, always, justification is made"; the "need of justification is ineradicable"; I must value also, and will: The problem is thus always posed and urgent. Here, no possible neutrality. 12-13.

¹⁰¹ *Moral Philosophy: The Critical View of Life* (1925), p. 4.

¹⁰² *Essays in Experimental Logic*, p. 383.

¹⁰³ A question which Mr. Perry asks, justly and wisely; though he admits that he has no answer to it. (*Present Conflict of Ideals*, pp. 206-7.)

¹⁰⁴ "Unum enim idem est quod agens intendit imprimere, et quod

toward good and our own maintenance and well-being is, like our existence, something with which we are equipped. To ask why we ever act so necessarily for welfare is to ask why we should exist as we do; the urge to welfare is included in our nature, in the pattern according to which we have being. And "we" here includes every finite thing. Any of us who have experience of the animal world may plainly tell you that the brute upon its very birth into this world is already headed toward its own good and preservation: it need not be indoctrinated on this basic and universal business.¹⁰⁵ As Mr. Santayana has convincingly observed: "An initial attitude sustains incipient interests. What we first discover in ourselves, before the influence we obey has given rise to any definite idea, is the working of instincts already in motion. Impulses to appropriate and to reject first teach us the points of the compass, and space itself, like charity, begins at home."¹⁰⁶

Whatever we may say of conation within the non-living thing, life itself as we everywhere experience is a struggle. Moral life and physical life is struggle. Perhaps on no other point is modern philosophy so nearly unanimous.¹⁰⁷ And we cannot begin to explain this struggle unless we admit what is indeed empiric fact: that we are precarious

patiens intendit recipere. Sunt autem quaedam quae simul agunt et patiuntur, quae sunt agentia imperfecta." I, q.44, a.4, c.

¹⁰⁵ I, q.103, a.8, c.: Every inclination, natural or voluntary, is but an impression of the First Mover. Hence, all things do as of their own accord ("*quasi propria sponte*") go on toward that to which they are directed; cf., 2-2, q.155, a.2, c.: These natural inclinations are back of all that follows, especially the preservation of the individual and the species.

¹⁰⁶ *The Life of Reason*, v. 1, pp. 43-4; cf., p. 62 and v. 3, p. 83.

¹⁰⁷ Cf., Ruggiero, *Modern Philosophy* (tr., London and New York, 1921), p. 356: "In this conception of life as a struggle and persistent effort, not as an easy and empty wooing of ideals and Utopias, in this necessity for the stimulus of evil and passion in order that the good may be created, lies all the seriousness of the modern vision of life."

creatures, largely on the defensive, and radically insecure, sure to fall down in the event.

The immediate relevance of the present chapter thus appears. Value—as we at all experientially know it—goes arm in arm with the object, and value is pragmatically demonstrated as often as you or any agent make a drive upon the object. Value, whatever else we come to know of it, is tangled up with the active enterprise; at least with that modicum of action which is known as appetite,¹⁰⁸ preference,¹⁰⁹ feeling,¹¹⁰ perhaps “interest.”

We may now summarize.

1. Ours is a moving universe. It is an expression, as is all action. Morality, if you please, is an expression.¹¹¹ Or, as M. Gilson says, morality is part of a universal movement.¹¹²

2. As Gilson farther shows, all action is like a beneficent boomerang: the agent aims at himself.¹¹³ The objective is never alien to the agent.

3. Action works only on a positive principle, and is aimed only at good. Evil or malevolence cannot interpret the moving universe. (Of this we shall see more.)

4. Does the universe take up, “make up,” direction and aim and meaning as it goes? This seems in no degree likely. It is much more plain and consonant with experience to say that the universe from the beginning has purpose, meaning, direction; and therefore that it is aimed.

¹⁰⁸ Appetition is a kind of action or change. I, q.59, a.1, ad 3.

¹⁰⁹ Brogan (“The Fundamental Value Universal,” *Jnl. of Philosophy*, v. 16, 1919, p. 100) urges that preference, or “betterness” is value.

¹¹⁰ Cf., J. Ward, *Psychological Principles* (1918), pp. 386-7: feeling is psychologically prior to desire.

¹¹¹ Fite, *Moral Philosophy*, p. 4.

¹¹² *Saint Thomas d'Aquin* (1925), pp. 18-9.

¹¹³ *The Philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas* (1924), p. 236. This is Aquinas' own view, as we saw: *C.G.*, 3, c.17.

It is not pertinent to declare with Professor Leighton that the universe has direction plainly enough, though perhaps not a director or a board of directors.¹¹⁴ Nor will it serve to assume with Professor Sellars that the very inception of meaning or purpose is something caught out of a void.¹¹⁵ It is paradoxical indeed, as Mr. Hobhouse has shown, to suppose that mind should put things into order, "while remaining in its own nature essentially anarchical."¹¹⁶

The question of how the end, which is not yet but is to be,¹¹⁷ can be a cause may now in part perhaps be answered. We say "in part," because, so far as we know, this is a question that is well answered nowhere in philosophy; we know *that* the yet unreal can be a cause, but we do not know precisely *how* it can. The objective which is an *ens acquirendum* or *agendum*,¹¹⁸ at least mentally exists; and, as we shall see, it usually exists, in the rough, as actual entity also. That is, the finite agent ordinarily works over materials which he has to take as given; unless indeed, as sometimes is the situation, his whole exercise is in the field of the conceptual.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁴ "Personality and the Metaphysics of Value," *I. J. Eth.* v. 21 (1910-11), p. 328. It is just to say that Mr. Leighton has pretty well outgrown this dubiousness; cf., *Religion and the Mind of Today* (1924), p. 153: "God is the eternally ever-giving and all-comprehending ordering Principle of the whole," and (p. 281) "The Creative and Sustaining Principle of Order."

¹¹⁵ *Principles and Problems of Philosophy*, p. 446: "I cannot—with the best desire in the world—see adequate grounds for this assumption that physical systems are not self-sufficient."

¹¹⁶ *Development and Purpose* (1913), p. 244.

¹¹⁷ This is the meaning of "the Ideal," says Mr. Tsanoff: it is "something beyond and not-yet." *The Problem of Immortality*, p. 345.

¹¹⁸ Cf., J. Ward, *Psychological Principles*, pp. 389-90: "Whereas theory starts from fixed *data*, 'what is,' practice starts from the *agenda* to which these prompt, 'what ought to be.'"

C.G., 3, c.97: "The principle in speculation is the *forma*, or what in any way is (*quod quid est*): and in action, it is the *end*": that which is to be done.

¹¹⁹ The problems of the conceptual and of creativity are treated below.

When we thus see that the objective is an existent, in whatever crude and perhaps unreal stage, and also a bonum and a bonum which is conveniens, that it is likewise as vital to me as my own self (*ipsemet*) we begin to see that it marshalls such an army that when it invites one to act he is little likely to refuse. Though I have not perfectly that which I act for, it may be said that I already begin to have something of it, and for this reason my action gives some satisfaction.¹²⁰ From the first moment of one's existence, *he is in act toward the good*,¹²¹ so that the problem of his getting off dead center is only a relative problem, since in an important way he is never on dead center.

¹²⁰ I-2, q.32, a.2, ad 1: "*Id quod movetur, etsi nondum habeat perfecte id ad quod movetur, incipit tamen iam aliquid habere eius ad quod movetur: et secundum hoc, ipse motus habet aliquid delectionis.*"

¹²¹ I-2, q.113, a.7, ad 4: "In the first instant at which the form is acquired, a thing begins to act according to its form: as fire immediately upon ignition moves upward."

CHAPTER VI

THE COMMON SENSE DATUM ON VALUE

THE ELEMENTS IN THE SITUATION

One should recall here the value situation and experience, and concurrently the study of why we act. The experience and situation is this: I act, I move on some thing. I appropriate it. That is my aim, and that in some measure is the result. Action, we shall try to explain in a later chapter, always attains; it necessarily has results. The present question is whether "value" has a significant and clear place in our everyday actions. For one thing, what is that location? And for another, what is value?

The *elements* here, in action and in what we have called "the value experience," are these:

The Agent.

That for which he acts—that is, the Object.

Desire and Knowledge.

Need.

A Choice; ordinarily there is choice or selection, but in any instance there is action.

Some Character or Quality which the agent finds in the existent and on account of which character or quality he acts and in a measure appropriates that existent.

The *results* immediately are two:

A new Relation—that of desire or conation—between agent and object. This is consequent, plainly, and just as plainly it is incidental and never intended. It follows from

the agent's effort to secure the object; hence it may be termed "conation."

The second result is more important. It is more than incidental, it is what the action is aimed at. This we have several times called "appropriation," the meaning of which was explained at some length toward the end of the chapter on *Why We Act*; it is, that action is never in the air or a vacuum, but is pointed at an object, that the agent's bent is to bring the object to himself, to make it his own, since the very end of his action is himself.

This is Thomistic thought, as we saw; it has relevance for theory of value and, we are inclined to think, is a theory of value. Yet whether we come to name any of these elements or results, or any ensemble or penumbra of them, "value," is relatively unimportant. The first and last thing necessary is that we keep track of these elements and results. We have heard almost every one of these called value. Mr. Brogan, for instance, says that choice, preference, is value: "Value is betterness." Mr. Santayana has urged that knowledge of value makes value, and many have said that value's father is desire: a kind of willing-to-value. One has not heard the agent called value,¹ nor the agent's need of the object; but the object is sometimes marked "value," sometimes value is said to be the relation between agent and object, sometimes also the character of the object on account of which character there is action. Professor Perry's value is variegated enough to be any of these three. He says, within the space of ten pages, that value is "any object of any interest," also "that special character" of the object in which interest is taken, and even "the peculiar relation"

¹ Perhaps Mr. Whitehead says value is the agent or, at least, in the agent. See Henry Nelson Wieman, "Value and the Individual," *Jnl. of Philosophy*, v. 25 (1928), p. 235.

between object and interest.² It is also said and often said, though not in these words, that valuing is value. For our part, we have been latitudinarian, saying that you might study any of the elements or results of action and valuing and (by straining language a little) name it "value"; but we have also urged that you must be consistent, and if you take value to mean, simultaneously, several different things you will find this difficult.

We must refuse to be blinded by a mere word. The term "value," if left unattached, is a sound, so many letters, an empty word; it yet means nothing. The reality "value," if there is such reality, is not an *ex machina* which the philosopher needs and therefore introduces. Nor is it a centipede, or a chameleon. We insist therefore that the test of value theory is not a slippery word; the test is justness to the situation through which the several elements naturally push up their heads asking for recognition. Keep to the experience: that is the first requisite. A sure grasp of the situation or the experience is more vital and important than the words of any writer on the subject or of any school, new or old. Once we get out of sight of the situation, we are lost and are liable then to any kind of vagary: and it is not likely that we shall say one just word about value or about anything else which conceivably is within the situation. Mr. Dewey for his part stops at the situation and does not define: "The only way to 'define' value," he says, "is to point to existential situations in which the quality is concretely found."³ This is suggestive of Plato's Cratylus who was so impressed by "flux" and impermanence that he named nothing but only pointed to things.

To which element then shall we affix the term "value?" It is not immediately apparent and beyond question that

² *General Theory of Value*, pp. 115-124.

³ "The Meaning of Value," *Jnl. of Philosophy*, v. 22 (1925), p. 129.

we must affix it to any one of them or to any grouping of them. We shall certainly not say that conation, or the effort of the agent to take the object, is value; nor shall we at once say that the result, that is, his appropriation of the object, is value; though we admit that conation and appropriation are elements or results in all valuing. And the relation between agent and object were poorly said to be value: it is a constant, but the most incidental element in the whole situation.

Before trying to say what value is, perhaps it will be better to locate it and to note in what company it always appears. Our laboratory for this study will continue to be experience, observation, the moving universe. Yet even now it is proper to take account of what the one qualified guide, namely, common sense, would say that value is.

Now what common sense, experience and observation repeatedly say is that when I act, what I act for has value for me. Else, I would not act. My acting is a demonstration that the object has value for me. And has it value independently of my acting for it? A kind of value, yes; a static or non-functioning value. Of course, this verdict of common sense need not be final;⁴ but it may not be lightly disregarded. It is taken from the warm experience, and what it says is this: At a particular moment there is the practical situation of my acting for such and such valuable thing; at a previous or a following moment, there is the possibility of my acting for it. And this "I am acting" is here more inclusive than Descartes's "I am thinking"; for the "I am acting" takes in anything that is acting, has been or may be acting: it takes in, let us say, the selecting-rejecting work of my stomach, the bird's nesting, the 'laboring' of cars as they face the long hill at my door.

⁴ Jacques Maritain has stated and illustrated when common sense is to be trusted and when repudiated: *Théonas* (Paris, 1921), pp. 75-77.

"I am acting" includes action. (The problems of whether I am acting and of whether I really am at all, are epistemological; we therefore may turn them over to another philosophical science. Whether justified or not, we begin in philosophy of value with the assumption that I am acting.)

Is philosophy of value to spurn the datum of common sense and experience as a vile thing? These repeat that the object has value when I act for it, and that, before and after, it has value in the sense that I might act for it. The question is best answered by considering the nearness of value to the object.

EXISTENTS AND VALUE

You can act for an object which does not really exist. But you must at least think that it exists; for you therefore it does exist. You must think that you can either soon or at length lay your hands upon the object. Then you can act. Otherwise, action is never begun; it is psychologically impossible. The lack of an aim, of an object to act for, has the would-be agent tied up, blocked. Consider the sayings, "I thought I had the world by the heels"; "I knew I was beaten." Between the two there is a difference which is not easily measurable: all the difference between ready action and the impossibility of moving one hair's breadth. To consider that you have been acting for something you surely cannot attain, is to take all the spark and drive out of your action. Defeatism, as well as agnosticism, always chills activity, and is likely to be the death of it. Where there is no object, there is no value, no desire or action of any kind.

Objects in general will not do, but a particular and definite object is required. "The striving of the agent," says

Aquinas, "must be for some determined thing." ⁵ Our conation, that is, must be specified.

In an early chapter we tried to show that in valuing, that is, in the experience and demonstration of value, the nexus between the agent and the object is an action of some kind: perhaps of desire, or of intellection, or of appreciation. And action is always aimed at an object. Hence, the nearness of value in this dynamic or functional sense to action and the object. Value in any sense is so intimate with the object that it can never actually be torn away from it and made to stand up apart, on its own legs.

Value, it has often enough been said, is "opposed to" existence. We have never been able to comprehend this, unless as an a priorism. We have something more than sympathy, we have perfect agreement, with those who have said that this is an untenable and even a silly view—the view that value is not founded on existence, is prior to and superior to existence. "A meaningless problem," says Herbert W. Schneider; "the problem of value *vs.* reality *in general* simply does not exist" but is "the fruit of a vicious abstractionism." ⁶ This we should say is entirely true. Value without an object with which it companions and in which it perhaps inheres, is unintelligible. Yet in point of fact it must be said that the objectless realm has been claimed as value's own, and we introduce this phase of the question here the more to bring out our own basis of value, what we should think its necessary basis, namely, being itself.

⁵ C.G., 3, c.2: "*Necesse est igitur quod conatus agentis sit ad aliquid determinatum.*"

⁶ "The Values of Pragmatic Theory," *Jnl. of Philosophy*, v. 14 (1917), p. 711. The realist justly refuses to discuss or inquire whether value is opposed to being. Mr. Perry's text is St. Paul to the Phillipians, 6, 8: Whatsoever things are lovely . . . if anything be worth while, think on these things.

"Nothing is desirable unless it be: and as a consequence nothing is good unless it be."^{6a} "Value," as Mr. Lindsay has said, "does not hang in the air."⁷

We adduce a few fairly representative citations; but we cannot cover even the current history of this phase of the value problem.

In a famous eloquent passage, Bradley declares for values: and let existence fall where it may! "And existence, on the whole," he says, "must correspond": our valuations frame and ground reality.⁸ Leonard J. Russell says: man forces his a priori forms upon reality and it is his part "to persist in them as long as they are his values"; for what we value, we take "as a clue to the nature of the universe, in spite of the facts to the contrary."⁹ Mr. Santayana remarks simply that "existence is irrelevant to an ideal."¹⁰ Horace M. Kallen is more voracious, making all philosophy an "imaginative perfection" of the actual.¹¹ Dr. Schiller himself says disparaging words about the view that "human valuations have no significance in establishing the nature of things."¹² Radislov Tsanoff summarizes the whole sweep of post-Kantian thought as the effort to rank value above fact.¹³ Professor Urban says that the thought center is now not knowledge but value, a shift from intellectualism to

^{6a} I, q.5, a.2 ad 4: "*Nihil est appetibile nisi ens; et per consequens nihil est bonum nisi ens.*"

⁷ "The Greatest Problem in Value," *Great Philosophical Problems*, p. 35; cf., Brightman, *An Introduction to Philosophy*, p. 148: "Critical reflection shows us that we never mean to ascribe value to an ideal apart from any realization of it." Sorley, *Moral Values and the Idea of God*, p. 82: "It is only as existing that the thing is held to be good."

⁸ F. H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality* (2nd Edition, 1902), p. 550; cf., *Essays on Truth and Reality* (1914), p. 64; and contrast, p. 141.

⁹ "Value and Existence," *Int. Jnl. Eth.*, v. 37 (1927), pp. 144, 143.

¹⁰ *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion* (1900), p. 72.

¹¹ *Creative Intelligence* (1917), pp. 464-5.

¹² *Humanism: Philosophical Essays* (1903), p. 262.

¹³ *The Problem of Immortality: Studies in Personality and Value* (1924), pp. 330-1.

voluntarism, and his own conclusion is that "worth experience in its entirety corresponds to a larger world of reality than the limited regions of existence and truth."¹⁴ Mr. Hoernlé at times identifies "spiritual facts" and "spiritual values" and remarks that both are "realms which exist through mind."¹⁵ Münsterberg early got in his word that value "is what makes a world,"¹⁶ and we have heard Mr. Perry saying that value or the greatest number of valuations is what dresses up the god which we are to worship.¹⁷ And Bertrand Russell of all men deserves rank here for his fervor and earnestness. He says that we create and confer value, and he bids us elude the world of fact. "It is we," he says, "who create value, and our desires which confer value. In this realm we are kings."¹⁸ And in a passage in which he imitates both the manner and the gloom of the closing lines of Pater's *Renaissance*, he urges us to un-realize existence as far as may be and to live "remote from the failures and disenchantments of the world of fact."¹⁹

Thus value, as we experience it, conditions reality. This view of value as overriding fact and existence and actuality goes even farther, on the subject of immortality and on religion as faith in the conservation of values. Whether we continue to exist or not is a small concern; the one desiderate, they say, is that no value should perish. The dictum of Höffding is that religion is faith in the conservation of values.²⁰ This is done now in variations by almost every current writer. Mr. Hoernlé for instance says that whether

¹⁴ *Valuation: Its Nature and Laws* (1909), pp. 1, 427-8; cf., p. 406: "Unhindered activity or continuity is the source of reality and value."

¹⁵ *Idealism: as a Philosophical Doctrine* (1924), p. 47.

¹⁶ *The Eternal Values*, pp. 74-7.

¹⁷ *General Theory of Value*, pp. 659, 682-3, 686.

¹⁸ *What I Believe* (1925), pp. 16-17.

¹⁹ "A Free Man's Worship," *Mysticism and Logic* (1925), p. 52.

²⁰ *Philosophy of Religion* (tr., New York: Macmillan, 1906), pp. 6-16 et passim.

we should continue to exist is not the issue; what matters is that values should keep on and on.²¹ Mr. Tsanoff declares for the perpetuity of values against an immortality of existence: "It is not the existential but the value permanence of the self which really concerns us."²²

CENTRALITY OF THE AGENT

We are very much tempted to conclude summarily with Mr. Schneider that the problem of value against existents is "meaningless." However, we say something of it presently. After all, these are asseverations, acts of faith, not arguments. Just now we note the reason advanced by Durkheim for urging that value is independent of the object and that of Mr. Perry for concluding that value is never in any sense independent of "interest" or the motor-affective attitude.²³

Mr. Perry argues that if value could ever in any sense belong to the object independently of present "interest," then we should be able "to point to a distinct *quale* which appears in that region which our value terms roughly indicate," to something as empirical and obtrusive, he seems to say, as the smoothness of the object, or its largeness, or its yellowness.²⁴ One may remark that Mr. Perry is concerned with "value terms," and not plainly with experience. The experience is definite and observable. It reads as follows. I want the object in some way, I move upon it and appropriate it. Maybe I want it because of its color, or of its

²¹ *Idealism: as a Philosophical Doctrine*, pp. 119-120.

²² *The Problem of Immortality: Studies in Personality and Value*, p. 297.

²³ E. Durkheim, "*Jugements de Valeur et Jugements de Réalité*," *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, v. 19 (1911), pp. 437-53. R. B. Perry, *General Theory of Value* (1926), ch. 2, "Value as Irrelevant to Interest."

²⁴ *General Theory of Value*, p. 30.

bulkiness in order, let us say, to hold a door. I must act, and act for something; and I can act for absolutely anything. "About" any existent there is something on account of which I can act for it. Perhaps that "something" is less tangible than yellowness or hardness, but we are inclined to think that it is as definable and as easily isolated. This is the quality of being desirable, a quality which enters into experience quite as readily as the quality of being colored; and though a particular object at any moment is not desired it is yet desirable, just as a colored object is always colored though it is not so to the blind and strangely so to the color blind.

Any being, we should carefully note, is at least potentially a veritable "object," that is, the end of some action, and many beings presently are objects, or the ends of action.

We would say then that an existent is always possessed of value, whether its value be perceived or not, just as it is always colored whether anyone perceives its color. And this value we should hesitate to term "potential" or "latent" value. It is "objective" in the sense that it is not really separable from an existent. It is "real" in the sense that it is there whether or not we think of it. And it is "actual" in the sense that it presently exists, whether or not it presently functions. To say that value, when not functioning, is merely potential, is to suppose that it becomes actualized when the agent moves on the existent, whereas the necessary and real change is not in the existent or in its value, but in the subject; and it will be proper to see at some length that when I have an "interest" in anything and go after that thing, the result is not a real change or limitation or "relativeness" in the object or existent, but in me. And Mr. Perry nearly concedes this himself when among diverse definitions he says that value is a "character" of the

object, but he further modifies: value is "that special character of an object which consists in the fact that interest is taken in it."²⁶

For our part we urge and shall urge that the object need take on no "special character" and sometimes does take on no "special character" by the fact that "interest" is taken in it; there need be no real change in the object, no new and special character, absolutely none. But in the subject there is and must be a real change.²⁸ This we shall study later.

The view of Durkheim that value cannot be *in* things has had a greater vogue. We saw his reasoning in an earlier chapter, namely, that if value were in things how could idolaters possibly give their allegiance and worship to a pile of stones? Plainly, so great value is not really in such an existent. Value, he therefore concluded, is wholly dependent upon the valuer and not at all upon the object.²⁷ And this opinion, of course, is the very one we have heard reiterated so often; value is created by valuing, if man does not value an object what value has it? Man creates and confers value and is the sole arbiter of value.

The insensate stone or wood does not really possess the value idolatrously ascribed to it. This is the point which Durkheim saw clearly. But what he seems not to have seen is that *for those people* the stone or wood does possess every bit of value which they ascribe to it. Neither persons nor peoples worship stone and wood as such. What they worship is an existent which for them is there; either symbolically or conceptually, but yet existentially, it is there in the wood and stone. In either instance, it is in an existent

²⁶ *General Theory of Value*, p. 124.

²⁸ When I desire anything, any real change is in me: the thing desired is not really changed. "*Appetibile apprehensum est movens non motum, appetitus autem movens motum.*" I, q.80, a.2, c.

²⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 443.

that they find value. The existent may be as real as the stone, it may be as conceptual and unreal as the stone-god. Still, let it be either: it is an existent. Therefore, persons or peoples can and do find value in it.

The reason given by Durkheim and any follower comes in the long run to rest on Vaihinger's *als-ob*. They argue thus: Peoples know that these bits of wood and stone are not very gods, but they worship them as if they were. This of course is contrary to what peoples or persons do or ever have done. Indeed, they could not do it. For this *als-ob* principle of Vaihinger's we have seen elsewhere to be precisely the no-go principle: I never act for what I know does not exist. I act for an existent, real or conceptual: the thing exists really, or I think it exists. Then action is a psychological possibility. I do not know that outside my mind the object does not exist, and I do not think that it does not exist: such knowledge or such conviction would put a sudden stop to any action.

CRITICISM OF THE SUBJECTIVISTIC POSITION

These are the arguments, Durkheim's and Mr. Perry's, which have seriously been put forward against value as really inseparable from the object.²⁸ We do not find them sufficient. Therefore, we only repeat what common sense and all action say, that value is resident within the object. This is its location. But it does not finally say what value is.

The proper criticism of Durkheim, as we saw, is that

²⁸ Value as belonging sometimes to a "hypothetical," a "presumed" or "assumed" existent, is (we think) not different from value as clinging to the conceptual object. Such objects of value are defended by Mr. Urban, *Valuation: Its Nature and Laws* (1909), pp. 39-47; and seemingly by Mr. Perry, "The Definition of Value," *Jnl. of Philosophy*, v. 11 (1914), pp. 154, 159, and, perhaps, *General Theory of Value* (1926), p. 24.

desire is of the good, true or apparent; that action is aimed at an existent, but this may be real or it may be only conceptual.²⁹ Any action, consequent upon cognition, is pointed toward the object as apprehended; and because objects can come into consciousness upside down, they can be and sometimes are so desired. Our estimates of things often need revision; but it is for epistemology, and not for thought on value, to say when they are correct.

The way then seems clear for saying that value is in the object primarily, that value is of the object, and that therefore it is a quality or character or property of the existent on account of which quality or character the existent is veritably an objective, that is, it presently is or it can be the end of action—of any action, human or other.³⁰ This is by no means to say that value can be really isolated from the object. Nay, do we not urge the very contrary—that value is in the object and of the object, and cannot be found apart from it or be sliced off from it? Of course the mere existent is not value; and until some agent sets his face toward it as object, the existent is not valued. Is it therefore not valuable, and is it in no sense of value? To say so were to make out that value is created by valuing, that present valuing is the *sine qua non* of all value, and that the agent is the center of value;³¹ and all this, we shall now see, is to confuse distinct factors in the situation. To say that value sometimes has subjective meanings and immediate personal reference is true enough; but that it has only these is extremely doubtful. It is silly to duck our head under a subjective wing and then announce that we cannot see out. That is,

²⁹ I-2, q.8, a.1, c.; C.G., 3, c.16.

³⁰ Cf., E. S. Brightman's excellent work *Religious Values*, pp. 123-4: even in the most subjectivist theory, "it is obviously presupposed that there is something in any valued object which is capable of satisfying the desire of the one who values it."

³¹ Prall, *Study in the Theory of Value*, p. 268; Bosanquet, *Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 312.

it seems to be a great error and perhaps it is a solipsistic error to announce that no value or worth ever goes unappreciated, or that there are no things of great value which yet are not valued. Persons there are, plenty of them, who are lovable whether I or anyone love them or not. Immortal life is object of great value whether I know of its existence and whether I care. To ask, "If she be not fair to me, What care I how fair she be?" is already to concede that she is fair. Things there are which I do not value and which perhaps no one now values; yet they are of value. This is plainly and experienceably so. And we must say so, unless we wish to give up the intelligible use of language.

The bare existent is not yet valued. So much is plain. None the less, independently of our striving, our loving or hating, it is there imperturbable; that is, if it is not merely a conceptual object but a reality. To say this is to point out something of importance and relevance. The same is not said and may not be said of our aims and desires. These are as dependent on the object, real or conceptual, as is the babe on the mother's breast. If there were no existents to aim at, "agents" would indeed be indifferent. To no living thing, however, is this possible, for the living thing is environed with good things, and it is a description of it to say that it has an initial bias toward the good or valuable things of its neighborhood and that it puts feelers out among them.

It may be well to take Professor Perry's view, since his is fairly representative now of idealistic and realistic schools, and to look at it carefully in the light of his reasons for rejecting the objective, common-sense datum and for clinging to the subjectivistic theory. We think interest or agent as central gives the whole tone and meaning of his argument, though we have pointed out earlier that his definitions are shifting and ambiguous, making value to be, at once:

interest-relation to object;
interest-character of object; and
interest-object.

Mr. Perry spends many pages showing how constant interest is in all valuing. We agree that it is so; but we do not see that the object is less constant. Interest in object, he says, is characteristic of all valuing, is a fact about all experience of value. We say, this is true. But it is not more true than the fact that an object is supposed and is characteristic; and so, from this angle, the presumptive argument in favor of either Mr. Perry's view or ours is worth but very little.

Professor Perry's central argument against the view that value is the capacity of existents to be acted for, is that such view is an instance of the pathetic fallacy.³² The weakness of his criticism lies in the fact that, so far as we can see, it does not apply to any theory on record. He says that the objective theory actually pretends to find "the conative factor or effort" in the object, and that "the object of my endeavor is credited with the endeavor which it arouses in me." It may be that some theorists have leant on such argument; if so, Mr. Perry's criticism is just and strong but we must say that we do not know any such theorists. It may be again that some have urged that the "force of desire" is in the object; if so, we think them few and unimportant; but it is really hard to get people to believe that objects have not the capacity to arouse desire—which capacity is not nearly the same thing as "force of desire."

Though Professor Perry says that his view must be tried out on "all special questions of value" before it can be well judged, he argues that some positive credence is to be given

³² *General Theory of Value*, pp. 69-71.

it because to create values it is enough to introduce an interest.³³ Here we run into one of the old problems. Is a thing valuable because acted for, or acted for because valuable?

It is in very large part a question of analyzing the experience, of keeping the elements of the experience strictly in their places, and of naming them with consistency and great care. When anything is in any way sought, it is valued and valuable. When it is not sought but could be sought, it is valuable but not valued. When it is attained, it is valuable and perhaps valued. Value is always in the object. Valuing, whether wise or unwise, is always in the valuer. The valued thing can change, the valuable thing can change, and the valuer's needs, interests, and valuations can change. But in this study we are not primarily concerned with problems of change in value or valuableness or valuing, with intensity of valuing, with standards of value or valuing or what ought or ought not to be valued, or with any scale or classification of valued or valuable things. We are concerned with the meaning of valuing as such, apart from standards; with the meaning of valuable, and of value, and with the location of value. To get at the meaning of these, naturally we study the situation and every element in it; but our primary concern remains, What is value? where is value? what does it mean to be valuable?

Professor Perry uses a formula to express his view: "X is valuable = interest is taken in X."³⁴ We should rather say: "X is valuable = interest is or can be taken in X; just as Y is lovable = Y is loved or can be loved." As Aquinas indeed remarks, such things as money and honor are valuable (*delectabilia*) only in so far as we make use of

³³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 124-5.

³⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 116.

them or "can make use of them."⁸⁵ What Mr. Perry's statement comes to, then, is this: valuable = valued; lovable = loved. In other words, he does not distinguish carefully between "valuable" and "valued."

This is the central error of the subjectivistic school—using the words "value," "valuing" and "valuable" in a promiscuous way. We shall study more of it in the next section. For the present, besides our rejection of the theory of Perry and certain others, we make positive claims for our own objective view. These claims rest on the fact that our view—namely, that valuation is in the agent and value in the object—better cares for and interprets the following important types of value experience.

1. Suppose I experience an exceedingly vague need and desire. I don't know what I want. I am just restless. I want diversion; but what will I have—reading, writing, thinking, outdoor sport, friends, solitude? Certainly I must be more specific. Well, I shall read. But again, what? Philosophy, science, poetry? No, I want a novel. But what kind? At last I select a blood-and-thunder story; this is what I want. My vague desire is objectified by meeting an existent possessing specific qualities. Value is not in the mere existent, or in it as possessing indeterminate qualities; the existent must possess or be thought to possess specific qualities which make it capable of satisfying desire, or in any case of being desired. Is reading therefore the only one of these diversions that is valuable? No one thinks so; I least of all. They all are valuable, though not all are now valued. Perhaps I and the whole neighborhood have no use for poetry, but poetry may nevertheless be a valuable thing. And all this is to repeat that things may be valuable whether presently valued or not, and that value is not conferred on the

⁸⁵ 1-2, q.32, a.1, ad 1.

object by the agent but found by him in the object. A subtle mistake that runs through the subjectivistic opinion lies in the failure to make the distinction pointed out by us in the preceding chapter, the distinction between "good" and "suitable." This latter, indeed, the thing as suitable for me, does depend in part on my present attitude; but good as such does not. For, as Aquinas says,³⁶ if a thing is at present being acted for, it is both "good" and "suitable" for that agent; and this latter circumstance, "that it be suitable for him, depends on two factors: namely, on the condition of what is proposed, and the condition of him to whom it is proposed"; for a thing is called suitable to his present desire "in a relational sense," so that the suitable depends on both terms of the value relation.

Value thus is in the object, but that a thing be valued depends also on the needs and desires of the agent. This is answer to Mr. Santayana's question: "If a man does not value fame, what value has it?" Perhaps, very great value. If a man does not value friends and health and home, they may nevertheless be of a distinct value.

2. There is a permanent element in value. If a reader is permanently fond of Thackeray, this author is of constant value to such reader; but it may be that Thackeray is of permanent value, independently of this or any present reader. So long as wine is capable of satisfying desire, it is bold to say that it is totally devoid of value—whether valued or not. A man loves a woman and values her highly; but because she values him slightly, he finds new loves and interests and ceases to think of her. Does her value there-

³⁶ 1-2, q.9, a.2, c.: "*Id quod apprehenditur sub ratione boni et convenientis, movet voluntatem per modum objecti. Quod autem aliquid videatur bonum et conveniens, ex duobus contingit: scilicet ex conditione eius quod proponitur, et eius cui proponitur. Conveniens enim secundum relationem dicitur: unde ex utroque extremorum dependet.*"

fore cease? Suppose no one now cares for her—is she of no value? It would be strange to say so. She has all the grace she ever had, all the likeableness, but nobody is liking her. She is lovable but simply unloved. Value, then, does not cease merely because in a particular instance or in many instances valuing ceases.

3. Groups, as surely as individuals, find value in things. Everybody wants a diamond. The child finds it pretty, the woman finds it splendid, the jeweler finds it saleable, the glazier finds it useful. All want it because of some qualities really in the diamond or thought to be in it. These qualities are not imparted by the social or individual desires for the diamond: but the desires arise as a result of the qualities. True, the diamond satisfies interests: but it satisfies them through the possession of qualities which it has or is taken to have.

4. Variability of valuation depends very much on the agent; for instance, on his needs. And perhaps it is the observation of this fact which leads so many to conclude that value is not in the existent but is conferred on it by the valuer. Yet evident as is this fact that intensity of valuing is largely subjective, we must also say that change in the object is more crucial in the value of the object than is change in evaluation or need or desire. A broken window, a cracked vase, a blocked road is good for nothing; and the change in value is precisely due to a change in the character or quality of the object.

5. In many experiences, value has a negative aspect. An object is disliked, feared, fled from, hated; and this is so because of the kind of thing it is, or is taken to be. Professor Dewitt Parker cites the case of a character in fiction who casts out a child found to be not his own child; and such instance, says Mr. Parker, shows that value is not in the

object but in the agent.³⁷ Not at all. The father valued the child, found value in it, because of what he took it to be; he hates it now and disvalues it, because of what he finds it really to be. Value or disvalue is in the object, valuing or disvaluing is in the agent.

The famous question, then, asked by Mr. Perry and by many others at many times, whether a thing is valuable because wanted or wanted because valuable, may be best put in this way: Is a thing wanted because of the kind of thing it is? or, is it the kind of thing it is, because wanted? Is wanting consequent upon quality, real or supposed? or, is quality consequent upon wanting?

6. Professor Perry says that, because of his subjective value-theory, he is charged with disrespecting his realistic theory of knowledge.³⁸ We think the charge just and serious, and that it stands.

What he says, excellently, is that the thing known doesn't really change because known; that it was knowable all the time; that knowable does not equal known; that the mountain "can maintain its historic existence" and nature whether Mohamet know it or not. But instead of making an irrelevant (and questionable) comparison then about love and fear being, "like mountains," independent of judgment, he might well have said that as Mohamet's knowing makes no real difference to the mountain, so his valuing makes no real difference to it—the mountain is knowable and valuable all the time. For *scibile* or the knowable thing has a potential meaning, but knowledge and known have an habitual or actual one;³⁹ and desirable and perfective⁴⁰ also have a potential sense,

³⁷ "The Notion of Value," *Phil. Rev.* v. 38 (July, 1929).

³⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 139.

³⁹ I, q.13, a.7, ad 6.

⁴⁰ *De Veritate*, q.21, a.2, c.

though desire and desired and perfecting and perfection have an actual one.⁴¹ If Mr. Perry admits that knowing includes a valuing element, and he does admit it by saying ⁴² that to name a thing is to give it value, then we think he must also admit that this knowing, which he admits is in part a valuing, no more affects the thing known than does Mohamet's knowing affect the mountain.

Anyone who has tried the experiment on unsuspecting persons knows how hard it is to get them to say or believe that value is not in the object but in the agent. Valuing, they persist, is in the agent, but value is in the object. The following quotations are from statements made in a written examination not in answer to any question but to size up the statement that "value is not in things but in the experient subject." The statements are repeated verbatim as given by undergraduates and are to be taken for what they are worth as evidence of the common-sense datum on the location and meaning of value; it will be noted that the third student echoed one sentence he had heard.

1. Value, I believe, exists in things themselves and is there whether the mind thinks about them or not. Take an example of a log that is so placed by nature that it prevents a river from overflowing. An overflow would cost a great many lives. In preventing an overflow this log inherits a peculiar value. And it has that value whether or not it is ever discovered.

Value affects minds differently. A thing may be considered by mind as more valuable in one place than in another, or as more valuable to one person than to another. The mind appreciates this, but does not cause it. Value is inherent. It exists in a thing by reason of the nature of that thing.

2. "Value is not in things." Where then is it? Were it true,

⁴¹ 1, q.16, a.1.

⁴² Chap. 5.

only one thing at a time would have value, because we only focus our mental attitude on one thing at a time.

3. On the contrary value is in things. The mind acts for a thing because of its value, the things do not obtain value because the mind acts for them. Things affect the mind because of their value. Value is the capacity of an object to become the end of action. The mind must have a motive for action; it does not act in any accidental or fatal manner. The value of the object is the motive—the mind perceives the value and desires the object because of it—if it desires it enough to act for the object. It is therefore the value of the object that causes the mind to first perceive it and finally to act for it.

4. We say a thing has value. What we mean is that it has some attribute which in our eyes is valuable or attractive. The cause of value is in the thing, the estimation of the value is in our mind. That is what I believe the statement means. . . The thing has the attribute which is attractive or is the cause of the value, but just as surely the estimation of that attribute is in the mind.

5. A thing has value or good in that it seeks its own end and tries to fulfill that end. The end of that thing may be far from the desire we have for it, thus it may be seen that the fact that we would desire a thing might not have anything to do with the attainment of its particular good. . . . Its mere existence signifies that there is a place for it in this world and in fulfilling that place alone that thing is attaining its own end. If we desire and appropriate things they become the end of our actions and good to us but that may differ greatly from the good or existence of the things themselves.

Tentatively, then, value may be said to be what action is aimed at. If anything act, it acts for an existent which has value for it; and the existent always has value in the sense that some agent might act for it. Value is the capacity of

any being to be the end of action; and that beings have such capacity is demonstrated by every action.

In urging that action invariably points toward an end or object, we must note also that this end or object is by no means always outside the agent, and we have seen that in an important sense it is never outside the agent. Ordinarily, of course, we think of the end or object as something clear of the agent. Such end is what Saint Thomas called a "factum," something made, constructed, done: as a house built, or a cure effected by a physician. And we shall see that even this kind of product is referable to the agent himself as its properest end. Yet there is a second kind of end or object, and this is not an external thing; this is within the agent even from the beginning and is never outside the agent; as for example when one thinks or feels; the end is then not necessarily some external product, but is properly said to be the action itself. So then we may say that in one instance the impetus of the agent tends toward the external work effected, but that in another instance it tends toward the very action.⁴³ Perhaps most simply said, "*Finis autem vel est actio, vel res aliqua.*"⁴⁴ Accordingly, the end is either the operation or its effect and terminus.⁴⁵

We must concede that things have value. And they have value because they are in the relation of being acted for, or because they can come into that relation. If there is some existent which is not acted for and never can in any way be acted for, it has no value. "Action" here takes in any kind of activity: all desiring, or knowing, or appreciating, as well as external behavior and the "doing of things."

We do not indeed accept Green's famous conclusion to

⁴³ C.G., 3, c.2: "*Actio vero quandoque quidem terminatur ad aliquod factum, sicut aedificatio ad domum, et sanatio ad sanitatem: quandoque autem non, sicut intelligere et sentire.*"

⁴⁴ I-2, q.13, a.4, c.

⁴⁵ C.G., 3, c.67; c.64.

the Prolegomena, that value is always for, of, or in a person and we do not maintain even that value, which is attached ever to an existent, is always for a conscious being. It is true of course to say that, if there were no consciousness, there would be no evaluation or estimation. Yet it is quite conceivable that, in such case, things should act and be acted upon: that plants, for instance, should attract, as they do now, just those foodstuffs that are of immense and vital value; and even then things are going to be acted for, so it must be that they are possessed of the capacity of being acted for: in other words, they are possessed of value.

Value may thus be the end, the first principle of action, which moves the agent. "For the first principle of action, which starts the agent, is the end; the agent himself has a second place, and the type of tool he uses has a third."⁴⁶ The motive for action is a being, an object, known as good or thought good: not merely the object, but the object as known.⁴⁷ So long as the being is not known, it is like buried treasure or undeveloped resources; whatever value it has is static and non-functional—not the end now of any action. But it can become the end of action—when known. It is like gold dollars buried these hundred years: they have as much value and as objective value as the coin which is passing from pocket to pocket, but their value is not functioning.⁴⁸ Value has to be known before it becomes the end of action; but we have no reason to conclude that

⁴⁶ I, q.105, a.5, c.: "*Nam primo quidem, principium actionis est finis, qui movet agentem; secundo vero, agens; tertio autem, forma eius quod ab agente applicatur ad agendum.*"

⁴⁷ C.G., 3, c.10: "*Voluntas vero movetur ex iudicio virtutis apprehensivae, quae indicat hoc esse bonum vel malum.*"

⁴⁸ The effort of Mr. L. A. Reid, "The Appearance of Values," *The Monist*, v. 37 (1927), pp. 77-8, to throw out the common-sense datum on value, turns on this point. He says: "Money in a napkin hidden in a field is not of real, but only of potential value." Here he concedes that the treasure is of value, and that is the point. Besides, "potential" and "real" are not adversatives.

any existent cannot become the end of some action. It would seem to be inexact to call this non-functional value "potential" value, for not the value, but the agent, is really modified when the object is known and acted for. It may well be called static value, or non-functioning value; the existent is unknown and a fortiori unclaimed.

The only way that value can be demonstrated is by action. What all things must act for—that is, well being—might seem to be the one object of intrinsic value. All other objects have instrumental value. The agent is not helpless, however, in the face of value and the object. Certainly, man is not helpless. There are degrees of knowing the object, and knowing the "good" of the object, and ways of going for the object.⁴⁹ There is a primal difference here between man and animal—the difference between freedom and necessity; that is to say, of nature. But this we do not now study.

TREACHERY OF THE TERM "VALUE"

Whether England is loved and hated because valuable, or valuable because loved and hated, is the great problem of value, says Professor Perry.⁵⁰ We have never been able to sanction this view. For one thing, the basic "because" in the experience and study of value is this: I love and pursue, and in part appropriate England or any other object because I am not sufficient of myself. If I were sufficient without any object, I should pursue none; I should simply stand upright within myself, and lean upon no exterior thing. Take away all need and insufficiency, and you are simply out of this ordinary world in which we begin and try to remain for both the experience and the study of value.

⁴⁹ *De Veritate*, q.25, a.1, c.: The three kinds of conation, with three kinds of accompanying knowledge, are: "natural" or inanimate, sense or animal, and volitional or human.

⁵⁰ *General Theory of Value*, p. 4.

Besides, study of value is not at all primarily concerned (we should say) with this old circle, this dog after his own tail, as Ruggiero has pilloried it.⁵¹ The important first thing is not a theoretical definition of "good" or "value." The experience is primal, and the guide; and the problem is to see what may rationally be made of the experience. This reads thus; I want things, I go toward them or bring them toward me; and whether, in a particular instance, I pursue this thing, I know that it is pursuable, and I do pursue something. Agent, object, need, desire, relation, appropriation—these are the elements and results, and it is of first importance to be mindful always of where we stand in the value situation.

Yet we should be the last to say that the use of terms is inconsequential. Call what thing you will "value" but, first, account for your flouting common sense and common experience, if you do flout them, and secondly, be consistent. And need we repeat that in current philosophy of value there is a pervasive jumbling of value, valuing, valuation, awareness of value, and values? For instance, it is said that the relation between me and this poem which I like, or between me and this loaf of brown bread, is value;⁵² is not the result of valuing, not an aid to locating subject or object or value, but is value. This is to tangle up valuation with value, and to end by taking the one for the other. A relation always results from the experience of valuing, that is to say valuing, as well as value, always implies a relation; but relation does not define or describe value. Awareness of an object's value "constitutes" its value; there is something immediately wrong with this statement of Mr. Santayana's.

⁵¹ *Modern Philosophy*, pp. 100-1: Meinong and Ehrenfels, he says, "go round and round."

⁵² E.g., Picard, *Values: Immediate and Contributory*, p. 119.

"Consists in," "constitutes," is "made by" or "created by"—these are the treacherous verbs in study of value.

The object according as I go the more intensely for it, evinces more compellingly to me the value which is really in that object, or in the spurious but existential status which I accord the object. Does this come to saying that value is measured by intensity of desire? Functioning or dynamic value is likely to be in large part so measured. But this amounts only to repeating that all objects as such are originally the homes of value, and to remarking that not all objects are equally pursued at all times.

All beings whatsoever are possible objects of value.⁵³ *Als ob*, however, will not do. For by definition *als ob* means that there is no object, real or conceptual, present or remote; but you act anyway—as if there were.⁵⁴ Now this is a psychological impossibility. Try it to-morrow morning. Unless the agent conceals somewhere in the situation an object that is real to him, the *als ob* congeals action.

Action aims at something, and the purview of value is precisely as broad and tall as the universe. Whatever is, can be sought, is appetible. Life, art, wisdom, science, the good things of life—any of them in so far as actual, says Saint Thomas, can be desired; that is, they are already desirable. And man for his part "does naturally desire not objects of will alone, but also other things which are suitable to his other powers, as a knowledge of truth and this is in keeping with the intellect; and being, and life, and other such things, all of which look to a natural well-being; and all of

⁵³ Cf., Perry, "The Definition of Value," *Journal of Philosophy*, v. 11 (1914), p. 154: all things within "this rich empirical field"; "a thousand different attitudes of liking and disliking."

⁵⁴ Hans Vaihinger, *The Philosophy of 'As If'* (tr., London, 1924), p. viii: "An idea, whose theoretical untruth or incorrectness, and therewith its falsity, is admitted, is not for that reason practically useless or valueless."

them are comprised, as particular goods, under 'object of will'": for will reaches out toward whatever makes for the good of the whole man.⁵⁵ And so with some such foundation, if we were studying any scale or system of value, we might go on to rank objects of value, for man or other, in some reasoned order.⁵⁶ For the present we only say that all things are possessed of value, can be, and often demonstrably are, valued.

Yet to take all beings of static value and all objects of functional value and call them "values," pooling them, is not to let any great light in; it is much more likely to lead to confusion and mental entanglement. Any existent is either valued or waiting to be valued, either it is yet sealed or it is on tap. For all that, even when it is served there is no particular merit or profit in naming it "a value." *It is an object valued, an object sought.* This is plain.

And will not objects sought multiply? They will, they do; nay, they are ever many. But they remain objects, and this fact allows us to lay intelligent hold upon them and still to keep track of where we are in the situation. This seems perhaps an inconsiderable point. Actually, it is of importance. We are concerned here not with any actuality which the data allow, but much more with the clarification of terms.⁵⁷ Value is one thing, the object valued a second,

⁵⁵ I-2, q. 10, a. 1, c.: "*Per voluntatem appetimus . . . ea quae pertinent ad potentiam voluntatis; sed etiam ea quae pertinent ad singulas potentias et ad totum hominem. Unde naturaliter homo vult non solum objectum voluntatis, sed etiam alia quae conveniunt aliis potentiis: ut cognitionem veri, quae convenit intellectui; et esse et vivere et huiusmodi alia, quae respiciunt consistentiam naturalem; quae omnia comprehenduntur sub objecto voluntatis, sicut particularia bona.*"

⁵⁶ We purposely avoid the problem of "values" until we have reasonable hold on the meaning of value. Can anyone, without a meaning for value, translate the sentence which follows? "But there is a real reason for studying intrinsic intellectual values in the case of Stevenson." (G. K. Chesterton, *Stevenson*, New York, 1928, p. 17.)

⁵⁷ Some have seen the peril of these terms. E.g., J. S. Mackenzie, as early as 1895, suggested that to esteem be used for the verb, estimable

and valuing a distinct third: just as, let us say, pleasure is one thing, an object which affords it another, and taking pleasure a third. Yet value, valuing, and object of value are perpetually interchanged. And is warning ever given? Not a word of it. "Values are objects valued," says Professor Sellars.⁵⁸ And when Dr. Schiller says that "*Truth is a form of value*," one among "other modes of valuation,"⁵⁹ he confuses valuation with value.

A broad reckless use of the term "values" beckons toward irrationalization, as we saw; toward self-deception, an unreal sublimation, even an hypostization. It might also bring on the habit of circling when one goes to define. Is God a value? is *als ob* a value? What is *a* value, if value itself is so hard to define? What are "the values"? Perhaps a better question would be, Do you not see what you do for any precise thought and expression on the subject? At any rate, the arbitrary interchanging of value, valuer, valuing, object of value, valuation process—this has made an inroad on clear thought and on the identification of the problem itself.

And after all something is to be said for the use of the terms "values" and "a value." Those employing them, though they tend to bungle the situation, are likely to come back to a wise objectivity. For by the word "values" the very solipsist does not mean his awareness; he means, in Professor Sellars' phrase, "objects valued" or objects of functional value.⁶⁰

for valuable, worth for bonum in se, and value for the useful good ("Notes on the Theory of Value," *Mind*, n.s., v. 4, pp. 448-9).

⁵⁸ *Principles and Problems of Philosophy* (1926), p. 434. Cf., Picard, *Values: Immediate and Contributory* (1920), pp. 8, 45: objective or "contributory values . . . comprise objects. . . . Pen, apples . . . are of contributory values"; but "the elementary perceptions" are "contributory values." This confuses (1) value and object of value; and (2) perhaps value and valuation.

⁵⁹ *Humanism: Philosophical Essays*, p. 55.

⁶⁰ Cf., Schiller, *Studies in Humanism* (1907), p. 7: "Truths are logical

Our own present conclusion is that wherever there is action, there certainly is value; indeed, at such place, value is demonstrated. But unmistakably, there is static value in the mere existent from the beginning, because the existent is possible aim of action. Yet functional value needs something in addition to *ens* or existent and in addition to this as desirable; to *ens* as desirable, functional value adds the element of being desired. This makes a logical difference. Such view of course puts value very nearly into the category of "good" or *bonum*. For value, we say, is resident within the existent always, and is functionally there when this is object or is sought. And "good," says Saint Thomas, "is anything"—is the thing itself—"in so far as it *can be striven for* and in so far as it *is the end of conative action*."⁶¹

Value then would be, *bonum* not merely in a contemplated sense, but as motivator of action, a driver of wheels. This is to make of value a dynamic kind of "good." But it is also static and can be considered from a more detached point of view.

Thus the genesis of value and, if not exactly its contour, at least something of its nature and habitat are indicated, and there is insistence on the necessary suckling of value at the breast of existence. To know more of it we must study the value relation.

values." Meaning, it seems, that truths are valuable objects, or objects of value.

⁶¹ "*Nam bonum est aliquid, in quantum est appetibile, et terminus motus appetitus.*" I, q.5, a.6, c.

The topic here is *bonum* as *bonum*—"secundum quod bonum est"; something broader—"communius"—than the human good. Hence the text hardly bears the Dominican Fathers' Translation as "term of the will's motion."

CHAPTER VII

STUDY OF THE VALUE RELATION

It is reasonable to question whether common sense is to be taken as final when it declares that an object has value when anyone acts for it or can act for it. Presumption favors the view but does not establish it. The problem then is: Can such assertion be at all points verified? Or can it perhaps be improved upon? We shall proceed to see. Our method will be to examine each factor in the experience of value.

To act is to value, we have said. This therefore may be taken to be the location of value: action points at value. When there is action there is a consequent relation with its two termini, and these of course deserve some scrutiny. And it is commonly urged that one terminus, the object, "acquires" value and that we "create and confer" value. These claims will now be examined, to see whether or in which senses they can be justified. The comparative importance of subject and object will then be mentioned and a definition of value essayed.

ACTION IS POINTED AT VALUE

The very wise saying of Mr. Santayana¹ that the All of Hegel is eternally without value because responsive to no living desire we should say is fundamentally right. Where

¹ *Soliloquies in England and Later Soliloquies* (1922), p. 207.

there is no actuality or effort or conation and no possibility of effort or conation—or, broader, of action—there is no value. The response of which Mr. Santayana speaks is not the crucial point, nor is human or other living desire the test. The test is action. We do not say (as is often said or implied) “action for”: since this, as we saw in another chapter, is redundant. Action is “for,” and as often and as far as you subvert the “for” you kill the action. You may pertinently explain what an action is for, but you already know that it is for something.

The one thing that action ever unerringly points to, is value. We have even said that therefore value is the end of action, in the sense that value is at the very terminus of action and that without value there can be no end for action and, accordingly, no action. But if a being can be the end of action present or possible, that being is possessed so far of value, and the action points to the value. The entity “value” thus clings to the existent very closely and (we believe) cannot really be loosed from the existent. Value, we should say, is in the existent and of it, just so far as the existent is or can be the end of action. And this would seem to say plainly that value has a necessary relation to appetition. Such location of value in the being, with a relation to desire or to action, is precisely where Saint Thomas finds “good.” He may be right or wrong, but such in his view is the locus of “good.” This, he says, “is in the existent just so far as the existent has a reference to appetition.”² Or, “Good means that toward which appetition tends.”³

Of these statements the latter, that good means that to which appetite or desire does presently tend, is a definition

² I, q.16, a.1, c.: “Bonum est in re, inquantum habet ordinem ad appetitum.”

³ Ibid.: “Bonum nominat id in quod tendit appetitus.”

of good. But the other is more inclusive and, we believe, more exact: good is in the existent in so far as this has or can have a reference to action. Otherwise, the existent has no value. Of course, as all experience tells, there is no existent totally devoid of such reference, but if there were it would be wholly without value. What either statement of Aquinas says then is this: if there be any existent toward which appetite or action can never aim, that existent has precisely no value.

It seems to us that Aquinas does not spend much time in saying either that the existent is good because I can act for it or that I can act for it because it is good. Now what observation and analysis show is that I think it has qualities which fit it to meet a real need in me. What Aquinas says is that I can and do act for it and that it is good. This is sticking to the experience and putting in the term "good" for one very definite element in the experience. We shall not argue farther whether the article is good because wanted or wanted because good.⁴ We like the method of Saint Thomas who in the main seems to hurry back to the experienced situation. "Good" is shorthand for what is desired or can be desired. And in answer to an objection he says that the dictum of Aristotle that good is what all things desire, does not mean that every good is desired by all things, but that "*whatever is desired has the nature of good.*"⁵ And this is only a repetition of what he had written a little earlier. "The very nature of good," he had

⁴ Cf., Gilson, *Saint Thomas d'Aquin* (2nd ed., Paris, 1925), p. 75: "*Le bien est ce que l'on desire; on ne desire que le bien.*"

⁵ I, q.6, a.2, ad 2: "*Bonum est quod omnia appetunt, non sic intelligitur quasi unumquodque bonum ab omnibus appetatur: sed quia quidquid appetitur, rationem boni habet.*"

put down, "consists in this, that anything be desirable." ⁶ He had said too that "any object is good, so far as desirable." ⁷

It seems no strain upon the text then, as it is none upon the experience or upon common sense, to say that value resides in any existent that is in any way wanted or can in any way be wanted; and action, as we have any experience of it, indicates some kind of want. Whatever else action may possibly do, it points always to value, and whatever value may be, it is demonstrated by every action.

The object may be unreal, but you can act for it if you think it real. You can act for it, and it plainly has value for you. Your action, whether the object be real or ideal or only logical, may be of any kind: an act of intellection, or appreciation, or more patently of appetite; in any event, it stands in some measure for conation and, even more surely, in some measure for appropriation. That is, your action is always somewhat of an effort, and it always has some result for you. You act for something. And you acquire something, not necessarily what you seek, but something: you grow—perhaps beautifully, perhaps weirdly. In every action the agent acquires something real. But what does the object acquire, something real, something logical, or nothing at all?

THE VALUE RELATION

It were much juster to say that the agent acquires value—value in the loose and treacherous sense of a valuable thing

⁶ I, q.5, a.1, c.: "*Ratio enim boni in hoc consistit, quod aliquid sit appetibile.*"

⁷ I, q.6, a.1, c.: "*Bonum enim aliquid est, secundum quod est appetibile.*"

—than to say that the object of any action or “interest” acquires value as a real entity. It is proper nevertheless and entirely just to say that any being which one moment ago was not desired, but is so now, is in a new relation: the relation of being desired. Perhaps it was never in that relation before: there was only the possibility of the relation. And if it had turned out that we should have had to say that an existent has value only when desired and not when merely desirable, then the existent by entering into the relation of being desired would now for the first time be possessed of value. Yet even here it is not quite exact to say that the object “acquires” anything, least of all anything real.

Hardly anyone will urge that there is not a relation between the agent and the object of value. “Value in all its forms implies a relation.”⁸ This relation is so observable that some have seen it to the exclusion of value itself, and said that the relation is value.⁹ For the present we only want to know what kind of entity this particular relation is, and from where to where it bridges: for a relation, it will be remembered, is an in-between.

No one doubts that there is a relation and a particular relation between agent and object. When I go from the state of indifference toward any existent to a liking for it, an enjoying or a knowing of it, a new relation has evidently been effected between me and that existent. When

⁸ Wm. Smart, *An Introduction to the Theory of Value* (3rd ed., London, 1914), p. 5.

Notice Mr. Prall's careful statement, *op. cit.*, p. 243: “Actual value then would imply the relation; potential value would simply be the possibility of the relation”; *cf.*, Mary E. Chase, “Valuing and the Quality of Value,” *Jnl. of Philos.*, v. 22 (1925), p. 71: “A valuable object, in other words, is an object which has the *potentiality* of being valued, but is not necessarily *actually* valued.”

⁹ “Values are relations of interest between conscious activity and environment.” Picard, *Values: Immediate and Contributory*, p. 119; Prall, *op. cit.*, p. 254. Perry, *General Theory of Value*, pp. 116, 124-5.

I begin to like a poem, one of Herrick's, let us say, or a climb up a mountain, or to like "facts" sufficiently to labor over those that are woven into a book and to grasp them, a new relation has begun to exist between me and the poem or the climb or the facts.

This is because, as we saw, the immediate results of action of any kind are a relation between agent and object, and the agent's appropriation, in some degree, of the object. As Saint Thomas remarks, to know anything means, principally, to bring the known thing in some form into the knower, so that in knowledge the relational arrow points from the known thing to the knower. But in desire or appetite it points the other way, for this means principally the conation of the agent toward the object. Cognitive action takes the shape, chiefly, of the knower, but conative action tends to take the shape of the object: "the act of any conative power is aimed at the object."¹⁰ Or, as we have said, good itself, or value for that matter, "*properly* has a reference to appetite."¹¹ Neither knowing nor willing can dispense with subject or object, and appreciating also takes in, and must take in, subject and object.¹² "And though to feel and to know is a sort of suffering," or is in some degree conative, yet conation belongs not properly to these but to desire. "And so the thing known is in some way drawn to the one who understands it. But the act of appetite means that the one who desires is inclined toward the appetible thing."¹³ For the very mean-

¹⁰ I, q.19, a.6, ad 2: "*Actus cognoscitivae virtutis est secundum quod cognitum est in cognoscente: actus autem virtutis appetitivae est ordinatus ad res, secundum quod in seipsis sunt.*"

¹¹ I, q.5, a.4, ad 1: "*Nam bonum proprie respicit appetitum.*"

¹² Cf., Leonard Callahan, *A Theory of Esthetic: According to the Principles of St. Thomas* (Washington, 1927), p. 29.

¹³ In 2 *Ethic.*, lec.5: "*Quamvis sentire et intelligere sit pati quoddam, non tamen dicuntur passiones, animae secundum apprehensionem intellectus vel sensus, sed solum secundum appetitum. . . . Et sic res appre-*

ing of conation is "a kind of movement toward something" which the agent has not yet.¹⁴

It follows that the conative acts have several degrees, according to the nearness of the thing desired and the relative sureness with which it is possessed; and these acts are positive and negative. The positive are: "(1) love which supposes a certain conaturalness of appetite with the thing loved; (2) desire which involves a movement of appetite toward the thing loved; and (3) joy which implies an appetite contented in the loved good. Opposed to these are the negative acts, namely, hate, aversion or flight, and sadness."¹⁵

One becomes like the thing he loves. He is brought, up or down, to that level. This is because, as we have said, the act of will or any act of appetition is pointed toward the object. The act of knowledge, however, looks the other way. It would seem well then to love principally those things which are above, for in these love is nobler even than knowledge. That is, knowledge has its perfection and consummation within the knower, in getting the known thing into the knower, and though the object known be itself higher it must be brought down in some sense if we are to know it: it is to exist now in us, and must therefore be brought to our shape and size. But love approaches its best, the more he who loves "is drawn toward that

hensa quodammodo trahitur ad comprehendentem. Operatio autem potentiae appetitivae est secundum quod appetens inclinatur ad appetibile."

¹⁴In 3 *De Anima*, lec.15: "Nam appetere est quidam motus in aliud tendens."

¹⁵In 2 *Ethic.*, lec.5: "Amor, qui importat quamdam connaturalitatem appetitus ad bonum amatum. Desiderium quod importat motum appetitus in bonum amatum. Et delectatio, quae importat quietem appetitus in bono amato. Quibus opponuntur in ordine ad malum, scilicet: odium amori; aversio desiderio; et tristitia delectationi."

which he loves."¹⁶ For the thing loved is a *pondus*, a lodestone: it has things its way.¹⁷

This, of course, is good psychology, approved and defended in everyone's experience. And it helps perhaps to illustrate the fact that the act of will or appetition "is inclined toward," and "is perfected" in being inclined toward, "the object, as this is in itself."¹⁸ In every instance, the object is the goal of appetition. And the appetitive act, in its simplest expression, is an inclination, a leaning toward;¹⁹ and this leaning is inevitably in the direction of an object. That is why Saint Thomas when he has said that "the soul in appetition has a reference *ad ipsas res prout in seipsis sunt*," goes on to quote Aristotle's summary that "good and evil are in things and are the aim and goal of appetition." Good and, as we shall see, value are principally in things, just as truth is chiefly in the mind.²⁰

Conation thus would seem to be best described by saying that it means the appetent leaning over toward the good or valuable thing.²¹ And again appetition or conation is "a quasi movement upon an object."²² The virtue of hope, for instance, is a volitional virtue which "implies a certain *extensio*, a reaching out, of the appetite upon

¹⁶ I-2, q.66, a.6, ad 1: "*In his autem quae sunt supra hominem, nobilior est dilectio quam cognitio. Perficitur enim cognitio, secundum quod cognita sunt in cognoscente: dilectio vero, secundum quod diligens trahitur ad rem dilectam*"; cf., "*Quando igitur res . . . est nobilior ipsa anima . . . ad talem rem, voluntas est altior intellectu. Quando vero res . . . est infra animam; tunc etiam . . . ad talem rem, intellectus est altior voluntate. Unde melior est amor Dei quam cognitio: e contrario autem melior est cognitio rerum corporalium quam amor.*"—I, q.82, a.3, c.

¹⁷ In S. Matt., c.25, *prin.*

¹⁸ I, q.82, a.3, c.

¹⁹ I-2, q.50, a.5, ad 1: "*Cum nihil aliud sit actus appetitivae virtutis quam inclinatio quaedam.*"

²⁰ I-2, q.22, a.2, c.

²¹ I, q.16, a.1, c.: "*Appetitus autem est secundum quod appetens inclinatur in ipsam rem appetitam.*"

²² I, q.5, a.4, ad 1: "*Appetitus est quasi quidam motus ad rem.*"

some good": it follows upon the knowledge of a future and arduous, though possible, good, and is "an extension of appetite upon an object of that kind."²³

Now relation itself, whether it be cognitive or conative or of place or any other kind, has two termini. It is a tenuous entity, not strong, not exactly here or there but, as we have said, in between. There is no more frail being, says Saint Thomas.²⁴ And the important present point is that there is a relation between the agent and the object of his action, and these two, the agent and the object, are the termini of the value relation. It is almost at once evident that agent and object are not affected in the same manner or degree by the coming of this new relation, and the question now is how each is affected and which, if either, is more intimately affected. And we must say that a survey of the field of thought on value shows that the comparative merits of these two termini, precisely as termini, have not too often or too pointedly been remarked.

"The conative faculty is in some sense a passive one, in so far, that is, as it is moved by the appetible object." It is accordingly of less primary and pivotal importance than the object: "and yet it is a principle of human actions,"²⁵ and also of any action. It is one principle of action. However, if we are looking for the very principle and indeed the very terminus, expressed in one word, we shall find it in the appetible thing. *"And thus the terminus of appeti-*

²³ 1-2, q.40, a.2, c.: "*Cum spes importet extensionem quandam appetitus in bonum. . . . Et secundum hoc, spes est motus appetitivae virtutis, consequens apprehensionem boni futuri ardui possibilis adipisci, scilicet extensio appetitus in huiusmodi objectum.*"

²⁴ *De Potentia*, q.8, a.2, ad 4: "*Relatio habet esse debilissimum*"; cf., *ibidem*, q.9, a.5, ad 14: "*Relatio inter omnia genera debiliiori modo res est.*"

²⁵ 1-2, q.18, a.2, ad 3: "*Nam appetitiva potentia est quodammmodo passiva, inquantum movetur ab appetibili: et tamen est principium humanorum actuum.*"

tion, which is 'good,' is in the appetible thing." ²⁶ The several principles in my present action, for instance, are readily seen to be these: (1) the end at which I aim, however poorly, (2) I who am the agent, and (3) any means which I use. And these principles may not be best studied regardless of their order. "For the first principle of an action is the end which moves the agent, the second is the agent, and the third is the means which is used to accomplish the purpose," though indeed the agent's own character tells in the achievement. A carpenter "is moved to action by the end, which is the finished product, say, a chest or a couch, and he applies the drawing-knife which, by reason of its sharp edge, cuts" and shapes the article.²⁷

Yet these three, the agent, the instrument and the purpose, can in any particular action be reduced to one: namely, the end or purpose. The tool or means patently has no *raison d'être* apart from the work which it helps to do. And you when you act, though as an existent and an individual you are not dependent on the end, yet as an agent you are dependent on it. You work through intellect and will, the cognitive and conative faculties; and this intellect, Saint Thomas proceeds to say, is the practical intellect which does not reason for the sake of the reasoning but to do something. "And all conation manifestly is for something. For it is silly to say that anyone desires for the sake of desiring. This is because desire or conation is a kind of movement tending to something. And that at

²⁶ I, q.16, a.1, c.: "*Et sic terminus appetitus, quod est bonum, est in re appetibili.*"

²⁷ I, q.105, a.5, c.: "*Finis vero et agens et forma se habent ut actionis principium, sed ordine quodam. Nam primo quidem, principium actionis est finis, qui movet agentem; secundo vero, agens; tertio autem, forma eius quod ab agente applicatur ad agendum (quamvis et ipsum agens per formam suam agat); ut patet in artificialibus. Artifex enim movetur ad agendum a fine, qui est ipsum operatum, puta arca vel lectus; et applicat ad actionem securim, quae incidit per suum acumen.*"

which conation aims, that is, the appetible object, is the principle of the practical intellect." In other words, the appetible thing is the end on which the intellect's practical consideration can first get any hold.

Now the appetible thing, which is the first thing considered by the practical intellect, is what begets action; and for this reason the practical intellect, because its principle, the appetible thing, begets action, is said to beget action . . . *And so there is just one movens* (just one thing which begets action), that is to say, the appetible object. For this moves conation, and is the principle of intellection, which two we granted are the *moventia*.²⁸ (And) if *moventia* are regarded formally and specifically, there will be just one movens, that is to say, the desirable thing or the thing desired, because among all movers the first mover is the desirable thing; for as known and thought of, it is an unaffected mover. But it is plain that secondary movers are not moved, except in so far as they share the first movens.²⁹

And when it is said, and very well said, that the good does of its own nature pour itself out, this does not primarily imply the doing of an agent, but of a final cause or purpose: "for the reason that the agent as such is not the measure and perfection of anything, but more properly its beginning."³⁰

²⁸ In 3 *De Anima*, lec.15: "Intellectus qui movet est intellectus qui rationatur propter aliquid, non propter ratiocinari tantum; et hic est practicus intellectus. . . . Et manifestum est quod omnis appetitus est propter aliquid. Stultum enim est dicere quod aliquis appetit propter appetere. Nam appetere est quidam motus in aliud tendens. Sed illud cuius est appetitus, scilicet appetibile, est principium intellectus practici. Nam illud, quod est primo appetibile, est finis a quo incipit consideratio intellectus practici. . . . Quia enim ipsum appetibile, quod est primum consideratum ab intellectu practico, movet, propter hoc dicitur intellectus practicus movere, quia scilicet eius principium, quod est appetibile, movet. . . . Sic igitur apparet quod unum est movens, scilicet appetibile; hoc enim appetitum movet, et est principium intellectus, quae duo ponuntur *moventia*."

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ *De Veritate*, q.21, a.1, ad 4.

"The real dependence" in the value relation, then, concludes Saint Thomas, is of agent upon object, it is "of that which is pointed at the end or goal": just as in the instance of logical-real relations.³¹ And this is only to affirm that "in those things in which intellect and the known thing differ and those in which will and willed thing differ, there can be a real relation" or dependence "both of knowledge to known thing and of the willer (*volentis*) to the willed thing."³² The value relation is thus a logical-real one, with the real dependence on the part not of the object but of the agent.

WHAT THE OBJECT ACQUIRES

It has been said that the object of "interest," or as we should say, the object or end of action, "acquires" value.³³ This is a strenuous word here—"acquires." It were more just and precise to say that by desire or, more broadly, by action we tend to "acquire" what we have not and what we need.³⁴ It is our contention, at any rate, that the object of action or interest acquires no real thing, but that it is now in a new relation and therefore a conceptual something may be said to have been added to it. The agent, however, acquires in the transfer; he always attains something. And for this difference between agent and object as the two termini of any action there is a formula that is mathematical in its strictness. It is this: the agent moves and is moved, the object moves and is not moved. The agent, as all philosophers of value agree, is concerned:

³¹ *Ibid.*, ad 8: "*Isti rationi aliquid respondet in re, scilicet realis dependentia eius quod est ad finem ipsum, sicut est etiam in aliorum relationibus rationis.*"

³² I, q.28, a.4, ad 1.

³³ Perry, *General Theory of Value*, p. 116.

³⁴ *De Veritate*, q.21, a.1, ad 4; C.G., 3, c.3; I, q.44, a.4, c.

that he cares is the origin of a value problem at all.³⁵ The object, all this time, is in reality unaffected.

The agent, we have remarked, is a lover, and the perfection of his proper act lies in his being "drawn to the loved thing."³⁶ "Now the loved thing is the end: and the end is the principle in action, as first principles are in cognition." And "when appetite is altogether permeated with the form of the good which is its object, and rests in it, and clings to it as in a sense made into itself," the result is that "through love the lover becomes one with the loved thing . . . and hence the saying of Aristotle,³⁷ that one's friend is another self . . . for the lover takes the loved as his own self." The reason of this, the presently important reason, is that "appetition, though a force, is passive. Whence the saying also of Aristotle, III *De Anima*, that the appetible thing is a *movens non-motum*": the object of action moves to action, but itself remains unaffected.³⁸

It must as a consequence be said that the terminus of action and of the value relation is principally in the object, that "good" is principally in the desired thing, and that value is also located there.³⁹ Yet this is not the only place where good and value may be said to reside; they

³⁵ Bosanquet, *Individuality and Value*, p. 294: "The fundamental fact is that I care for some sort of thing." Cf., Quick, "The Humanist Theory of Value," *Mind*, v. 19 (1910), pp. 218f.; Perry, "The Definition of Value," *Jnl. of Philos.*, v. 11 (1914), p. 149.

³⁶ I-2, q.66, a.6, ad 1.

³⁷ *Ethics* IX, 4.

³⁸ 3 *Sent.*, d.27, q.1, a.1, c.: "*Bonum autem amatum est finis: finis autem principium in operabilibus sicut prima principia in cognoscendis.*" "*Quando affectus vel appetitus omnino imbuatur forma boni quod est sibi objectum, eo placet sibi in illo, et adhaeret ei quasi fixum in ipso*"; "*efficitur unum cum illo; ideo per amorem amans fit unum cum amato . . . et ideo*" dicit Philosophus, IX *Ethica*, cap. 4, *quod amicus est alter ipse . . . enim amans amatum assumpserit quasi idem sibi.*" "*Appetitus autem est virtus passiva: unde in III De Anima, dicit Philosophus, quod appetibile movet sicut movens (non) motum.*"

³⁹ I, q.16, a.1, c.

are in the object primarily, but not to the exclusion of the appetent, or the relation of desire. For when Saint Thomas has said that "the terminus of appetite, which terminus is 'good,' is in the appetible thing," he goes on at once to compare "good" and "true," and he says that "truth is principally in the intellect, but secondarily in things, according as these are referred to intellect as to their principle." And thus, says he, "the thing known may be called true derivatively, in so far as it has some reference to intellect." This point which he wishes to make about truth, he illustrates from what he takes to be well known about good: truth is primarily in the mind, he says, and secondarily in things, "just as good is in the object, in so far as the object has a relation to desire: and therefore is applied, derivatively from the object, to the desire; and so desire or appetition, which is of the good, is called good."⁴⁰

Thus it is unmistakable that the theory of Saint Thomas, rightly or wrongly, regards value as first in the object, and derivatively but improperly in the desire of the object: "*bonum est in re, in quantum habet ordinem ad appetitum.*"

This too, as is well known, is in accord with his mild doctrine of the beautiful. The *pulchrum*, he says, is not in mind alone nor in object alone, but in both. *Pulchrum est quod visum placet*: the beautiful is anything that when seen pleases.⁴¹ And he is fond of making a comparison of

⁴⁰ I, q.16, a.1, c.: "*Terminus appetitus, quod est bonum, est in re appetibili*"; "*veritas principaliter est in intellectu; secundario vero in rebus, secundum quod comparantur ad intellectum ut ad principium.*"

"*Sicut autem bonum est in re, in quantum habet ordinem ad appetitum; et propter hoc ratio bonitatis derivatur a re appetibili in appetitum, secundum quod appetitus dicitur bonus, prout est boni: ita, cum verum sit in intellectu secundum quod conformatur rei intellectae, necesse est quod ratio veri ab intellectu ad rem intellectam derivetur, ut res etiam intellecta vera dicatur, secundum quod habet aliquem ordinem ad intellectum.*"

⁴¹ I, q.5, a.4, ad 1; 1-2, q.27, a.1, ad 3.

the good and the beautiful, showing that though they are not the same, they are very much alike.

He holds that they are the same, "except that they differ in their appeal. For since the good is what all desire, it is characteristic of good that appetite is fulfilled in it. And it is characteristic of the beautiful that at sight or knowledge of it the apprehending subject should find appeasement . . . so that is called good which is simply pleasing to desire, and that is called beautiful the mere apprehension of which is pleasing."⁴² That is to say, the *bonum* is what draws out desire; and the *pulchrum* itself, when and so far as sought, is a particular *bonum*. But, properly, the *pulchrum* is what we look upon and are satisfied with. As Bosanquet says, in æsthetic enjoyment "it is not the transition towards an unattained terminus that makes the essence of the activity."⁴³ Again Aquinas remarks, "They differ logically. For good properly has a reference to desire: good is what all desire. And therefore it has the nature of an end: for desire is a kind of descent upon an object. The beautiful on the other hand has a reference to cognition: we call those things beautiful which when seen please."⁴⁴

Does good then, or we may say "value," add any real thing to the object? There is a new special relation to the object, as indeed to the subject. The existent is veritably an object now, the end of action. Yet this cannot be said to be a real addition to the existent. "Though good does

⁴² I-2, q.27, a.1, ad 3: "*Pulchrum est idem bono, sola ratione differens. Cum enim bonum sit quod omnia appetunt, de ratione boni est quod in eo quietetur appetitus: sed ad rationem pulchri pertinet quod in eius aspectu seu cognitione quietetur appetitus . . . ita quod bonum dicatur id quod simpliciter complacet appetitui; pulchrum autem dicatur id cuius ipsa apprehensio placet.*"

⁴³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 130-1.

⁴⁴ I, q.5, a.4, ad 1.

For these matters, see Callahan, *op. cit.*, pp. 29, 69-71.

imply a special relation, i.e. (a relation) of end, still this relation belongs to every conceivable entity, and makes no real addition to the entity."⁴⁵

The existent in becoming a valued object or end of conative action takes on at most a conceptual something, almost precisely as in becoming the end of intellection it gains not a real entity but a conceptual one. Now if Mr. Perry meant this kind of being, this merely conceptual addition, when he remarked that the existent in becoming object of "interest" and entering into the value relation, "acquires" value, he has kept evidently to the experience. And maybe this is what he did mean; it is not clear. Certainly, however, he always tends to unbalance the whole situation and not to see value quite in its place and nature, for he has repeatedly said that the principal terminus of the value relation is at the interest end and not at the object end. "An object would be said to possess value in so far as it fulfilled interest, or assumed the relation of fulfillment to the term interest."⁴⁶ This, as we have seen, is to jar the situation and to view the elements out of their natural proportions and places. Interest, or agent, is not the central or main terminus.

The value relation itself is some one of three kinds: it is *real*, if both termini of the relation are really affected, *logical*, if neither terminus is really affected, *mixed* or logical-real, if only one terminus is really affected.⁴⁷ Now the value relation is of this logical-real or mixed kind: the agent is really affected but the object is not. And certainly the being which is added to the object, or acquired by it, must also be one of three kinds, as Saint Thomas notes.

⁴⁵ *De Veritate*, q.22, a.1, ad 9: "*Quamvis 'bonum' dicat aliquem specialem habitudinem, scilicet finis; tamen ista habitudo competit cuilibet enti, nec ponit aliquid secundum rem in ente.*"

⁴⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 150; cf., *General Theory of Value*, pp. 115-24.

⁴⁷ I, q.13, a.7, c.

It must be (1) wholly outside our minds, as a man or a stone, (2) wholly within the mind, as a dream or chimera, or (3) within and without, as time, truth, humanness or any universal.⁴⁸ And we have been led to conclude that value is this third kind of entity: that value is in the object primarily, but also in the mind or agent. And if we wish to consider the question from the point of view of adding anything to another thing, we again have a threefold possibility, and again value, it plainly appears, can only be the third. For, as Saint Thomas says, it is not (1) a sugar coating, not like whiteness put, wholly from the outside, upon a wall, (2) nor is it such that it brings the object within a special class, as for instance man adds to the mere animal: to the vital principle which the animal has, man adds a discursive vital principle which the animal has not, (3) so it must add something unreal, a conceptual something only. And this mental addition might possibly be a mere negation, as blindness for example is said to "add" something to a man; or it might be a relation. Thus *unum*, oneness, "adds that which is logical only, i.e., a negation, for *unum* means an undivided entity. But the true and the good are predicated positively. Thus these can add only the logical end of a logical-real relation": and this is a conceptual, not a real, entity.

Now in a relation there is a logical terminus if that which is not dependent is said to be referred or related to that which is indeed dependent:

Since the relation itself is a kind of limitation: as knowledge and the knowable thing, sensation and the sensible thing; for knowledge does depend on the knowable thing, and not vice versa: hence the relation of knowledge to the knowable thing is

⁴⁸ 1 *Sent.*, d.19, q.5, a.1, c.

real, but that of the knowable thing is logical only: for the knowable thing *is said* to be referred or dependent, according to Aristotle, not because *it* is referred or dependent, but because the other is referred to it (and dependent on it); and it is so wherever things are as measure and measured, or perfective and perfectible.

Therefore, it is necessary that, to the granted entity, true and good should add the relation of its (greater) perfection.⁴⁹

In either of two ways this greater perfection can be added to a being. First, intellect might take the being, though under another form, into itself and so perfect the being in this merely conceptual sense; and that is why anyone rightly defining "true" is careful to put in a reference of the thing to mind or intellect: anything is true so far as "conformed or conformable to intellect." Another way of perfecting a being is according to the existence which it has in the nature of things, and it is in this way that "good" is perfective: good is in things. And this good, which is in things, is the object of conative action or desire:

So far as any being, by its own existence, is perfective of another or preservative of it (as the object of my conative action is really perfective or preservative of me) the former has the nature of an end with relation to that which is perfected by it; and so all who rightly define "good," work in something which has a reference to end: "good is that which all strive after or toward."⁵⁰

The addendum then to the thing sought or valued is never more than a conceptual one, and the dependence of the object on the seeker is not more than logical. The real dependence is in the seeker. It follows thus that some

⁴⁹ *De Veritate*, q.21, a.1, c.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

writers have tended to overstress the dependence of the object. Says one: if any object has meaning, purpose, or value, such object has a "lack of complete independence."⁵¹ If God is sought as value, or is valued, then he is not perfect: for value always involves a beyond and not-yet.⁵² If God is equivalent to "values," says Professor Spaulding, then there is no Absolute or God: for values, he believes, are dependent on human or animal consciousness.⁵³ The error in such views, we must remark, lies in supposing that the valuing begets a real dependence in its object.

And if it is insisted that there is a "real dependence" somewhere in the situation, this is easily granted: "i.e., the real dependence is of that which is pointed to the end itself."⁵⁴ In other words, I have a real dependence upon that which I value, but the object of my valuing has no real dependence upon me. Or if, with Professor Perry and others, anyone urge that there is a new special relation, this too is granted, and even insisted upon: there "is a special relation, namely, the relation of end."⁵⁵ It is quite important to be aware always of where we stand in the whole situation and to recall which way the relational arrow points. And it is little relevant, Saint Thomas notes, to say that a relation is like a road: it leads both ways. For though it be true that the road from New York to Boston is the same as the road from Boston to New York, the directions are different, the termini are different, and it makes a world of difference which way you face.⁵⁶ And this is

⁵¹ J. S. Moore, "Value in Its Relation to Meaning or Purpose," *Jnl. of Philos.*, v. 11 (1914), p. 184.

⁵² Tsanoff, *The Problem of Immortality: Studies in Personality and Value*, p. 345.

⁵³ *The New Rationalism* (1918), p. 69. Mr. Spaulding is not consistent in this view (see pp. 84, 520).

⁵⁴ *De Veritate*, q.21, a.1, ad 8.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, ad 9.

⁵⁶ I, q.28, a.4, ad 5.

true in all relations in which there is a one-way dependence, and which are logical at one term but real at the other. There must accordingly be said to be "a real relation of knowledge to the known thing and of will to the willed thing."⁵⁷ The real dependence, that is to say, is in the valuer, and not in value and not in the valued object. And the real addition or acquirement is to the valuer, and not to the valued object.

The plant reaches into the ground for food, as Mr. Alexander says very well, but the food is really there: it would be "extravagant" to think that the soil it lives in "depended on the tree for its existence or character": the tree reacts to nutritive elements which are in the soil.⁵⁸ In other words, the dependence is on the part of the valuing plant, and not on the part of the valued phosphates. "Knowing and experiencing do not make any difference to the 'thing' known," says Mr. Spaulding; "relatedness does not imply dependence."⁵⁹ No real difference, we have said, or no real dependence.

Action then points toward value. It points, patently, toward an object. Yet value, like the object which it indwells, need not be more than conceptual, it may be as unreal and superstitious as Durkheim found it in important instances to be. However, it remains existential. The one requirement is that action be aimed at the object *as this is apprehended*. It is the good as known that moves and itself is not moved, it is the appetible thing, not always as this is, but as we understand it.⁶⁰

And now which of these shall we call "value"? The

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, ad 1.

⁵⁸ *Space, Time and Deity*, v. 2, p. 105.

⁵⁹ *The New Rationalism*, pp. 84, 520; *cf.*, p. 499: to be dependent on, is not to be identical with.

⁶⁰ I, q.80, a.2, c.; I, q.105, a.5, c.; *de Veritate*, q.21, a.1, c.; I-2, q.8, a.1, c.

independent and really unaffected object? The really affected agent? The agent's need of the object? or his desire and knowledge of it? The choice, ultimately, between acting and not acting? Or the relation which fits in incidentally between the agent and the object? Maybe not any of these. For one thing, we must certainly say that value is located in the object.

Experience tells that we value the object, that the existent is found possessed of value in the sense that it can be the end of action. For this reason we cannot accept the contrary view, that the actor, and not the end of his action, is central and primary. We cannot accept the statement of Mr. Brightman for instance, that "it is rather its effect on a mind, or the attitude of a mind toward it that constitutes its value."⁶¹ The value relation is here made to look both ways indiscriminately. For our part, we still agree wholly with Mr. Urban who says, "We are really confusing value with the relation of value to a sentient subject."⁶² A saying of Mr. Santayana's also is quite a propos here: "To confuse the instrument with its function and the operation with its meaning has been a constant foible in modern philosophy."⁶³ And we yet see no good and sufficient reason to reject the common-sense datum. We still maintain, accordingly, that value is in the object when I act for it and always in the existent in the sense that I might at any time act for it and that thus it might at any time be truly an object. Value is the capacity of an existent to be the end of action.⁶⁴ Value is the character or

⁶¹ *An Introduction to Philosophy* (New York, 1925), p. 143; cf., p. 158: "Value consists in some relation to the experience of conscious beings."

⁶² *Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy*, 1926, p. 296.

⁶³ *The Life of Reason* (1922), v. 1, p. 113.

⁶⁴ Cf., Laing, *A Study in Moral Problems* (1922), p. 8: "Values are not existences like objects that have a definite spatial limit, but are

quality of an existent on account of which character or quality the existent is or can be the end of action. Has the existent such capacity or, more precisely, such character or quality? Every action demonstrates that it has.

We have gained some understanding of the relation between agent and object and of what each acquires in any action. We are thus in a better position to say what credence is to be given to the rather popular report that the agent confers value. With the doctrine that value creates reality we shall have little or nothing to do: this is too extreme for us.⁶⁵ And on the other hand we do not at all question but fully agree with the view that "it is only by relation to life that we can predicate value."⁶⁶ We examine now only such tenet as Nietzsche's The Strong Man who "knows that it is he himself who confers honor on things; he is the *creator of values*."⁶⁷

ON CONFERRING VALUE

We endow objects with value. We create and confer. This, as was often said, is common doctrine. Our awareness of an object's value, Mr. Santayana says, "constitutes" the whole worth of it.⁶⁸ This is just stronger than the usual statement. Felix Adler only says: I do not find worth in others, I attribute it to them and to myself.⁶⁹ Our valuing does it, says Mr. Prall; our desiring, says Professor Perry.

qualities attaching to things, actions, and human beings." Quick, *op. cit.*, p. 218: "'Value' may be defined as that property of an instrument which makes it useful."

⁶⁵ E. S. Waterhouse, *The Psychology of Religious Experience* (London, 1923), pp. 199, 203: "Values create facts"; "value creates fact."

⁶⁶ A. G. Wiggery, Introductory Note to Eucken's *Life's Basis and Life's Ideal* (tr., London, 1918), p. xi.

⁶⁷ *Beyond Good and Evil* (tr., London, 1924), p. 228.

⁶⁸ *The Life of Reason*, v. 1, p. 221.

⁶⁹ *An Ethical Philosophy of Life* (1918), p. 125.

"Value is created by valuing."⁷⁰ "And it is the primary relation to desire that endows a thing with value."⁷¹

This is everyday doctrine. How pointed, and exact, and verifiable is it? Recall the situation. We come, or any agent comes, with a need, perhaps a voracity for the object; certainly with readiness and capacity for the object. That is, appetite is expressive always of a need, whether or not the need be very distinct and marked.⁷² At that moment there is in some rough kind of way a fusion of the striving, pursuing agent and the object; and the resulting compound, the object as sought, is possessed of functional value. Or, in simplest words, there is a new special relation between agent and object, which object was until now but an existent and a possible object or end of action; and at one end of the new special relation value is functioning, at the other end is the needy pursuing agent; in between, is conation or action. This is the experience. And in the whole of it what do we create?

The one thing that we do not create is *ens*, unless it be of the conceptual and unreal sort. And *ens* or being, as we saw, is the backbone of value.⁷³ A mere existent of course is not value. Yet an existent is as necessary as desire or conation, and more fundamental; for it is the existent that awakens desire. No existent, no desire, hence no conation or action, and no value of any kind. And *ens*, whether there be desire or not, is an entity of one kind or another: real or mental, it is unabashed existence: this is the meaning of *ens*.⁷⁴

⁷⁰ *A Study of the Theory of Value* (1921), p. 268.

⁷¹ *The New Realism* (1912), p. 141; *cf.*, p. 148: "In order that a thing shall be valuable, it must be object of desire." All this is, again, the confusing of distinct items—valuable, valued, and value.

⁷² I, q.44, a.4, c.; C.G., 3, c.3; *cf.*, Gillet, *La Morale et Les Morales* (1925), p. 274.

⁷³ C.G., I, c.37: "*Esse igitur actu boni rationem constituit.*"

⁷⁴ I, q.5, a.1, c.: "*Esse enim est actualitas omnis rei.*"

We consider here and criticize the view that in all instances our desiring begets value, and in doing this we shall think over again in part the theory that value overrides existence, creates fact or spurns it.

We never engender any real *ens*. This is plain and relevant truth. We stop, in any but a conceptual instance, with the *fieri*, the *devenir* or the reshaping of *ens*. We take being for granted.⁷⁵ We work upon this as given. Here are women, let us say, who pick up wastrels and make what they can of them. These women begin with human lives as given. And even of natural parents it is diremption from fact to say that they create *de novo*. Using language precisely, we must say that man never creates.⁷⁶

The empiric agent, says Saint Thomas, effects changes in things, but he works upon a stuff or *esse* which he did not produce and cannot produce. The carpenter, for instance, erects a house. But he uses materials which he does not make. He uses cement, stone, timbers which can be shaped and will remain shaped in such and such ways. Saint Thomas proceeds: "Thus the *esse*, the very being of the house depends on the nature of these things, as its building or *fieri* depends on the action of the carpenter."⁷⁷

⁷⁵ "You beg a kilogram of being at once," or "a thousand successive grams; but you . . . are the same beggar whatever you pretend." Wm. James, *Some Problems of Philosophy* (New York and London, 1921), pp. 44-5.

⁷⁶ Creativity, emergence, progress, practicality, enjoy a good press, but make inroads on precise thought. The "doctrine of Progress" is now "the dominating and controlling idea of western civilization" (Bury, *The Idea of Progress*, 1921, pp. vii, viii). Yet says Mr. Perry (*The Present Conflict of Ideals*, p. 61): "Deeper and incomparably more difficult are the problems of ends and purposes."

The Eastern World, rightly or not, disregards our religion of progress; cf., Yu-Ian Fung, "Why China Has No Science," *Int. Jnl. Eth.*, v. 32 (1922), pp. 237-63.

⁷⁷ I, q.104, a.1, c.: "*Aliquod agens est causa sui effectus secundum fieri tantum, et non directe secundum esse eius. . . . Aedificator enim est causa domus quantum ad eius fieri, non autem directe quantum ad esse*

I create no real thing, but I may create a logical or merely conceptual one. And I confer value: when and in so far as I confer ens: which ens, of course, has no status except in my mind. Yesterday this book had value for me; to-day, almost none—as object in any serious way sought or treasured, it does not now exist for me. To-morrow I take up with the book again. Have I at any time added a mite of value to the book, or withdrawn any? A conceptual value, perhaps. A real value, no. The real value was now static, now at least in part functional; but it was real all the time and not of my making. I have discovered the real value of the book and let this take hold on me, I have lost for a while that value as functional or dynamic, and discovered it again. Or, I have lent to the book an existence which in reality it has not, and this merely mental existent I have endowed with spurious value.

Whatever value such merely mental objects bear is strictly conferred by the mind which creates these objects. It is very true that our conation and all conation is aimed at things “as these are in themselves.”⁷⁸ But often we and sometimes even the animals give to things, wholly or in part, not the existence which they have “in themselves,” but that which they have for us. For, as we noted, our conation, taking the direction supplied by our way of apprehending the object, may be toward a merely “apparent good.” The purely “natural” appetite, however, as the

eius . . . aedificator facit domum adhibendo caementum, lapides et ligna, quae sunt susceptiva et conservativa talis compositionis et ordinis. Unde esse domus dependet ex naturis harum rerum, sicut fieri domus dependet ex actione aedificatoris.”

Cf., F. H. Bradley, *Essays on Truth and Reality* (1914), pp. 338-9: “I can, for instance, make a noise or an experiment . . . make a box, but not the nature of the materials, nor again the properties of the box itself when once made. I can make a noise, as we saw, but to make an explosion begins at once to strain language.”

⁷⁸ 1, q.19, a.6, ad 2: “*Actus autem virtutis appetitivae est ordinatus ad res, secundum quod in seipsis sunt.*”

plant's, is toward "a really existing good."⁷⁹ We for our part create ex nihilo or nearly so, that is, out of the void, and though there is little or no reality to starch our creation we yet endow it with value. Or upon real objects we confer a value which the reality in them does not sustain, but this we can do only because to the stature of the real object we add a cubit or two of our own. For instance, of the bourgeoisie M. Goblot says that its superiority is in its belief that it is superior.⁸⁰ And it is thinkable, at a distance, that either M. Goblot or this people is right; and if M. Goblot, then the people has begotten an entitative but bastard superiority and conferred value upon it. However, when I find delight and use and something natively good in playing with this small boy, let us say, it does not at all follow that value from these three points of view is not really in the object, i.e., in such act of play. And if the act, or anything else, is natively good I have a certain guarantee of its usefulness.⁸¹

It is important to renote with care that the real change consequent upon valuing is wrought necessarily in the valuer but not in the thing valued. The object sought moves and is not moved, the seeker moves and is moved.⁸² A lad may be enamored of all the maidens in the neighborhood, but though he grow pale and lunatic over the several affairs the maidens may be unaware, and were they aware they might be little affected. It makes a difference to the science of botany whether we botanize or not, but

⁷⁹ I-2, q.8, a.1, c.: "*Id in quod tendit appetitus naturalis est, bonum existens in re. . . . Ad hoc igitur quod voluntas in aliquid tendat, non requiritur quod sit bonum in rei veritate, sed quod apprehendatur in ratione boni . . . finis est bonum, vel apparens bonum.*"

⁸⁰ *La Logique des Jugements de Valeur* (Paris, 1927), p. 1.

⁸¹ 2 Sent., d.21, q.1, a.3, c.: "*Utilitas semper coincidit honestati.*"

Cf., 2-2, q.145, a.3, c., et ad 3.

⁸² I, q.80, a.2, c.: "*Appetibile apprehensum est movens non motum; appetitus autem, movens motum.*"

no real difference to the plants. Or, more exactly in the words of Aquinas: "the dependence of knowledge on the knowable thing is consequent upon the action of the knower, and not upon the action of the knowable thing. For the knowable thing, as it is in itself, is just the same when it is known and when it is not known."⁸³

What we repeat is that value, whatever it is, lies in the object, whatever this is. We create and confer only when we create and confer. It is likely that the poet created and conferred when the rosy wreath smelt "not of itself but thee!" Altogether likely, yet not apodictic.

⁸³ C.G., 4, c.14: "*Relatio enim scientiae ad scibile consequitur actionem scientis, non autem actionem scibilis; scibile enim eodem modo se habet, quantum in se est, et quando intelligitur, et quando non intelligitur*"; cf., C.G., 2, c.12: "*Comparatur igitur Deus ad alia entia sicut scibile ad scientiam nostram, quod eius mensura est.*"

CHAPTER VIII

BEYOND VALUES AND DISVALUES

Action demonstrates value. Perhaps one cannot easily know what value is, but if he wishes to know where value is he needs only to follow the arrow. On a common-sense view, value is seen to be in the object, but not really separable from the object, for which I act. And we have seen that the end of action is not what is ordinarily termed "the object"; the very end is the agent. Value then is intermediate in "the object," but it resides ultimately only in the agent himself.¹

More precisely, as we shall now see, value turns out to be (1) our perfection, and (2) God; since in the long run it is at these that our action is aimed.

Value, we have urged, is what action is pointed toward (and without entering this farther field, we may hint that moral value requires only moral or human action as its exhibitor). Certainly we should pause long before saying that a complete philosophy of value is anywhere worked out along these lines, but it is true that shreds and patches of it are here and there discernible. "In the light of values," says Mr. B. M. Laing, the individual "can select objects at which he may aim or direct his activity."² Any conscious and free process, Mr. J. Laird believes, "is directed

¹ Things which suffice per se for the end, have a perfect goodness or value; these which are of use are of instrumental value. 1-2, q.98, 1, c.

A clear and interesting study of this subject of the very end of human action, with which, however, we do not fully agree, is Miltner's "Self Realization and Ethics," *The New Scholasticism*, v. 3 (Jan., 1929).

² *A Study in Moral Problems* (1922), p. 75.

towards the attainment of value.”³ The problem itself is stated in these terms, “What is man’s Chief End?”⁴ And Mr. Taylor has said in his recent book: “What is of value to a man comes as an interwoven or organic response to a desire or activity of his own; in general, to his impulse to live and function.”⁵

Within the object itself value indwells, and it can never survive away from home. Shall we say therefore that value is the result of action? or, is action the result of value? These are questions which with great finality cannot be answered. Common sense would seem to say that the latter is the case, and it has not yet been well shown that common sense is misled. And it would go on to say that as any object has the value sapped out of it, action and desire abate and die down, and these rekindle only as value is discovered in some other object or from some other point of view. Yet this is a question of instrumental value alone. For, on a further view it is true that the agent is central, is first and last, in both valuing and value, and the object is but an intermediary. The agent then and not the object is the end of action truly; unless we say—what is not

³ *Problems of the Self* (London, 1917), p. 133; cf., Sir Henry Jones, *A Faith That Enquires* (1922), p. 87: It is a “fundamental characteristic of rational beings that they act from purposes; and purposes are at once thoughts and volitions, and are charged with value.”

⁴ J. S. Mackenzie, *Ultimate Values* (1924), p. 25.

⁵ Henry Osborn Taylor, *Human Values and Verities* (1928), p. 7; cf., Bosanquet, *Some Suggestions in Ethics*, pp. 52-3: “What is good or has value is naturally observed as possessing the general character of what a human being wants . . . or anything in which we find ourselves affirmed.”

Hobhouse, *The Rational Good*, p. xix: “But the values of human life are the objects of our wishes.” E. G. Spaulding, *The New Rationalism*, p. 66: A value is anything desired “as an end to be attained.” Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World*, p. 136: “Realization therefore is in itself the attainment of value.”

Hans Driesch in *Mind and Body* (New York, 1927), p. 58, calls attention to “the experience of the æsthetic and logical (including ethical) finalities: ‘this creation is beautiful,’ ‘this one is true’—‘both are in order.’”

forced—that the agent is indeed the final object. And so we come to a current view which we once repudiated: the view, namely, that value is mainly in the agent or valuer; or we seem to come to it. Yet our way of putting the problem and the attempted solution, such a finding of action pointed back to the agent, is not expressed and is not meant by any current writer, with, we should say, one exception.⁶

Where there is no action there is no demonstrable value, and where there is no possible action there is simply no value.

It is another question when the agent has his hands unshakably on the object. Appetition slackens. Certainly, conation comes to a standstill. For attainment is plainly the termination of yearning after and striving for. The end was what once gave bent and meaning to the agent's doing, but is now possessed and it represents fulfillment and the appeasement of desire.⁷ All conation, it will be recalled, implies a hunger, a need and insufficiency.

Yet it is an error to suppose that possession ends all action. When we possess, we do not any longer strive for, we enjoy and sometimes treasure and cherish, and it may be that we more and more comprehend. In other words, though conation in the broader sense ceases, action does not. I labor for something—say, a rifle, a watch, an education. Are we to say therefore that it has value for me only

⁶ H. O. Taylor, *op. cit.*, p. 19: "I think of value as the realization in my nature of that which profits me"; also pp. 9-10; *cf.*, Wm. Smart, *An Introduction to the Theory of Value* (3rd ed., 1915), p. 5: "Value, in the subjective sense, we may call, generally, the importance which a good is considered to possess with reference to the well-being of a person." One of Mr. Perry's definings, namely, value as any object of any interest, would fit here if he made the agent the veritable object and did not stop at the intermediary object, which after all only has value and is not value.

⁷ C.G., 3, c.3: "*Finis est in quo quiescit appetitus agentis vel moventis, et eius quod movetur.*"

while I strive for it? Of some objects certainly this would be untrue. For some objects, even though attained, continue to be ends of action, objects of a considerable and steady liking and appreciation. That is to say, often there is an habitual element in our valuing: for our brothers and sisters, let us say; and if our possession of even common things be challenged, it may be that we are keen to defend. For there are these two aspects to be kept in mind "about the nature of end or good; namely, that it is sought or desired by those who have not yet attained it, and that it is loved by and is a source of pleasure to those who share it; since the same nature tends to the end and in a measure is satisfied with the end."⁸

Now, the pure *quies sine sollicitudine* is harder to comprehend, for the reason that it is pretty well beyond any temporal experience. We have existence and life and knowledge—some of each of these; and we reach for more. Yet even as we do, these are not possessed absolutely without anxiety and care. Little is unchallengeably ours. All our having is tentative and precarious. We have some things, more or less have them; but unperturbed possession may be said to be beyond our present range. It seems a desiderate, and as such we may put it down as a datum; but, like Nirvana—which no one can see, and live—it is something which, necessarily, we have not tasted. Of course, an unloseable hold on things is not so utterly out of our world as is annihilation; for of the poet it must be said that he did not know what he was talking about in the phrase "dear non-entity." It is a datum, however, that what we have not come to, and, while living, will not come to,

⁸ *De Veritate*, q.21, a.2, c.: "*Duo autem sunt de ratione finis; ut scilicet sit appetitum vel desideratum ab his quae finem nondum attingunt aut sit dilectum, et quasi delectabile, ab his quae finem participant; cum ejusdem rationi sit tendere in finem, et in fine quodammodo quiescere.*"

is the cessation of desire. We are born for virtues, Aristotle said; and it is even more plain that we are born for desiring. And it is a great question—which, though, we think is hardly to be settled by philosophy of value—whether there is any lasting object of value, and, of course, whether we last to value it. It is not only the “agonized conscience” that hungers and thirsts for good things; for this is a human business and, even more broadly, a conscious one.

DOES LIFE TOTAL ANYTHING?

Such indeed is the effect of any particular good once it is well secured: appetite tends to lull and die down. But what of the additive effect of many particular goods when they have been contended for and with a fair consistency achieved? Have they any perfective and lasting result?

None, says Professor Dewey. Conduct, he notes, is one act after another, but there is only a “present meaning of action”: a “*moral* moment”; “and the good is now or never”; “the rest is luck, fortune.”⁹ Professor Perry dissents. One plus one, he says, equals two, and this is the end: “there is in fact no resort to another principle.” At best, “interest-fulfillments are merely compounded.”¹⁰ More recently, though not more clearly, he reiterates this view. The “test of inclusiveness,” or numbers, is final; even “the will of two-thirds” is “sacred.” Yet what he says would be the greatest good, to wit, an agreement of all wills, he marks down as “hypothetical” and never yet realized.¹¹

This is the way with Mr. Alexander’s “deity” too: it keeps on, tantalizingly, “in front.”¹² Any realizable aim,

⁹ *Human Nature and Conduct* (1922), pp. 280-1, 290.

¹⁰ “The Definition of Value,” *Jnl. of Philos.*, v. 11 (1914), p. 156.

¹¹ *General Theory of Value* (1926), pp. 673, 659, 688.

¹² *Space, Time and Deity*, v. 2, p. 348.

says Cassius J. Keyser, is "spurious": "Pursuit of the unattainable is the proper vocation of man."¹³ And of his own "divine imagining" Mr. Fawcett says it were death to it, could it be "'accomplished,' harmoniously complete above change . . . a system frozen hard at the back of beyond."¹⁴

And all this, mind you, in the face of Sir Henry Jones's trim and assertible thesis, that Morality Is a Process That Always Attains.¹⁵ Perhaps, though, Sir Henry's own conclusions are shaken a little, as "based, from beginning to end, upon an assumption . . . that the moral life has a value which is final, unlimited and absolute."¹⁶ Mr. Leighton, too, finds himself content "to assume" that he is "rowing with and in the main stream of the Cosmic Life."¹⁷ Whereas Mr. M. C. Otto raises up a voice for "the richest total of satisfied desire."¹⁸

Now the views of these several writers, thus taken together, answer to what Professor Whitehead understands by evil—that is, "turbulence," or things "at cross purposes."¹⁹ At any rate, it seems that they pave a treacherous and uneven road to where perhaps, after all, value and moral value want us to go, and that Dr. Schiller's criticism of them, expressed a quarter of a century ago, is always just and psychologically sound. He said: "All action would

¹³ *Mole Philosophy and Other Essays* (1927), pp. 2, 4; *Idem, Pastures of Wonder* (1929), pp. 116-7.

Cf., Felix Adler, *An Ethical Philosophy of Life*, p. 150: "The moral end" for man "is just to realize the unattainableness of the end."

¹⁴ *Divine Imagining* (1921), p. 95.

¹⁵ *A Faith That Enquires* (1922), ch. 10, pp. 127f.; *cf.*, p. 209: "Morality is acquirement *all the way*."

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 270.

¹⁷ *The Individual and the Social Order*, p. 351.

¹⁸ *Int. Jnl. Eth.*, v. 31 (1920), p. 25.

¹⁹ *Religion in the Making* (1926), p. 97; *cf.*, the really strange statement, p. 91: "The fact of the instability of evil is the moral order in the world."

be paralyzed by the conviction that nothing we desired could ever be attained.”²⁰ This is Thomistic teaching, as we saw in the chapter on Why We Act. We shall go on now to a criticism of the opposite view, as represented by Mr. Dewey, let us say, and Mr. Keyser; and this Thomistic teaching, just expressed by Mr. Schiller, we shall think of in its particular application to man.

If one will take up so plain and legible a document as the life of Old Singleton who, after half a century of measuring himself “against the favours and rages of the sea,” said,²¹ “Ships are all right. It is the men in them!” he will admit that this one life tasted good things, bore impacts and reverses, and at last yielded. And just this, he will also admit, is roughly the experience of every finite life. All of us living things see and know some good, bear some precipitate winds, and at last do what the living thing is by nature most loath to do. This is everyday fact, a thousand times repeated before the eyes of anyone. We do not here go on to say or inquire whether any living thing survives this common mortality. And indeed we are less entitled to say or ask, since our question is, “Why action?” and our study, “The End of Action.” We only say—indeed repeat, stubbornly—that action is for an end, that human action is for this particular good and yet, at least sometimes, for *the good*;²² and we proceed now to say that any acting thing acts in some degree and in some important sense for God and that it can act for God so far as it can know God. Without hesitation, we shall say that action always attains, always effects something.

It may be that Mr. Wildon Carr’s if-clause is out of

²⁰ *Humanism: Philosophical Essays* (1903), p. 262.

²¹ *Nigger of the Narcissus*, ch. 1, p. 24; ch. 4, pp. 98-9.

²² The animal life is describable as “Just one thing after another.” Man’s is—and is not.

place, but for the rest we should say that he unjustly minimizes the situation when he remarks that "the final cause of the cosmos, if it be striving for an end, is striving in and through our lives."²³ We would rather say, Through our lives and all the events of the universe. When we speak of the cosmos or universe, this must not at once be disintegrated. We never have good reason, or any reason, for unhinging man from the universe and, with Huxley, turning him around and setting him against the universe. Man is not against the universe, not an alien to it, but of it, one of the items in any objective inventory of the experiential cosmos. We study man particularly, of course, and it is inescapable that as men we do so. But we study all action. And in study of value we are always exposed to the danger of misplacing the fact that we deal with action and value as such and not with human action and human value as isolated and apart. Our questions remain these: first, why action? and, second, why human or any specific action? Man, we repeat, is at the center of the universe for us. We begin, necessarily, with our conscious and thinking selves, our experiencing selves; we cannot think or desire or hope at all, if we ourselves have not a certain centrality in our action. This is only to say that we are "centers of experience"²⁴ and to repeat, from the first chapter, that we are centers of appropriation. And though this says plainly that man is in an important sense at the peak of the universe, it does not at all say that he is an intrusion and alien to the universe. "Man goes to make up the perfection of the universe," Aquinas remarks, "as an essential part of it, because in man is somewhat that is

²³ *Changing Backgrounds in Religion and Ethics* (1927), p. 30.

²⁴ Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of God* (1920), pp. 284-5, 288.

not contained potentially in any element or planet, namely, his rational soul." ²⁵

In another chapter we saw that action, or every result of action, is an expression.²⁶ Our present point is that man and all things work together unto the expression of God's goodness, and *are* an expression of that goodness.

The universe itself is a moving thing, an expression, and at every turn it evinces living things, so that some have thought, though without warrant, that the universe is not only in motion but is alert and alive. On any view, it is an action; and therefore evil cannot be interpretative of it. Evil we saw to be sterile. Evil can be turned to nothing, initiates nothing and keeps nothing going.²⁷ If evil is the character of the universe, we are unable to do anything, we cannot possibly get off dead center. Action, as we know it, is for the sake of (*propter*) something; this thing is in some sense an existent and at its poorest wears a halo of good. Hate, one must insist, does not explain. Malevolence is not, certainly is not alone, behind action—unless for the dour and agonized conscience. Evil at its virulent worst can gnaw at the good and even eat into it, but cannot ever wholly consume it.²⁸

On the evidence, one has small respect for a plus opti-

²⁵ *De Potentia*, q.5, a.10: "Nam homo ordinatur ad perfectionem universi ut essentialis pars ipsius; cum in homine sit aliquid, quod non continetur virtute nec in elementis nec in caelestibus corporibus, scilicet anima rationalis."

²⁶ Cf., Chesterton, *Stevenson* (1928), p. 27: "Whether or no we see faces in the carpet, we ought to see a mind in the carpet."

²⁷ C.G., 3, c.10: "Malum igitur non potest esse alicuius causa."

²⁸ C.G., 3, c.12: "Quantumcumque multiplicetur malum, numquam potest totum bonum consumere."

"Semper enim oportet quod remaneat mali subjectum, si malum maneat. Subjectum autem mali est bonum"; cf., Brightman, *Religious Values*, p. 133: "Evil implies good as a necessarily prior concept," but not vice versa.

mism. Things suffer; yet happily they also rejoice, and it is doubtful enough whether any person, though islanded and barbarous, does not know "the warmth and intimacy of the contemplated me"; and something akin to this is likely the experience of every conscious being. Perhaps in some lives suffering does seem to predominate and for a time "hath the awfuller sway." Yet if so, this does not cancel the fact that action is real and therefore got of good and both aimed at good and expressive of reality. The universe itself is an action, that is, an expression; and all action, we have had to conclude, is based on being and is pointed toward actuality of being, toward good and even toward the agent himself. The universe can perhaps be interpreted in terms of act, being, goodness, a person; but one may not justly envisage it as nihilism at large, or evil, or impersonalism.

"We observe in the works of nature, either always or rather generally, what is fairly good; as, in plants, the foliage is so disposed as to produce fruits; and animal parts, so as to keep the animal sound." Is this from chance and fortune? "It cannot be. For the casual and fortuitous thing occurs (at most) in the rarer cases, but not always and not often. Therefore, the 'natural' agent works toward the better, and much more does man, using his intellect. Every agent therefore as agent aims at good."²⁹

The great problem of value therefore is: What does the universe express? what, in the long run and taking everything in, is action for? To begin with, every acting thing

²⁹ C.G., 3, c.3: "*Videmus autem in operibus naturae vel semper vel frequentius quod melius est: sicut in plantis folia sic esse disposita, ut protegant fructus; et partes animalium sic disponi ut animal salvum possit.*" . . . "*a casu vel fortuna?*" "*Sed hoc est impossibile: nam ea quae accidunt semper vel frequenter, non sunt casualia neque fortuita, sed quae accidunt in paucioribus. Naturale igitur agens intendit ad id quod melius est. Et multo manifestius quod agit per intellectum. Omne igitur agens intendit bonum in agendo.*"

makes insistent claim upon being, and every living and conscious thing that acts demands life and knowledge. Being, life and knowledge—these are the goods which we find it hard, and impossible, to refuse allegiance to: these are among those “effects of God which can in no way be contrary to the human will.”⁸⁰ These are objects of value for all. I do not make these articles by acting for them: they are, and I act for them. It may be that this is what I came into the world to do; in any event, I am here, and this I do. The question thus is whether Aquinas or any Scholastic is justified in his view, namely, that “purpose is the theme which runs through the whole of creation, maintains order and gives human life its ultimate value.”⁸¹ This issue is not tangential here, and we may at least state it. Unless purpose runs through the universe, in a sense holding it together, I did not come into the world to do anything: I came into the world and I do particular things. It is all haphazard, or it is not. Either I came into ex-

⁸⁰ 2-2, q.34, a.1, c.

And “God, known as author of these effects, cannot be hated.” *Ibid.*

On grades of being, and “emergence,” see C.G., 3, c.97: “An observer, if he look diligently, will find a gradually rounded-out diversity of things”: lifeless matter, plant life, irrational animal life, intellectual life; “and within each class he will find diversity, according as some are more perfect and seem nearer the next higher class . . . so that as Dionysius says, ‘Divine Wisdom joins the tails of the first to the heads of the second.’”

Cf., E. Caird, *The Evolution of Religion*, v. 2, (3rd ed., Glasgow, 1899), p. 76: “The idea of evolution carries with it the conception that, while all existences manifest their Divine Original, they do not all manifest Him equally; but that there are grades of existence, rising from the inanimate to the animate, and from the animal to man, and in man’s history from the stage in which he is nearest to the animal to a more and more full realization of that which distinguishes him as man.”

St. Augustine’s view is in part cognate: the grand outline of goods is (a) bare existence, (b) vegetal life, (c) conscious life, (d) spiritual and intellectual life.—Joseph Mausbach, *Die Ethik des Heiligen Augustinus* (Freiburg and Saint Louis, 1909), v. 1, p. 92.

⁸¹ Edward A. Pace, “The Teleology of Saint Thomas,” *The New Scholasticism*, v. 1 (1927) p. 215.

istence in order to be and to do certain things; or I came into existence and I am what I am and I do what I do.

A few years ago, Mr. Leighton said that maybe evolution has no director, or perhaps board of directors, but it "evidently has direction."³² Mr. Sellars to this day says he cannot for the life of him see why materiality does not answer, and cover the universe from tip to tip.³³ General Smuts says that whatever we have in the way of beautiful things and strong things and seeming purpose is just the way things have of getting together; or, at least, he seems to us to say just this: the tendency of things to run together, explains.³⁴ C. D. Broad seems to say that *als-ob* handles purpose: teleological means that an organism or system acts "*as if* it were designed for a purpose."³⁵ "I cannot see why it is indispensable that the universe should have intention, end or meaning"; why not "a farce played out by nothingness"?³⁶ This is boyish, yet Lawrence J. Henderson in these times repeats, "We simply cannot doubt that the origin of a body like the earth depends exclusively upon chance plus the properties of the elements . . . and the other known factors of mechanism."³⁷

Yet if after all the universe is an action: and this, whatever else, it is; and if it is an expression: and we have no reason for supposing any action to be anything else—then it is aimed, and I came into the world to be something and to do something. "The view," says Mr. Hobhouse, "that Purpose, Value, the whole world of Mind—that which owes its discovery of mechanical laws to its ideal of

³² "Personality and the Metaphysics of Value," *Int. Jnl. Eth.*, v. 21 (1910), p. 35.

³³ *Principles and Problems of Philosophy* (1926), p. 446.

³⁴ *Holism and Evolution*, pp. v, 86-7, 144, 221, 241, 305.

³⁵ *The Mind and Its Place in Nature*, p. 81.

³⁶ J. Rivière (Caudel's *Letters to a Doubter*, pp. 84-5).

³⁷ *The Fitness of the Environment* (2nd ed., New York, 1924), p. 304.

order—is itself rooted in disorder, is due to an imperfect development of critical method.”³⁸ Aquinas in his whole philosophy argues that there is nothing loose or vagrant or chance in the universe. He therefore gives the following answer to this root question on value. I came and other things came into existence as part of a universal expression—to know and love God. The full-circle goal of action, as we saw, is *ipsemet*, or the agent; and in the instance of God the *ipsemet* is *bonitas*, or very goodness.³⁹ “The first principle of action therefore is the divine goodness.”⁴⁰ We find empiric evidence, certainly, that good exercises the deciding pull in all action. The farther question is: How divine the goodness? or, even, Is all goodness in a measure divine?

IS GOD VALUE?

It is the poet who says he went forth intoxicated on the morning and the glory of God. But sometimes the philosopher also has urged that the end of our human going is “the glory of God in the way God has ordained.” Lorti, for instance, who says that he copies the mind of Saint Thomas, puts down the end of action as the glory of God.⁴¹

Aquinas for his part has meager reference to any action or creature being for the glory of God. They may in-

³⁸ *Development and Purpose* (1st ed.), p. 244.

For Hans Driesch, “At the beginning of all philosophy stands the primary fact, the only completely indubitable one among all ‘facts’: *I know something (ordered)*.” *Mind and Body* (1927), p. 144.

³⁹ C.G., 3, c.17: “*Finis ultimus cuiuslibet facientis, in quantum est faciens, est ipsemet*”; *ibidem*: “*Voluntatis autem ipsius nihil aliud finis quam bonitas, quae est ipsemet.*”

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 3, c.97.

⁴¹ *Elementa Philosophiae ad Mentem S. Thomae* (3rd ed., Quebec, 1917), v. 2, p. 67. Even Lorti draws back, making glory as end of action an afterthought.

deed be so, in his theory or in fact, but he has sparingly said so. He says rather that creatures are "on account of" or "for the sake of" the goodness of God.⁴² He does say that "the glory of God is not to be referred to any but God, that it belongs to God that his glory be sought for his own sake"; but he has just repeated that "to know the divine goodness" is man's end.⁴³ Only man attains to "the very ultimate end of the universe," and he does this by knowing and loving God.⁴⁴ Aquinas says that God points "all things toward his goodness as end; not that anything will accrue to the divine goodness through things which are made, but that, so far as may be, the imprint of his goodness may be upon things."⁴⁵ On such view our existence, not to mention our action, seems to be the expression of goodness and not to be aimed particularly at glory. And Saint Thomas, rightly or not, goes so far as to turn the phrase around, saying that "God seeks his own glory not for himself but for us," as "man may laudably do, seeking his own glory for the use of others."⁴⁶

We wish accordingly to discern what Saint Thomas may mean by saying that in all action goodness has a centrality, and that it converges upon God. He urges repeatedly that the divine goodness is naturally to be sought: the primal piece of work on which all things are engaged is in seek-

⁴² 2 *Sent.*, d.1, q.2, a.2, c., et ad 2; *C.G.*, 3, c.97; *De Malo*, q.9, a.2, ad 4.

⁴³ *De Malo*, q.9, a.2, ad 4.

⁴⁴ *C.G.*, 3, c.112.

⁴⁵ *C.G.*, 3, c.97, *prin.*: "*Deus per suam providentiam omnia ordinat in divinam bonitatem: non autem hoc modo quod suae bonitati aliquid per ea quae fiunt accrescat, sed ut similitudo suae bonitatis, quantum possibile est, imprimatur in rebus.*"

Cf., Solovyof, *The Justification of the Good* (tr., London, 1918), p. 150: "The real and great work" is "manifesting God in man"; and, p. 166, "the end of our life, that for the sake of which we exist, is the 'likeness of God.'" Also, Pringle-Pattison, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

⁴⁶ 2-2, q.132.

ing the divine goodness.⁴⁷ "The first principle of action is the divine goodness."⁴⁸ If this is indeed so, it is at once relevant; for value being what action is aimed at, the divine goodness and value would then seem to be interchangeable terms.

The question of God as value, or perhaps of God as having value, depends above all things on God's existence. If God exists as real, or conceptual (like Durkheim's God of stone) or potential, then God so far has value or, conceivably, is value. We have found value to be at the end of every action, and if God is the source of all action and therefore a superior or even universal end of action or *ipsemet*, then God is object of great value and it may be that he is value purely. But all this will depend on the validity of God's existence, even more than upon the nature of God. The "good" thing is the appetible thing, and anything is good or appetible just so far as it is in any sense an existent.⁴⁹ Hence the degree in which any object, God or other, can be object of quest, hinges upon that object's degree of existentiality; or, as Saint Thomas says, quoting Saint Augustine, "We are good in so far as we are."⁵⁰ The hart can pant after the fountains of water with an avidity which corresponds precisely to their existence for him.

We do not say, even tentatively, that God is "a value," though it may intelligibly be so. For "a value," so far as we can make out, has not been given precise meaning in terms of value. "The values" and "a value" have played pranks on clear and exact expression, as is evident from such a sentence as the following. "A value-judgment cannot itself

⁴⁷ 2-2, q.27, a.6, c.; C.G., 3, c.112.

⁴⁸ C.G., 3, c.97: "*Primum esse diximus divinam bonitatem, quasi ultimum finem, qui est primum principium in agendis.*"

⁴⁹ 1, q.5, a.1, c.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*: "*In quantum sumus, boni sumus.*"

be constitutive of the value which it values."⁵¹ But God as existing has value, and he has value just so far as he exists. God at least has static value; that is, he could be desired and sought, could be the end of action.⁵²

Now God, according to Thomas Aquinas, is pure actuality, or present existence without a hitch or condition. A particular "God" of course may have his limits and his needs as we have, may even be but conceptual and therefore unessential (though not irrelevant) or, like Mr. Alexander's deity, he may be potential, a God in the making. Such a God begins handicapped, and will bear little value. The trouble with him, from the standpoint of understanding action and value, is that he would leave the beginning of action, even possible action, paralyzed, and there is then no question of value, great or small, real or vacuous.

God, says Aquinas, is actuality right through. God is. His essence is to exist. Therefore, God is not definable, except in terms of being, and such defining is in a circle.

Being belongs to God, properly is his. *He who is*—this is the fittest name for God.

This name, he who is, is most suitably used of God, for three reasons:

First, On account of its signification. For it does not stand for any species, but for being itself. And, as the existence of God is his very essence and as it was shown that this is true of no other being, it is plain that among other names this one exceptionally and properly is God's; for we denote a thing by its form.

Second, On account of its universality. For any other name is

⁵¹ Olaf Stapledon, "Ethics and Teleological Activity," *Int. Jnl. Eth.*, v. 38 (1928), p. 252. (The rest of the article is extraordinarily good.)

⁵² Brightman, *Religious Values* (1925), p. 15, says that "a value" is any object "liked, desired, or approved"; it is (p. 81) "something that meets our need." In these senses, God is "a value." The ultimate end, or God, comes within the *genus appetitus*, and from it all appetition derives. *De Veritate*, q.22, a.1, ad 11.

less catholic, or, if convertible with this, yet adds something to it, at least conceptually.

Third, From its connotation, as standing for present existence: and this correctly and above all is affirmed of God, whose existence, as Augustine says, knows not past or future.⁵³

As anyone will agree, God in this primal sense is not a postulate but very reality. For if anything is, something has always been.⁵⁴ And the one denying such view does not seem to have any ready refuge. If anything at all exists, it is necessary that some being be *per se*: that some being exist without the need of another to bear it up.⁵⁵ That we do not stumble upon such being in our daily journeyings does not at all demonstrate that it need not and does not exist, but only reminds us that such being is rationally comprehensible and not immediate object of hand or eye.

The phrase, he who is, plainly does not define God, but only names him. God is; that is, if anything is. It is necessary then that God be.⁵⁶ And it is necessary that God be of and through himself.⁵⁷ This indeed is the meaning of "God": that being who is of and through himself. And *ens*, or being, which we found to be the only sure basis for value, is in its absolute and rigid or simple sense predicated

⁵³ I, q.13, a.11, c.

⁵⁴ Cf., C.G., I, c.15: "If God sometime were not and afterward became, he was brought forth by another from non-being to being. Not by himself: since what is not cannot do anything. And if by another, then this other is prior to Him:" and this other we call God. The logic of this argument, that what is not cannot do anything, is answer enough to Professor Perry's strange saying that the organism somehow "so acts as to bring itself into existence."

⁵⁵ C.G., I, c.37: "*Aliis est causa essendi, sicut per se ens necesse esse.*"

⁵⁶ *Opus*, 3, c.7.

⁵⁷ C.G., 2, c.15: "*Necessarium autem quoddam est habens causam suae necessitatis: in quo etiam in infinitum procedi non potest; et sic est devenire ad aliquid quod est per se necesse est. Hoc autem esse non potest nisi unum.*"

of God alone.⁵⁸ That God is, of course is shown not from wishful thinking but from effects, and in many ways.⁵⁹ However, we do not propose here, and we are scarcely entitled, to prove that God—or anything else—exists, but only to note that if God exists and in so far as he exists and is known he is object of value.⁶⁰

The modern thinking world has had its own opinions about the existence of God and the nature of God, opinions which are mostly a heritage of certain postulates and certain denials. Many writers have encouraged as substitute a "feeling for God," and managed to make out with this. Yet, as everyone knows, feelings hit and miss, and are treacherous like the weather. We very much doubt whether it is good and wise to forego objective argument. It has been done, of course: not so precisely because it was objective, as because someone began by clamping an arbitrary cylinder about his head, and then announcing that he could not see out. And many have echoed him, saying that he could not see out, that they could not see out and that no one could see out. And it is true that no one could. Yet the desiderate, whatever the cost, is to begin and to remain in the open air, and not in capricious immuration.

It will not be impertinent therefore to mention how Aquinas from his daily experiences arrives at a knowledge of God. He insists indeed that only so can we get under way on this important journey.⁶¹ Metaphysics, he says, takes the data or findings of all the sciences and uses them as illustrative of its own position.⁶² In the following argument

⁵⁸ *De Veritate*, q.2, a.3, ad 16: "'Esse' simpliciter et absolute dictum, de solo divino esse intelligitur, sicut et bonum."

⁵⁹ I, q.2, a.2, c.; a.3, c.; C.G., I, c.13.

⁶⁰ On the existence of God see Garrigou-Lagrange, *Dieu: son Existence et sa Nature*; for a critical examination of current ways of knowing God see Sheen, *God and Intelligence*.

⁶¹ Or on any philosophical journey: C.G., 2, c.4.

⁶² *Ibid.*

for instance he takes data, first, from (at least) the sciences of government and mechanics and from all the arts, and, secondly, from those of biology, astronomy, meteorology and physics; and with these data for basis he draws his conclusion. The argument runs:

It is not possible that many contrarieties and dissonances should come into one accord always or even several times, unless because of the governance of some thing, from which governance it is given to all and to each that they should tend to a certain end. But we do see in the world things of different natures working together in harmony, not rarely or from chance, but always or for the most part.

Many things of many natures do work together as one whole or harmony. "It is necessary therefore that there be an *aliquid* whose foresight rules the world. And this we call God."⁶³

This is an argument which Aquinas credits to Damascene and Aristotle. The famous argument of the latter from the empiric fact of change he states at the beginning of the same chapter. The moving thing, which we see, either goes into motion at another's instance, or it does not. If it does not, it is at once the "*aliquod movens immobile*," which we call God. And if it is not this "*movens immobile*," some other is. It is of course useless, as Saint Thomas in his own words remarks, to urge that if a wheel, let us say, were tall enough and its hub thick enough it would become locomotion. Or, as has been said,

⁶³ C. G., I, c.13, f.

It is to be kept in mind that the data or "documents" of science which have their own dependence on Metaphysics, are one thing, and that a scientific law or conclusion which Saint Thomas—as surely as any modern—accepts as tentative and subject to recall and revision, is quite another; cf., Sheen, *Religion Without God* (New York, 1928), ch. 8, "The Fallacy of the Uniform Method of Science."

you may elongate the handle of a brush, but the brush will never move without a hand to move it and never paint without a mind to direct it. Let piece be after piece forever, Aquinas concludes, yet "there will be no motion."⁶⁴ You would begin, if that seem a good method, by denying the fact of motion and change.

The cult of numerosity can plainly attempt to go too far. Maybe it were better to cut down than to distend the circumference of a wheel, in order to set the cart in motion.

God therefore, whatever else he be or do, is back of the expression which our universe is.⁶⁵ God is accordingly a possible object of value for the conscious being that in any way can know him.⁶⁶ And even were there no conscious thing in our universe, God would be object of value:⁶⁷ since value is what action is aimed at, and the end of God's action—as we saw of any action—is himself, the agent. Yet God, from the point of view of our interests and desires, would in such instance be a kind of static God, aloof and "impossible." This is not God. For God is not mere object of possible quest, but is being sought ever and by all things. So it comes out that God is object of absolute functional value.

Indeed, the very name *Good* does in one sense better fit God than *he who is*.⁶⁸ For God as cause is good. Yet,

⁶⁴ C.G., I, c.13, *med.*

⁶⁵ I, q.75, a.5, ad 1: "*Primus actus est universale principium omnium actuum, quia est infinitum, virtualiter in se prae habens omnia.*"

⁶⁶ Perhaps it goes without saying that man does not immediately know God, except "in some confused way, i.e., in so far as God is man's happiness; for man naturally desires this and therefore naturally knows it. But this isn't *simpliciter* to know God, as to see some one coming is not to recognize Peter though it be Peter." I, q.2, a.1, ad 1.

⁶⁷ "When, *ab aeterno*, there were no creatures, and were there ever to have been none, it was true to say that God is wise, good and so on." I *Sent.*, d.2, q.1, a.2.

⁶⁸ Cf., Schumacher, *The Knowableness of God* (Notre Dame Univ. Press, 1905), pp. 179-81: He who is, is "the rounded concept" but it "does not say enough for us as it stands."

absolutely, Good is not the more appropriate, since the idea of existence, taken absolutely, is precedent to the idea of cause.⁶⁹

God is object of value, since he is desired by all things. "Now that which moves as desired, moves as a mover quite unmoved"; and God is the first mover unmoved. "He is therefore, as first mover unmoved, the first desired."⁷⁰ "He is the absolute good simply, and not only in some genus or class of things. For good is attributed to him inasmuch as all desired perfections flow from him as from their first cause."⁷¹ "Communication of being and goodness proceed from goodness; which is evident from the very nature and meaning of the good"; that is, good is diffusive of itself. The good radiates, and in an intelligible sense may be said to be at once centrifugal and centripetal: it both initiates and receives action. "For naturally the good of anything is its action and perfection. And anything which acts is already in act, and by its action it diffuses being and goodness." Now the nature of the good is that anything be appetible and that it be an end, "which indeed moves the agent to act; and it is in this sense that the good is said to be diffusive of its own being. And such diffusion belongs to God; for it was shown (c.13) that God is the cause of being, as it is necessary that there be an *ens per se*. God therefore is truly good."⁷²

A particular good is derivative or underivative. If it is

⁶⁹ I, q.13, a.11, ad 2.

⁷⁰ C.G., I, c.37: ". . . aliquod primum movens immobile, quod est Deus. Movet autem, sicut movens omnino immobile. Quod movet sicut desideratum. Deus igitur, quum sit primum movens immobile, est primum desideratum."

⁷¹ I, q.6, a.2, c.

⁷² C.G., I, c.37: "Naturaliter enim bonum uniuscuiusque est actio et perfectio eius. Unumquodque autem ex hoc agit quod actu est. Agendo autem esse et bonitatem in alia diffundit. . . . Haec autem diffusio Deo competit . . . aliis est causa essendi. . . . Est igitur vere bonus."

the former, "it supposes something before it from which it gets goodness." And it will not rationally do to go on *in infinitum*, from cause to cause. "It is therefore necessary to come to (*devenire*) a first good which isn't participated good with a dependence on anything else, but through its own essence is good; and this is God."⁷³ We may remark that the ultimate lesson of science and evolution and civilizations is that no empiric thing is underived.

His goodness is not something other than he. God is his goodness. If it were not so, God would be made up piece by piece, fold on fold (*aliud et aliud*) his simplicity would be destroyed: that is to say, there would be no God.⁷⁴

It is necessary to note too, or indeed to renote, that God as first actualizer and God as the end of all action is one. The two concepts, agent and the very end of action, must be kept conjoined. This we saw in an earlier chapter. In the long run, agent and the end of action are one.⁷⁵ "Everything," says Aquinas, "naturally desires God implicitly, but not explicitly"; for as a tool acts only when shaped and handled by the carpenter, so a subsidiary end is desired only as part of a main purpose. "And as God, for the reason that he is the *primum efficiens*, acts in every agent, so, as *ultimus finis*, he is desired in every end. And this is to desire God implicitly."⁷⁶ This is the famous saying, of

⁷³ *Ibid.*, c.38.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 3, c.17.

⁷⁶ *De Veritate*, q.22, a.2, c.: "*Omnia naturaliter appetunt Deum impliciter, non autem expliciter . . . sicut secundarium agens non agit nisi per virtutem primi agentis existentem in eo; ita secundarius finis non appetitur nisi per virtutem finis principalis in eo existentem. . . . Et ideo, sicut Deus, propter hoc quod est primum efficiens, agit in omni agente; ita propter hoc quod est ultimus finis, appetitur in omni fine. Sed hoc est appetere ipsum Deum impliciter.*"

course, of Dionysius, that God is called good as from whom all things subsist.⁷⁷ As Henry Osborn Taylor repeats, "God's love taken, life is cut off at the source."⁷⁸ Says Hartley B. Alexander, "For full understandings we demand an end and a purpose as well as a cause or source."⁷⁹

God is thus "*per quem omnia*," as efficient cause, and "*propter quem omnia*," as final cause. "All things are: (1) for his sake, and (2) for the sake of communicating his goodness: and this is the motive cause for producing things."⁸⁰ In the words of a current thinker, "The supreme motive of our moral action is the divine reality, considered as the last end of the rational creature."⁸¹

The divine goodness brings us forth into being; yet, as Professor Gilson remarks,⁸² it must not be thought that its power is exhausted once we exist, but by the same act by which we are, we are given also a native impulse to return to the source of our being in so far as our nature will permit. The moral life, or man's deliberate action, Gilson says, is a movement from God to God, and the whole study of morality is thus put: "What becomes of the efficacy and the direction of the movement impressed by God on creatures, at the moment when that movement reaches the human creature?"⁸³ And maybe this matter is not less well put by M. Gillet: "Duties to God aren't at the terminus of human duties, as Kant wished them, but at the

⁷⁷ I, q.6, a.1, c.

⁷⁸ *Human Values and Verities* (1928), p. 182.

⁷⁹ "The Evolution of Ideals," *Int. Jnl. Eth.*, v. 16 (1906), p. 311. Mr. Alexander's recent eloquent book (*Truth and the Faith*, New York, 1929) considers the world a revelation, and all experience—æsthetic, religious, social—significant.

⁸⁰ *In Hebr.*, c.2, lec.3, med.

⁸¹ J. Maritain, *La Revue des Jeunes*, v. 44, no.10, p. 559.

⁸² *The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas* (tr., 1924), p. 236.

⁸³ *Saint Thomas d'Aquin* (2nd ed., Paris, 1925), p. 18.

beginning. . . . Efficient cause and final cause here coincide"; God "efficiently produces human nature," and is "the Sovereign Good which attracts."⁸⁴ And Aquinas himself says: An effect is perfect when it returns to its source, as a circle or as a circular movement; and this therefore is the highest perfection of created things, "that they return to their source each and all of them, by a likeness to their source, so far as their being and nature allow."⁸⁵ For "whatever the supreme agent does, he does for himself as end," primarily; and so, as we saw, does every agent. Lower and secondary agents he moves to their acts and ends, too, so that all action is pointed toward him. God of course "is this first agent; and of his will the end is nothing else than his goodness, which is himself." And all things are made by him, either primarily or mediately, for "nothing can be which has not being from him."⁸⁶

Action seems thus to effect a kind of circle or beneficent boomerang; and reality or God is not, on a long and proper view, definable—unless in a circle. "God himself," says A. S. Pringle-Pattison, "is at once the supreme Reality and, as Dante calls him, the supreme Value, *il primo, il sommo valore*."⁸⁷ And Professor A. E. Taylor finds in Plato's Form of Good that "the distinction, everywhere else valid, between *essentia* and *esse*, *So-Sein* and *Sein*, falls away . . .

⁸⁴ *La Morale et Les Morales* (1925), pp. 216-8.

⁸⁵ C.G., 2, c.46.

⁸⁶ C.G., 3, c.17: "*Quidquid enim agit supremum agens, agit propter finem suum. Agit autem supremum agens actiones omnium inferiorum agentium, movendo omnes ad suas actiones, et per consequens ad suos fines; unde . . . in finem suum proprium. Agens autem primum rerum omnium est Deus, ut in Secundo probatum. Voluntatis autem ipsius nihil aliud finis est quam sua bonitas, quae est ipsemet.*"

⁸⁷ *The Idea of Immortality* (Oxford, 1922), p. 190.

Perhaps the view of Lloyd Morgan is nearly one with that of Aquinas and these moderns. He says (*Emergent Evolution*, p. 36): "For better or for worse, I acknowledge God as the Nisus through whose activity emergents emerge, and the whole course of emergent evolution is directed."

the distinction, too often regarded as absolute, between value and existence." ⁸⁸

The problem of value versus reality, or fact, or science, or being—becomes thus the most misguided of all researches. To study value or anything else, we do not begin by a discard of being or fact, we do not begin in the air or in a vacuum; we begin with being as we find it environing us and we keep a hand resolutely upon being and fact. And, also, if value at full height and in the pure state is God, then value cannot be a relation; value, at least in its deepest sense, cannot be a relation. For relation, as we saw, is a stretched-out entity between some two beings.

It might well be asked how it is that in such schema of goodness giving itself away and never impoverishing itself in the giving, goodness has not aboriginally given itself away. We may only say that there is no rational way of proving that goodness has not always worked so. For all that any pointed and conclusive argument and evidence can now establish, it may be that the good has poured itself out over multitudinous worlds and aeon upon aeon. It may be so. One awaits proof that it is so or that it is not so; though meanwhile he remains (preferably, perhaps) a cool and unperturbed agnostic on the matter.⁸⁹ Who for instance knows that our universe was not suckled at the breast of a score of universes more powerful and perhaps more tidy than itself—or less so? Theory takes its run here, there is so little, if anything, in the way of fact or datum to leash it. What we know is that we now live in

⁸⁸ *Plato: the Man and his Works* (1927), pp. 288-9.

Cf., Knudson, *The Philosophy of Personalism* (New York and Cincinnati, 1927), pp. 308-312: for Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Anselm and Aquinas worth and being "ultimately correspond."

⁸⁹ *Cf.*, Hobhouse, *The Rational Good*, pp. 224-5: "Whether such beings exist we have no direct means of knowing, but it is hardly to be supposed that the strange and rich development of mind is peculiar to one little segment of a single solar system."

an imperfect world, which therefore had a beginning, and that it seems in a fair way of playing out—sometime.

HOW MUCH CAN MAN BEAR?

It need never have been remarked that man has an inalienable right to pursue happiness. If there is prescriptive right to anything, man has it to such pursuit. The only great difficulty comes in attaining happiness. Man does pursue it; but he has seldom enough sat down to an affluent board of it.

Is the achievement after all to be the seeking? Jacques Rivière, who was a sad young man, once thought so, or tried to think so.⁹⁰ Mr. Dewey too says that "perfection means perfecting, fulfilment, fulfilling."⁹¹ Mr. Keyser (as we saw) twice fondles the unattainable as the great and propellent good. Professor Perry's greatest good, he says, is as thin as theory. And Mr. Alexander seems willing to whip his horses toward a migratory goal of his own. Of these goods one may say that as goods they are at least scarfed with the *als-ob*: you know they aren't goods, but you make out that they are.

Man undoubtedly is at the peak of things in this immediate universe of ours. So far as we know, he is; though it is not inconceivable that he is not. Man comes to a fine yet strong point. He draws the universe into himself,⁹² and

⁹⁰ Claudel, *op. cit.*, pp. 2-3, 9.

⁹¹ *Human Nature and Conduct* (1922), p. 290.

Tsanoff, *op. cit.*, p. 355: "He who desires to end the quest by obtaining its ultimate goal is likely to be disappointed; not he whose goal is the quest itself."

Felix Adler, *Reconstruction of the Spiritual Ideal* (1924), p. 150: "The moral end therefore for men is just to realize the unattainableness of the end."

⁹² *Opusc.*, 69, *med.*: "All nature has its noblest being in man; for he has being with the stone, life with plants, sentiency with animals, intelligence with the angels."

by his intelligence he in some sense is all things.⁹³ His reach of intellect is just as high and as deep as any existent can go.⁹⁴ Beauty is his possession, and his claim seems not disputed at all by lower creation. Whether an "emergent," he alone tends upward, never satisfied, is on a level of his own, takes knowledge as a good,⁹⁵ has freedom, alone knows the moral ferment. He not only wants this good thing, but he knows what "good" is.⁹⁶ "The rational or intellectual nature is related to good and evil in some special way, beyond other creatures; for these others are intended for some particular good, but only the intellectual nature (1) apprehends the very meaning of good and (2) by force of its volitional appetite is moved toward the universal good."⁹⁷

It seems then that the only adequate object of man's action is God. The creature, as end of man's action, will do very well so far as it goes; but, like man himself as he now is, such object does not go far enough.⁹⁸ "The object of will is the universal good, just as the object of intellect is universal being. . . . And only God is the universal good, and sufficiently moves the will as object."⁹⁹ As Jay William Hudson has well asked, "*How much* goodness will satisfy the human spirit?" How much beauty, or truth? How long till man say "enough"? "Man desires a life whose

⁹³ I, q.14, a.2.; q.16, a.3, c.

⁹⁴ I, q.82, a.4, ad 1: "*intellectus est apprehensivus entis et veri universalis*"; cf., I, q.59, a.1, c.

⁹⁵ I-2, q.31, a.6, c.

⁹⁶ I, q.59, a.1, c.; C.G., 3, c.3 (man knows evil as evil); cf., Santayana, *Winds of Doctrine* (1926), p. vi: "Spirit is not the pursuit of this good or that beauty, but of the good and beautiful."

⁹⁷ *De Malo*, q.1, a.4, c.

⁹⁸ C.G., 3, c.50: Man's intellect is not satisfied with a knowledge of God through effects; cf., Claudel, *op. cit.*, p. 81: "There is no such thing as perfect and integral development, unless it be proportioned to its end, and this, for mankind, is God."

⁹⁹ I, q.105, a.4, c.

fulfilment would be life's perfection in its Beauty, in its Goodness, and in its Truth. Anything less than this foils the spirit's quest."¹⁰⁰ "By nature the will has need of a good which fills its capacity of willing. And this capacity is unlimited. Will naturally reaches as far in its desires as intellect, on which it depends, in its visions. Now intellect can rise to a knowledge of sovereign or absolute Good. This then is the first desirable, and the natural élan which carries the will toward it cannot be stayed."¹⁰¹

This seems pretty definitely experienceable. And what does it prove? that God exists? No. At least, we should hesitate before saying so.¹⁰² But as Saint Thomas notes, it does show plainly enough that man is capable of a greater good than he at present enjoys, and is capable even of beatitude. For beatitude, he remarks, "means the attaining of a perfect good; and anyone capable of a perfect good, can therefore attain beatitude. And man is capable of a perfect good, as appears from the fact that his intellect can comprehend the universal and perfect good, and his will can desire it."¹⁰³ Or, more plainly, it means the "total satisfaction of one's will: which everyone does desire."¹⁰⁴

If such good exists, and if man arrive at a position to enjoy it and if he remain there, then such object is object of value, ever and ever, for man. We do not purpose to prove that man is immortal, or mortal either, that he shall see God, and that God exists, or does not exist. We only

¹⁰⁰ *The Truths We Live By*, pp. 147-150; cf., Roop, *Christian Ethics* (New York, 1926), p. 92.

¹⁰¹ Gillet, *op. cit.*, pp. 217-8.

¹⁰² The force of the argument from our best conations to God and immortality lies, we believe, in the fact that if there were no God and immortality the universe would be orderly and sane until it came to us, its highest point, and to us at our best; then it would go crazy.

¹⁰³ I-2, q.5, a.1, c.

¹⁰⁴ I-2, q.5, a.8, c.

note what a difference it makes to man if a perfect good exists and if we are immortal and capable of possessing and enjoying that good.¹⁰⁵ For, as we have repeated, to want, certainly to enjoy, is to appropriate.

God, we have concluded, is the end of action for all things, and thus is supreme value.¹⁰⁶ He is value properly and underivatively, and in some sense is alone possessed of "intrinsic" value.

The end of action for anything is twofold. It is demanded, first of all, that the thing work. And in this sense it may be said that the end is the going, or, as Mr. Dewey says, fulfillment is fulfilling. The thing must work like a charm, run smooth as oil. This is a perfection of it, and in an important degree is the end. "Whence, when in its own line it functions well, it is said to be virtuous and good."¹⁰⁷ Man for instance "is called healthy when he can do the work of a healthy man."¹⁰⁸

That a thing work is "either the end or the way to the end."¹⁰⁹ And if it is to attain any further end, this must be accomplished through its own operation.¹¹⁰ Yet to say, with Mr. Dewey or another, that achievement means achieving is not quite true, certainly not the whole truth, and will answer only so far. To act and act, though you know you cannot attain—this is not psychologically possible. Even the good honest horse balks after he has tugged and tugged and the load has not budged. And to jiggle

¹⁰⁵ For the difference, especially to our moral "values," see Galloway, *The Idea of Immortality: Its Development and Value* (Edinburgh, 1919), p. 150.

¹⁰⁶ Cf., Brightman, *Religious Values*, p. 217: "God is perfect goodness, perfect value."

¹⁰⁷ C.G., 3, c.25: "*Unde quod ad propriam operationem bene se habet, dicitur virtuosum et bonum.*"

¹⁰⁸ I-2, q.49, a.3, ad 3.

¹⁰⁹ I-2, q.49, a.4, ad 1.

¹¹⁰ C.G., 3, c.64.

and jiggle, in the manner of a small and narrow practicalism, is unsatisfactory. This would be "to take 'Fidgety Phil who couldn't sit still' as your model of manly excellence."¹¹¹ "The eternal unassuagement of desire is proper" not to spirit but, as M. Maritain says, "to matter, to that which Plato called '*le non-être existant*'; and when G. Bruno, Lessing, and all the devotees of *devenir* boast that they like seeking better than finding, investigating better than knowing, desiring better than possessing, they impose on the human being the law of the uninformed as such, of that which is beneath everything. If the human soul doesn't find repose in any created thing, this is not because it was made for perpetual motion but because it was made to be fixed in the Infinite."¹¹² With Saint Thomas we note, "It is silly to say that anyone desires for the sake of desiring. For desire is a kind of movement tending to something farther."¹¹³ For "it cannot possibly be said that the act itself, elicited by the will, is the ultimate end; for the object of will is the end, as the object of sight is color. So, as it is impossible that the first visible thing be sight itself, for all sight is of some visible thing, so it is impossible that the first desirable thing be willing itself."¹¹⁴ In other words, the operation does not perfect itself, but "its object terminates and perfects it and is its end. So it is impossible that the operation have the nature of an *ultimate* end. Yet because we do not gain the object except through the operation, the desire of the object and the desire of the operation are the same."¹¹⁵

We shall have to seek further therefore for the very end

¹¹¹ A. E. Taylor, *Plato: the Man and his Works*, p. 182.

¹¹² *Théonas* (1921), p. 112.

¹¹³ *In 3 Anima*, lec.15: "*Stultum enim est dicere quod aliquis appetit propter appetere. Nam appetere est quidam motus in aliud tendens.*"

¹¹⁴ I-2, q.1, a.1, ad 2.

¹¹⁵ I *Sent.*, d.1, q.2, a.1, ad 2.

of the universe, and, as we have noted, it cannot be that the ultimate end of the universe be other than its beginning: it comes back, as all action does, to the agent. And this first agent is God. "Toward God tend all things" says Professor DeWulf.¹¹⁶ "Take away the end of the world—which is also its beginning," says Paul Claudel, "and all order is at an end. What remains is simply chaos."¹¹⁷ We shall see now that it is not vastly different to say that anything is for the sake of its own operation and to say that it is for the sake of expressing the divine goodness; and this is to say that it is for God.¹¹⁸

Now to understand is the proper operation of the intellectual substance. This therefore is its end. And what is most perfect in this operation is its ultimate end, and particularly is this true of its operations, such as to know and to feel, which are not directed to exterior works. And since such operations are classified by their objects, through which they are known, it is necessary that such operation be more perfect according as its object is more perfect. Thus to know that of which most is to be known, in other words God, is the most perfect of the intellectual acts. To know therefore in the sense of knowing God is the ultimate end of any intelligent substance.¹¹⁹

Indeed, all things in their own ways tend toward God as ultimate end, but the intelligent creature in a special way, "by its own operation, by understanding him." The conation of all things is toward God: "everything tries to be conjoined to God as ultimate end, so far as this is possible for it. And anything is more at one with God by the

¹¹⁶ *History of Mediæval Philosophy* (tr., 1925), v. I, p. 286.

¹¹⁷ *Letters to a Doubter*, p. 52.

¹¹⁸ "It is the same for a thing to be for the sake of its own operation and for the sake of the divine goodness, to which it most approaches according as it is in most perfect act." 2 *Sent.* d.1, q.2, a.2, ad 2.

¹¹⁹ *C.G.*, 3, c.25.

fact that it in some way attains to his very substance, which is done when any thing knows something of the divine substance."¹²⁰

Man like other creatures shows forth God's goodness. But he overtops them all, for two reasons. (1) Man can deliberately show forth God's goodness. And (2) he can recognize God's goodness when it is shown forth.¹²¹ He is thus at the very peak of the universe.

The divine goodness of course is an end "infinitely exceeding creatures; and so it cannot be acquired" fully and just as it is in itself.

And yet the divine goodness can be acquired by the rational creature as a perfection which is the end of action, inasmuch as it is possible for the rational creature to see and love God. Thus in a singular way God is the end to which the rational creature tends beyond the common measure by which every creature tends to him, inasmuch as every creature desires some good, which is a certain likeness of the divine goodness.¹²²

The end indeed of anything, "*through which it comes to the ultimate end*," is its proper operation." Now, in perfectiveness of operation, consider: object, habit, and delectation. "For the higher the object, the more beautiful and perfect the operation tending to it: so *from the object* the operation has perfection, and from the noblest the noblest perfection." Perfect operation is *from habit*, and the most perfect operation is from the most perfect habit. "And operation itself is perfect happiness, and the highest object is God, and the most perfect habit is charity, and

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*

¹²¹ Man is superior in dignity of nature and perfection of end. He is free in nature, and, for end, attains "the very ultimate end of the universe," i.e., by knowing and loving God. C.G., 3, c.111.

¹²² 2 *Sent.*, d.1, q.2, a.2, c.

the most pure *delight* is spiritual delight." Therefore, God is "the end of right wills, and charity, and good delight, and happiness; and so (1) *God is the ultimate end, and* (2) *happiness embracing charity and delight—but as an end under the end, or conjoining to the end: since operation tends toward the object.*"¹²³

God is goodness, and as such he is the end. Still, we must point out that "though the goodness of God is the end of things, these are related to this goodness in different ways. For (1) God himself possesses it perfectly, both according to his being: whence he is *summe bonus*; and according to his operations, by which he perfectly knows and loves it: whence he is *beatus* because beatitude is perfect operation."¹²⁴ But (2) the intelligent creature does not attain it according to the creature's own being, in such fashion that the creature would be *summum bonum*, but according to its own operation by understanding and loving it; whence it is a sharer of the divine beatitude and not only of the divine goodness. And (3) the irrational creature approaches it (only) according to some likeness, but it does not attain it according to either operation or being: whence it shares goodness, but not beatitude."¹²⁵ This may be stated better perhaps in diagram:

¹²³ 2 *Sent.* d.38, a.1, a.2, c. Current thought tends to shunt "the problems of ends and purposes," though these are "deeper and incomparably more important." Perry, *Present Conflict of Ideals*, p. 61; cf., J. B. Priestley, *George Meredith* (New York, 1926), p. 80: "Meredith does not attempt to indicate ends or goals, nor does he ever grapple with ultimate values."

¹²⁴ Cf., L. A. Reid, "Evil and Evils," *Int. Jnl. Eth.*, v. 36 (1925-6), p. 25: "speaking broadly, happiness is a sign of perfect functioning, and unhappiness a sign of imperfection."

¹²⁵ 2 *Sent.* d.1, q.2, a.2, ad 4; cf., *C.G.*, 3, c.24: The imperfect creature tends to its own good only; the less perfect to the good of the species; the more perfect to the good of the genus; "and God, who is fully perfect in goodness, to the good of all being."

God:

in his being	possesses the divine goodness,
in his operation	possesses the divine goodness.

Man:

in his being	does not attain the divine goodness,
in his operation	does attain the divine goodness.

The Irrational Creature:

in neither being nor operation attains the divine goodness.

This "threefold relation," which is there whether we think of it or not, was expressed with fineness and ardor by the great Solovyof.

Above us (he said) is the absolute good or God. . . . On a level with us is everything which, like ourselves, is capable of spontaneously increasing in moral perfection, everything which, like us, is on its way to the absolute, and can conceive the purpose of its action,—that is, all human creatures. Below us is all that is incapable of inward spontaneous perfection and can enter only through us into a perfect relation with the absolute—namely, material nature.¹²⁶

The moral life is in order "that the kingdom of God may be finally revealed in the world."¹²⁷

Plainly, all this means to say that there is no dividedness in God: his being and operation are one. It will not do to say of him as is said and must be said of us, that he is and is not. We for our part struggle for the good: we must do this, or perish; and even as we perish we fight for actuality of being in our own measure. God need not do this. God is actuality of being. This is why he can be

¹²⁶ *The Justification of the Good*, pp. 470-1; cf., John A. Ryan, "The Basis of Objective Judgments in Ethics," *Proc. of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy*, p. 395, on the threefold relation native to man: relation to God, to other men, and to lower creation.

¹²⁷ Solovyof, *op. cit.*, p. 174.

real object of pure or absolute value. And our imperfection and dividedness, our hit-and-miss character, explains why we struggle: we are such that we cannot hold what we have without farther effort. Actuality of being, for which we live and strive, is the very basis and very core of value.¹²⁸ And therefore, too, the saying of Bosanquet that value is that in which we find ourselves affirmed,¹²⁹ that is, that the agent's own perfection or realization is what he ultimately acts for, is pretty nearly the meaning which on a long view we find for value.

Our human perfection is not to be thrown out as irrelevant. It is honorable so far as it goes. But it is a scattered perfection: it is "*in multis*." God's, on the contrary, comes to a point: it is "*in uno*."¹³⁰ It is perfection indeed.

We have a perfection of our own, the finest and strongest in our universe. We come more or less to a point in our doing and being. When we reflect upon our power to take in all things—appreciatively, conatively, and cognitively—we may not but say, What power—not seeming, but power—is here! What centrality is here, how the universe is focal upon this one point, man! And yet we are very friable.

It might be particularly our human business to protect whatever of integration we have and to deepen and perfect the centrality that is native to us. Yet the human self

¹²⁸ C.G., 3, c.37.

¹²⁹ *Some Suggestions in Ethics*, pp. 52-3.

¹³⁰ C.G., 3, c.20: "*Deus in ipso suo esse summam perfectionem obtinet bonitatis; res autem creata suam perfectionem non possidet in uno, sed in multis; quod enim est in supremo unitum, multiplex in inferis invenitur.*"

Cf., Taylor, *Human Values and Verities*, p. 204: "My unity lies in my relationship to God, a relationship of gratitude, love, and aspiration. He made us; so He first loved us." For a study of "creative co-ordination" in living and non-living things, in man through his soul, and through Christ who rounds out the human cosmos, see Pupin, *The New Reformation* (New York and London, 1927), pp. 201-272.

remains relatively scattered. Even to aim at an unequivocal oneness is vain, the projection, we should say, of a foregone torso. We need things, we cannot go on without them.

Imperfection remains the great problem of philosophy, and the occasion of all problems. For so long as our being is not totally in ourselves and we have to lean on others, our perfection is scattered. This is why we have ultimate problems at all—of value, or of anything else. If someone will solve this problem of imperfection, this potency-act problem, he is philosophic king. He takes in, as incidents, such considerable but smaller problems as that of evil, and of the moral conflict which is so poignantly real in modern life and thought. He thus sets himself a day's work. Mr. Bernard Shaw for instance lately asked, as others have asked, what to do or say about the problem of evil. We may answer, in his own words: The Superman, *soi-disant*, has not arrived, and farther, in his own words, Nor is likely to! Man, like each of his perceptible neighbors, is and he is not, he is and he is becoming, has something of actuality and something of potentiality.¹³¹ Therefore, his growing pains; nay, it costs to keep going at all. He acts and suffers.¹³² It is the way with every limited thing: it acts, producing something like itself, and keeping itself, at least in its kind, in being; but when it acts "it never remains the same." This is because its activity, "by which it effects something like itself, is an *aliquid* going out of itself, the agent, upon the matter; and this is a circumstance which has no place in God whose action is his sub-

¹³¹ I-2, q. 103, a. 1, ad 2: "*In omnibus rebus creatis est aliquid stabile, ad minus prima materia; et aliquid ad motum pertinens.*"

¹³² I, q. 44, a. 4, c. et ad 1; cf., Santayana, *The Life of Reason* (1922), v. 2, p. 58: "How tentative and violent, even here—" in human love and parentage—"are nature's most brilliant feats."

stance."¹³³ For our part, we are in act and we do act, but we use objects which are in potency.¹³⁴

We are imperfect, but we resent it. Disintegration, which is so constantly our lot, "is an evil to every one of us."¹³⁵ The end is our perfection, and we rest in it when we have it.¹³⁶ But this is deferred. Meanwhile, imperfection is our status, the beginning of our problems and itself perhaps the greatest problem.

¹³³ *De Div. Nom.*, 7, lec.2: "*Ea quae in rebus naturalibus generant sibi similia, non semper eadem manent; et ideo ut conservent se secundum similitudinem speciei similia sibi quaerunt . . . actio agentis, qua facit sibi simile, est aliquod egrediens ab agente in patiens, quod in Deo locum non habet, quia eius actio est eius substantia.*"

¹³⁴ *C.G.*, 2, c.21; 3, c.102.

¹³⁵ *C.G.*, 3, c.3.

¹³⁶ *C.G.*, 3, c.16.

CONCLUSIONS

We have gone carefully over the ground of current theory, seeking a good reason for deciding against the common-sense datum on value. It is but just to say that we have not found it. Far be it from us to say that someone will not advance a sufficient reason or group of reasons, we only note that it has not yet been done.

The datum is as follows. One acts, and he acts always for an object which has value for him. The action itself may be termed conation, since in the finite agent it means a need and some effort. A relation naturally arises between agent and object, and the agent in some measure appropriates the object. Value is in the object and not in the relation, not in the action, the need or the agent; it is in the object, and is not really separable from the object. Value is the capacity of an existent to be the end of action.

Study of the value relation confirms this first view. The relation points to the object and shows that value is primarily in the object and may not, except in a derivative and improper sense, be said to be in the relation or the agent. Valuing, actual or possible, implies a relation, with two terms: one term is in the agent, and, more precisely, is his need and desire; the other is in the object, and, more precisely, is the capacity of that existent to receive action. Value is that capacity, and thus value is one term of the value relation; it is the object-term.

The problem itself has sometimes been unduly narrowed. By Münsterberg, for instance, who wished to know only whether there is any object of absolute value; by Mr. Perry, who dissects only the experience of "passion-

ately" loving and hating; and by Mr. Brogan,¹ whose excellent study is not of good, but of "betterness." For our part we study action which is (1) the unequivocal sign of love, but love in any tiniest, as well as in a "passionate" degree; and (2) the mark of an ultimate choice—a "betterness" of acting over inaction, or callousness. And if we are to come, over the road of value or "values," to an Absolute, we must then indeed come, and not begin at what might be the end.

Touch-and-go from "values" to God is a dangerous game. Nor do our everyday "values," any of them or any grouping of them, wear well as God.

One quibble that runs pretty universally through current thought on value comes from a tangling of the elements in the situation. The value datum is this, experienced or observed; an agent striving for an object. One must with great circumspection study agent, object, and the descent and relation, before naming any of them "value," and before locating or identifying value. Then when he has isolated and perhaps defined value, consistency will be a great test—too great, perhaps, for any of the following views. Value is the "attitude" of the subject, says Dr. Schiller; awareness of the object's value "constitutes" its value, says Mr. Santayana; value, says Mr. Perry, is the "special character" of the object, it is the "peculiar relation" of interest to object, and it is the object. Value, Professor Whitehead probably says, is in the valuer. These several views point to a lack of scrutiny of object, subject and relation—that is, of the whole situation.

"And it is the primary relation of desire that endows a thing with value." "The essence of value lies in the experient subject." These statements were shaped to fit a

¹ And by many others who study, not value but values; e.g., Nietzsche, DeWulf, Kremer, Sorley, Everrett, Leighton, Mèrsch.

theory or a vogue and not to account for experience. It makes no real difference to the thing valued whether it ever be valued, but it makes a real difference to me, the valuer. Things remain unperturbed, but I must value something. Indeed, this is the irreducible datum in study of value: things make a difference to me. A callousness, an inert neutrality cannot be attained; I must act, and I act only in terms of something that has value for me, and on any view action can be interpreted only in line with what is good for me, the actor. This theory of action and value is not a puritan height which we ask people to toil up, but an everyday road along which men and women and all conscious things go. It is a purely democratic view therefore, and not an oligarchic or rarefied one. And may we say that the object in the transfer, the object toward which I necessarily point my action "acquires" anything? or is "endowed with" anything? It must be said that the addendum to it is never more than a logical one. Moonrise over the Atlantic has no value, let us say—though the saying is a hard one—no value until some conscious being prehends it. When I do value it, it makes all the difference to me; none of a real sort to moonrise over the Atlantic.

"Value," "a value," "the values"—the words are as velvet. A certain poet says that of all the letters *l* and *v* are the readiest to lilt. And maybe the very word "values" titillates so gently that we tend to forget. Values and verities—not value and truth—cultural values, moral and sacred and dead values,—these words charm and take us in, their sound is a present satisfaction and they promise to become as pointed and meaningful as "evolution," "more complex," "social sense," and "contribution." Is "values" a multiple of value? It is seldom said yes or no, and few take trouble to explain the relation which may exist be-

tween the two, but leap from one to the other with a nimbleness that seems to say they know what they talk about.² Of course, our remarking the abuse will not remedy it, for it is already like a disease, widespread and driven in.

So far as we can make out, value is not opposed to anything, unless, as Professor Hocking says, to callousness. Must it, as is said of James's philosophy, "seek peace rather than understanding,"³ and be a substitute for something? This seems useless, for one thing. Besides, the lover of wisdom begins by coveting fact and embracing the available fact.⁴ Must value indeed oppose fact, and be a counter-evolution like Huxley's? This also seems useless. Yet perhaps those taking this view mean only that philosophy of value is to interpret particular data and experiences, and we have reason to urge that this is the rôle of all philosophy and not that of philosophy of value alone or specifically. And in this might lie the significance of thought on value; it might be a return to philosophy, a kind of afterthought, as someone says, a granting that after all such scientific "documents" and conclusions as we have will not wholly or finally answer and that beyond the immediate fact meanings are to be sought. In this reversion to metaphysics the great scientists at present join and often lead the way.

Value as end of action comes, effectually, to : (1) the agent himself and his perfection, the end being "not that which is consumed" so that it be not, but that which is

² There are exceptions. Reid, "Finite Value and Cosmic Value," *Philos. Review*, v. 25 (1926), p. 39, and Brightman, *Religious Values*, p. 81, distinguish between value, values and a value.

³ Mumford, *The Golden Dawn* (New York, 1926), pp. 185-6.

⁴ Cf., Millikan, *Science and Life* (Boston, 1924), p. 51: "The purpose of science is to develop without prejudice or preoccupation of any kind a knowledge of the facts, the laws, and the processes of nature."

perfected so that it fully be";⁵ and (2) the first agent, or God. Intrinsic value is in the very end, which is the agent, but instrumental value can be found in anything along the way.

Action is the pragmatic proof of value, its demonstration. And action always points back to the agent. Yet it is not to be thought and it is thought by hardly anyone that in the primal and complete scheme of things we are the ultimate end of our action; we are ends for ourselves, yes, but we are a small part of a large work. "Man is not created *by* himself nor *for* himself," says M. Claudel, "but *by* and *for* God."⁶ As a recent writer remarks: "However I was brought about, *I* did not do it. I am not self-made. I both think and feel that I had a Maker—beyond my earthly parents."⁷

If I am not the maker of myself, neither am I the farthest end of my action. And I do not seem to come closer to that end by adding up the several acts that go into the making of my life and multiplying these by all empiric provisional lives.⁸ An arithmetical scheme gives a greater good, but it never reaches a perfection that justifies itself. "If one begins with the best simply, sharing which all things are good, no addition to this will make it better. But in other goods it is universally true that any good

⁵ I-2, q.1, a.5, c.: "*Cum unumquodque appetat suam perfectionem, illud appetit aliquis ut ultimum finem, quod appetit ut bonum perfectum et completivum sui ipsius. Unde Augustinus dicit, xix De Civitate Dei: 'Finem boni nunc dicimus, non quod consumatur, ut non sit, sed quod perficiatur, ut plenum sit.'*"

Cf., Sorley, *Moral Values and the Idea of God*, pp. 239-240: "The good is recognized as having a claim upon our allegiance; as requiring a doing which moulds our being," "something which satisfies my purpose and completes my nature."

⁶ *Letters to a Doubter*, p. 81.

⁷ H. O. Taylor, *Human Values and Verities*, p. 181.

⁸ Cf., A. E. Taylor, *Plato: the Man and his Works* (1927), p. 358: The indefinite regress will never satisfy.

becomes better by addition to it.”⁹ The circle, it is plainly seen, must be more ample than our lives, since it is to justify these and also itself.

⁹ 1-2, q.34, a.3, ad 2; *cf.*, 1, q.65, a.2, c.: (1) Every creature is for the sake of its own perfection and its proper act; (2) the ignoble creature is for the sake of the nobler; (3) all creatures (*a*) round out a harmonious universe, and (*b*) the whole universe, with its individual parts, “is pointed toward God as end”; and (4) rational creatures, beyond others, have God as end, “whom they can attain by their own operation—in a word, by knowing and loving him.”

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¹The specific divisions, though they naturally overlap, show where the emphasis is being put in study of value: on religious, mental and moral value. General works touching on value often throw the clearest light.

I

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- HUDSON, JAY WILLIAM, *The Truths We Live By* (New York: Appleton, 1921). Defends the "higher" good things, and says our yearning for them points toward God and immortality.
- KEYSER, CASSIUS J., *Mole Philosophy and Other Essays* (New York, 1927). Semi-popular, on "the values." Says that pursuing the unattainable is man's proper vocation.
- KNUDSON, ALBERT C., *The Philosophy of Personalism* (New York and Cincinnati: Abingdon Press, 1927). Pp.153-163, 306-314. The views of the personalist stated.
- KOEPGEN, GEORG, *Die Neue Kritische Ontologie und das Scholastische Denken* (Mainz: Verlag Kirchheim, 1928).
- KROPOTKIN, PRINCE, *Ethics: Origin and Development* (tr., New York: MacVeagh, 1924). Mutual aid, which is found among the animals, is the moral life.
- LAING, B. M., *A Study in Moral Problems* (London and New York, 1922). Man selects ends, and aims his conduct.
- LEIGHTON, JOSEPH A., *The Individual and the Social Order* (New York: Appleton, 1926). "A right act is one which furthers the good of some group"; "the realization of value in man implies a positive relation to a Cosmic Principle of Value."
- MCDUGALL, WILLIAM, *Modern Materialism and Emergent Evolution* (New York: Von Nostrand, 1929). A study of order, meaning, purpose.
- , *Outlines of Psychology* (New York: Scribners, 1923). Final chapter studies purposive action.
- MACKENZIE, J. S., *Elements of Constructive Philosophy* (New York and London, 1918). The conception of value is close to that of feeling. Only the Cosmos, perhaps, has intrinsic value.
- , *Fundamental Problems of Life: an Essay on Citizenship as Pursuit of Values* (New York: Macmillan, 1928). Beauty and Joy are "the central elements in Value."

- , *Manual of Ethics* (5th. ed., Oxford, 1924). "No one can exist at all without being in some degree conscious of the human end."
- MOORE, GEORGE E., *Philosophical Studies* (London: Keegan Paul, 1922). Pp.253-276, "The Conception of Intrinsic Value." A "fixed relation to an intrinsic kind of value" gives right and wrong fixity and impartiality.
- , *Principia Ethica* (new ed., Cambridge, 1922). Good "is a simple notion, just as 'yellow' is"; good cannot be defined.
- OLGIATI-ZYBURA, *The Key to the Study of Saint Thomas* (Saint Louis: Herder, 1925). "The focal center where all rays of the Thomistic system meet" is *being*.
- PERRY, RALPH BARTON, *The Moral Economy* (New York: Scribners, 1909). Introducing the word "interest" as pivotal for study of action.
- , *The New Realism* (New York: Macmillan, 1912). Pp.141-148.
- , *Present Philosophical Tendencies* (New York, 1921). Ch.14, "A Realistic Philosophy of Life." "Value in general arises from a relation of interest."
- PUPIN, MICHAEL IDVORSKY, *The New Reformation: from Physical to Spiritual Realities* (New York and London: Scribners, 1927). A study of Order and of "Creative Co-ordination."
- RASHDALL, H., *The Theory of Good and Evil*. 2 volumes (2nd. ed., Oxford, 1924).
- RUSSELL, BERTRAND, *Mysticism and Logic* (3rd. ed., London and New York: Longmans, 1925). Ch.3, et passim. Value and all things must perish.
- SANTAYANA, GEORGE, *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion* (New York: Scribners, 1900).
- , *The Life of Reason: or The Phases of Human Progress*. Five volumes (2nd. ed., New York: Scribners, 1922). Value is the result of valuing, value is only subjective.
- , *The Sense of Beauty* (New York: Scribners, 1896).
- , *Soliloquies in England and Later Soliloquies* (New York,

- Scribners, 1922). The existence of a conscious God would have "a considerable value in itself."
- , *Winds of Doctrine* (2nd. ed., New York: Scribners, 1926). "Interest" lends "inalienable value" to objects.
- SCHILLER, F. C. S., *Humanism: Philosophical Essays* (New York and London: Macmillan, 1903).
- , *Studies in Humanism* (New York and London: Macmillan, 1907).
- SERTILLANGES, A., *La Philosophie Morale de Saint Thomas*, (2nd. ed., Paris: Alcan, 1922). A comprehensive study of the moral thought.
- SHEEN, FULTON J., *God and Intelligence* (New York and London: Longmans, 1925). A statement and criticism of modern ways of knowing God.
- SMUTS, GENERAL THE RIGHT HONORABLE JAN C., *Holism and Evolution* (New York: Macmillan, 1926). Value is one result of the evolutionary tendency in things to unify.
- SPAULDING, EDWARD GLEASON, *The New Rationalism* (New York: Holt, 1918). "The Problem of Values," pp.66-70; "The Value-Centric Predicament," pp.206-8; "The Realistic Doctrine of Values," pp.496-507; et passim.
- TURNER, J. E., *The Philosophical Basis of Moral Obligation* (New York: Macmillan, 1924). "Value in some form is always the end of action."
- UNAMUNO, MIGUEL DE, *Essays and Soliloquies* (tr., New York: Knopf, 1925). A great zeal for human value and survival.
- VAIHINGER, HANS, *The Philosophy of 'As If': A System of Theoretical, Practical and Religious Fictions of Mankind* (tr., London: Kegan Paul, 1924). Preface; "Practical Fictions," pp.42f.; et passim.
- WARD, JAMES, *Psychological Principles* (Cambridge, 1918). Ch.16, "Value, Choice and Freedom."
- WHITEHEAD, A. N., *Religion in the Making* (New York: Macmillan, 1926). Pp.100-105, "Value and the Purpose of God."
- WILSON, GEORGE ARTHUR, *The Self and Its World* (New York: Macmillan, 1926). Pp.171-273: "The World as Value."

- WINDLEBAND, W., *Präludien* (1st. vol., Tübingen, 1911).
 WULF, MAURICE DE, *History of Mediæval Philosophy*. Two volumes (tr., by Messenger, London and New York: Longmans, 1925-6).
 ZYBURA. See Olgiati-Zybura.

III

ARTICLES AND WORKS ON VALUE PROPER

- ALEXANDER, SAMUEL, "The Idea of Value," *Mind*, v.1 (1892), pp.32-55.
 BAUCH, BRUNO, *Philosophie des Lebens und Philosophie der Werte* (Langensalza, 1927).
 BERTRAND-BARAUD, DANIEL, *Les Valeurs Affectives et l'exercice discursif de la Pensée: essai d'empiricisme psychologique radical* (Paris: Vrin, 1924). Accounts for reality affectively: look within and find the deploying of satisfactions or intrinsic values.
 BLECHMAN, NATHAN, *The Philosophic Function of Value* (Boston: Badger, 1918). "A voluntaristic and monistic conception of experience." Value is "the key to existence."
 BOSANQUET, BERNARD, *The Principle of Individuality and Value* (London: Macmillan, 1912). The supreme good is the Cosmos as suprapersonal and one, and this oneness or completeness is the principle of value. Religion is the sense of man's fragmentariness made whole, filled out with value.
 —, *The Value and Destiny of the Individual* (London: Macmillan, 1913).
 BOUGLÉ, C. C. A., *Leçons de Sociologie sur l'évolution des valeurs* (Paris: Colin, 1922). *The Evolution of Values* (tr., by Helen Sellars. New York: Holt, 1926). Values are "realities," objective and imperative, because they are "products of a sort of synthesis of consciousness." Yet "the time comes when" reason must stand against "all collective authority."
 BRIGHTMAN, E. S., *An Introduction to Philosophy* (New York:

- Holt, 1925). Ch.5, "What Are Values and Universals?" The higher value contributes more to "the coherent functioning" of experience as a whole.
- BROGAN, A. P., "The Fundamental Value Universal," *The Journal of Philosophy*, v.16 (1919), pp.96-104. "To be on the value scale is to be better or worse than anything."
- DASHIELL, J. FREDERIC, *The Philosophic Status of Values* (New York, 1913). "Values *immediately* are for us." "That richest values are to be had here and now" is a kind of "gospel for an age of doubt."
- , "Values and Experience," *The Journal of Philosophy*, v.11 (1914), pp.491-7. Values are "the original data"; objects come later, as a result.
- , "Values and the Nature of Science," *The Philosophical Review*, v.22 (1913), pp.520-538. Scientific discovery comes in the course of finding and analyzing "these dynamic values in the interests of living."
- DEWEY, JOHN, "The Meaning of Value," *The Journal of Philosophy*, v.23 (1925), pp.126-133.
- , "The Problem of Value," *The Journal of Philosophy*, v.10 (1913), pp.268-9.
- , "Valuation and Experimental Knowledge," *The Philosophical Review*, v.31 (1922).
- , "Value, Objective Reference and Criticism," *The Philosophical Review*, v.34 (1925), pp.313-332.
- , "Values, Liking, and Thought," *The Journal of Philosophy*, v.20 (1923), pp.617-622. "There *are* no such things as values"; there are things having the "experienced, but undefinable, quality of value."
- EHRENFELS, C. VON, *System der Werttheorie*. Two volumes (Leipzig, 1897). Desire is the psychological worth-fundamental. The value of a thing is its desirability; also, value is the relation of a thing to a human desire.
- HEYDE, JOHANNES ERICH, *Wert: eine philosophische Grundlegung* (Erfurt, 1926).
- KANE, ROBERT, *Worth* (London and New York: Longmans, 1920). General; on the formation of character. The criterion

of moral worth is the supreme end of man, and this is the full realization and perfection of rational nature.

LEIGHTON, JOSEPH A., "Personality and the Metaphysics of Value," *International Journal of Ethics*, v.21 (1910-11), pp.23-36. Personality is "the final sustaining ground of values," and human persons are "the most adequate manifestations of a Supreme Personality."

LINDSAY, JAMES, "The Greatest Problem in Value," in *Great Philosophical Problems* (Edinburgh and London, 1922); also in *The Monist*, v.29 (1919), pp.32f. The truth-value is "the only value that is really absolute."

MACKENZIE, J. S., *Ultimate Values* (London and Toronto: Hodder and Stoughton, 1924). What we value is something "useful as a stage in our growth"; but what we grow toward "is not so easy to discern."

MEINONG, A., *Psychologisch-ethische Untersuchungen sur Werttheorie* (Graz, 1894). Value is the motivation-force of an object, due to the nature of that object and to its environment and the concerned subject.

MOORE, JARED S., "Value in Its Relation to Meaning and Purpose," *The Journal of Philosophy*, v.11 (1914), pp.184-6. Purpose is "primarily" cognitive, value affective; meaning is the genus.

OAKLEY, H. D., "On the Meaning of Value," *Philosophical Review*, v.31 (1922), pp.431-448.

OSTWALD, WILHELM, *Die Philosophie der Werte* (Leipzig, 1913).

PAGE, EDWARD A., "Assimilari Deo," *The New Scholasticism*, v.2 (1928), pp.342-357. The ultimate end of human action is to know and love God—"to be like God."

—, "The Teleology of Saint Thomas," *The New Scholasticism*, v.1 (1927), pp.213-231. Action is for an end, and especially for the agent's welfare.

PARKER, DEWITT H., "The Notion of Value," *Philosophical Review*, v.38 (1929), pp.303-325. Value is in the mind, an experience; "any interest in any object."

PERRY, RALPH BARTON, "The Definition of Value," *The Jour-*

nal of Philosophy, v.11 (1914), pp.141-162. Value is to be defined in terms of "interest," or an affective-motor attitude toward.

—, *General Theory of Value: Construed in Terms of Interest* (New York: Longmans, 1926). Aims to describe the value-experience, and to interpret in terms of the motor-affective attitude. Value is any object of any interest, value is the special relation between object and interest, value is the character resulting from interest in the object.

PICARD, MAURICE, "Metaphysics and Value," *The Philosophical Review*, v.34 (1925), pp.457-476. There is much agreement on the classifying of values, but not on assigning "specific questions about the nature of value to their respective fields."

—, "The Psychological Basis of Values," *The Journal of Philosophy*, v.17 (1920), pp.11f.

—, "Value and Worth," *The Journal of Philosophy*, v.20 (1923), pp.477f.

—, *Values, Immediate and Contributory, and Their Interrelations* (New York University, 1920). A plain and excellent work; analyzes the experience of valuing.

PRALL, DAVID WIGHT, *A Study in the Theory of Value* (University of California, 1921). "Value is fulfilment of interest"; "the being liked, or disliked, of the object is its value." Includes an excellent bibliography.

—, "Metaphysics and Value," in *Essays in Metaphysics*, pp.115-140 (Berkeley, 1924).

QUICK, OLIVER C., "Value as a Metaphysical Principle," *Hibbert Journal*, v.22 (1923), pp.123-135. To appreciate is to "take sides, to identify oneself with the positive value against the negative."

REID, LOUIS ARNAUD, "The Appearance of Values," *The Monist*, v.31 (1927), pp.77-97. Mind "conditions and even creates value," but "it discovers what it conditions or creates."

RICKERT, H., "Psychologie der Weltanschauungen und Philosophie der Werte," *Logos*, Band 9 (1920), ss.1-42.

—, "Zwei Wege der Erkenntnistheorie," *Kant-Studien*, B.14 (1909), ss.202-8.

- SCHNEIDER, HERBERT W., "The Theory of Value," *The Journal of Philosophy*, v.14 (1917), pp.141-157. The fundamental element of values is "feeling or desire." We now use value and worth for good and goods, for the former seems less objective.
- SHELDON, W. H., "An Empirical Definition of Value," *The Journal of Philosophy*, v.11 (1914), pp.113-124. The value of an object "consists in its helping to complete or fulfill some tendency already present."
- SMART, WILLIAM, *An Introduction to the Theory of Value* (3rd. ed., London: Macmillan, 1914). Chiefly economic, with a very good philosophical introduction.
- STERN, WILLIAM, *Wertphilosophie* (Leipzig, 1924). "*Ich werthe, also bin ich*"; "*Ich werthe, also bin ich—Wert*." That is, because I value I am of intrinsic value.
- TAYLOR, HENRY OSBORN, *Human Values and Verities* (New York: Macmillan, 1928). Value comes as a response to our impulse to live and function. Our realization is found in art, science, thought, "love between two human beings," in religion, which is a grasping "of the relationship between God and man."
- TURNER, J. E., "The Problem of Values," *Journal of Philosophical Studies*, v.3 (1928), pp.41-48. "Few current problems" are so "confused." Pure subjectivism in value confuses consciousness and its object.
- URBAN, WILBUR M., "Ontological Problems of Value," *The Journal of Philosophy*, v.14 (1917), pp.309-327.
- , "What Is the Function of a General Theory of Value?" *The Philosophical Review*, v.17 (1908), pp.42-62.
- , *Valuation: Its Nature and Laws* (New York: Macmillan, 1909).
- WIEDERHOLD, KONRAD, *Wertbegriff und Wertphilosophie* (Berlin, 1920).
- WIEMAN, HENRY NELSON, "Value and the Individual," *The Journal of Philosophy*, v.25 (1928), pp.233-239. Value is "in the concrete individual" so far as he can actualize possibilities.

IV

MORAL VALUE

- BEHN, SEIGFRIED, *Sein und Sollen: eine Metaphysische Begreundung der Ethik* (Berlin: Deummlers, 1927).
- BOSANQUET, BERNARD, *Some Suggestions in Ethics* (London: Macmillan, 1918). Pp.46-66, "Value and Goodness." "Value, worth, and goodness seem all to be names for the same character of objects."
- BROGAN, A. P., "Moral Evaluations About Men and Women," *International Journal of Ethics*, v.35 (1925), pp.105-124. Based on questionnaire. "Popular opinions" seem to confirm the view that "all facts about value are facts about the relation of betterness or worseness."
- COLUMBIA ASSOCIATES IN PHILOSOPHY, *An Introduction to Reflective Thinking* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1923). Ch.9, "Reflective Thought in the Field of Values." The problem is one of ends, and these "can be evaluated" only when "regarded in the light of still further ends."
- CRISSMAN, "Dewey's Theory of the Moral Good," *Monist*, v.38 (1928), pp.592-619.
- DEPLOIGE, SIMON, *Le Conflit de la Morale et de la Sociologie*, 4th. ed. (Paris: Nouvelle Librairie Nationale, 1926). A statement of the sociological theory of morals and a criticism of it from Thomistic principles.
- DORELLE, M., "La Conscience et les Valeurs Morales," *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, v.30 (1923), pp.415-442.
- EASTWOOD, E. LIGHTFOOT, "The Implication of Good," *International Journal of Ethics*, v.29 (1919), pp.414f. Acts of will get their value "with reference to a complete, harmonious or rational point of view."
- EVERETT, WALTER GOODNOW, *Moral Values: A Study of the Principles of Conduct* (New York: Holt, 1918). Human welfare is synonymous with value. Value is a question of "the contribution" which all human activities make "to the worth of life as a whole."

- FITE, WARNER, "Moral Valuations and Economic Laws," *The Journal of Philosophy*, v.14 (1917), pp.5-20. Economic and moral values have "a common basis in human need and desire."
- GILLETT, M. S., *La Morale et Les Morales* (Paris: Desclée, 1925). Biological, sociological and psychological moralities (up to 1910); the moral thought of Thomism.
- HULL, ERNEST R., *Why Should I Be Moral?* (Bombay, 1923). Not merely *what* we strive for but *why* we strive: only the Christian theist can tell.
- JANSENS, E., *Cours de Morale Generale*, two vols. (Louvain and Liege, 1926). A complete study of morals in Aquinas; documented.
- LAIRD, JOHN, "Moral Responsibility and the New Psychology," *Hibbert Journal*, v.20 (1922), pp.748-759.
- , "Value and Obligation," *International Journal of Ethics*, v.23 (1913), pp.143-158. What is the meaning of "good"? Why ought we to do this or that?
- LINDSAY, JAMES, *Great Philosophical Problems* (Edinburgh and London: Blackwood, 1922). Ch.2, "The Ethical Value of Individuality." I do not make or alter "these ethical values—love, honor, justice—" 'tis they that make me."
- LOTTIN, O., "*Les Elements de la Moralité des Actes*," *Revue Néo-Scholastique*, v.24, pp.25-65, 280-313. Studies the basis of the moral act according to Aquinas.
- LEVINE, ISRAEL, *Reason and Morals* (Glasgow, 1924). Ch.9, "Morals and Value." "The ultimate source of value is . . . none other than life itself."
- MCGILVERY, E. B., "The Warfare of Moral Ideals," *Hibbert Journal*, v.14 (1916), pp.43-64. "The issue between moral ideals is to be decided *by the issue*."
- MACKENZIE, J. S., "The Meaning of Good and Evil," *International Journal of Ethics*, v.21 (1911), pp.251f. "Ultimate justification for" the use of the word "good" is found only in reference to a conception of good "which cannot be defined in terms of means."
- MCTAGGART, J. ELLIS, "The Individualism of Value," *Inter-*

- national Journal of Ethics*, v.18 (1908), pp.433-445. Better to worship a crocodile, which has life, than the state. Conscious beings and their states are intrinsically good or bad; all else are good or bad as means.
- MÈRSCH, EMIL, *L'Obligation Morale: Principe de Liberté* (Paris and Louvain, 1927). The judgment of value is a strict necessity.
- METTRICK, EDWARD F., "G. E. Moore and Intrinsic Goodness," *International Journal of Ethics*, v.38 (1928), pp.389-400. Moore despairs. Duty and goodness as dynamic and on the march give vitality.
- MILTNER, CHARLES C., "Self-Realization in Ethics," *The New Scholasticism*, v.3 (1929), pp.57-65.
- PATRICK, G. T. W., *The World and Its Meaning* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1925). Ch.22 and ch.33, "The Higher Values"; et passim. The higher values are moral and religious.
- PERRY, RALPH BARTON, "The Basis of Moral Obligation," *International Journal of Ethics*, v.21 (1911), pp.282-298. Wherever there is "a configuration," there is obligation.
- PRINGLE-PATTISON, A. SETH, *The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy* (2nd. ed., Oxford, 1920). Ch.12, "The Criterion of Value: Its Nature and Justification." Reality, God and religion are perhaps to be interpreted in terms of value and grades of value.
- REID, LOUIS ARNAUD, "Evils and Evil," *International Journal of Ethics*, v.36 (1925-6), pp.21f.
- RIGNANO, EUGENIO, *The Aim of Existence* (Chicago: Open Court, 1929). Harmony is final, the "supreme human aspiration."
- SCHELER, MAX, *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik: neuer Versuch der Grundlegung eines Ethischen Personalismus* (Halle, 1921).
- , *Über Resentiment und Moralisches Werturteil* (Leipzig, 1912).
- SHARP, FRANK CHAPMAN, *Ethics* (New York and London: The Century Company, 1928). Book II, The Good.

- SOLOMON, J., "Is the Conception of 'Good' Indefinable?" *Proc. Arist. Soc.*, v.6 (1905-6), pp.128-140.
- SOLOVYOV, V., *The Justification of the Good: an Essay in Moral Philosophy* (tr., London: Constable, 1918); passim.
- SORLEY, W. R., *The Moral Life and Moral Worth* (3rd. ed., Cambridge, 1920). Inquires, beyond fact of moral life, into its validity and worth. Morality "belongs to the inner life." The conception of a moral order in the world gives the moral life "the unity and power" it needs.
- STAPLEDON, OLAF, "Ethics and Teleological Activity," *International Journal of Ethics*, v.38 (1928), pp.241f. Good is the "concrete 'achievement of willed ends.'"
- STURT, HENRY, *Human Value: an Ethical Essay* (Cambridge, 1923). Impatient of accepted social living. Says value can be defined only in a circle.
- TUFTS, JAMES H., "The Moral Life and the Construction of Values and Standards," in *Creative Intelligence* (New York: Holt, 1917), pp.354-409.
- SYMPOSIUM UPON ETHICAL OBJECTIVITY, *International Journal of Ethics*, v.37 (January, 1927). (a) W. D. Ross, "The Basis of Objective Judgments in Ethics." Good arouses "experience in a mind," but belongs only to minds and their states and qualities. (b) George P. Adams (same title). The basis of objective ethical judgments lies in the nature of the real world disclosed by our total experience. (c) Leonard J. Russell, "Value and Existence." (d) W. K. Wright, "The Objectivity of Moral Judgments." Aims at a half-way between permanent standards and subjective and group standards.
- WIEMAN, HENRY NELSON, "A Criticism of Coordination as Criterion of Moral Values," *The Journal of Philosophy*, v.14 (1917), pp.533-542.
- WULF, MAURICE DE, *Mediæval Philosophy Illustrated from the System of Thomas Aquinas* (New Haven, 1922). Ch.12, "Personal Conduct and Moral Values." Among many good things we must draw up a scale of their "respective values," and come to an Absolute Good.

- WRIGHT, W. K., "The Objectivity of Moral Values," *The Philosophical Review*, v.32 (1922), pp.451f.

V

ESTHETIC VALUE

- BUSH, W. T., "Esthetic Values and Their Interpretation," *The Journal of Philosophy*, v.20 (1923), pp.119f.
- CALLAHAN, LEONARD, *The Esthetic Principles of Saint Thomas* (Washington, 1927).
- REID, LOUIS ARNAUD, "Beauty and Moral Betterment," *International Journal of Ethics*, v.37 (1927), pp.239f.
- URBAN, WILBUR M., "Value Theory and Esthetics," pp.54-75 of *Philosophy Today* (ed., E. L. Schaub; Chicago and London: Open Court, 1928).
- WHITMORE, CHARLES H., "The Scale of Esthetic Values," *The Journal of Philosophy*, v.21 (1924), pp.617-631.

VI

RELIGIOUS VALUE

- AMES, EDWARD SCRIBNER, "Religious Values and the Practical Absolute," *International Journal of Ethics*, v.32 (1922), pp.347f. Religion is a striving toward realizing "desired ends and felt values."
- BALDWIN, J. M., *The Super-State and the "Eternal Values."* Herbert Spencer Lecture (Oxford, 1916).
- BIXLER, JULIUS S., *Religion in the Philosophy of William James* (Boston: Jones, 1926). Ch.6, "The Purposive Will: Values and Teleology." "Values are dependent on human interests." Moral ideals seem to correspond to our "inborn feeling for the fitness of things," which is like our sense for colors and designs.

- BRIGHTMAN, E. S., "The More Than Human Values of Religion," *The Journal of Religion*, v.1 (1921), pp.362-377.
- , *Religious Values* (New York and Cincinnati: Abingdon Press, 1925). Considers the meaning and value of religion in human experience. In one Supreme Person is the reality of those values which truly satisfy human life.
- BYERS, ROBERT PAYTON, *Transcendental Values* (Boston: Badger, 1925).
- HARPE, JEAN DE LA, *La Religion comme Conservation de la Valeur dans ses rapports avec la philosophie générale de Harold Höffding* (University of Lausanne, 1920). Höffding is inconsistent with his monistic postulate: he follows Kant's theory of knowledge but Spinoza's monistic metaphysics.
- HÖFFDING, HAROLD, *Philosophy of Religion* (tr., London, 1906). Religion is faith in the conservation of values.
- INGE, WILLIAM RALPH, *Outspoken Essays* (New York and London: Longmans, 1921). Ch.II, "Survival and Immortality."
- JAMES, WILLIAM. See Bixler.
- JONES, SIR HENRY, *A Faith That Enquires* (New York: Macmillan, 1922). Postulates the perfect, in the interests of "all minor degrees of good." Postulates immortality, in order to go on striving for good. In nature, there is "only one process," that of producing moral character.
- LEIGHTON, JOSEPH A., *Religion and the Mind of Today* (New York: Appleton, 1924). No physical theory can tell me why I love justice and beauty; in these feelings of value we find the meaning of life.
- MACKENZIE, J. S., "Spiritual Values," *International Journal of Ethics*, v.33 (1923), pp.248f.
- MOORE, JARED S., "The System of Transcendental Values," *The Journal of Philosophy*, v.10 (1913), pp.244-8. Beauty, truth and goodness bring us into harmony with parts of our environment. The soul is taken not "as a substrate" or substance but in terms of meaning, purpose and value.
- MÜNSTERBERG, HUGO, *The Eternal Values* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1909). An over-personal demand is satisfied in truth

and beauty and morality and religion, without any reference to any one's personal satisfaction.

OTTO, RUDOLF, *The Idea of the Holy* (tr., by J. W. Harvey, from 9th. German ed., Oxford, 1923). Ch.8, "The Holy as a Category of Value"; et passim. The Holy is the positive "numinous" value, the creature is the positive numinous disvalue or unworth.

OVERSTREET, H. A., "God as the Common Will," *Hibbert Journal*, v.13 (1914-5), pp.155f. God is "the deep-lying, ever-persistent, ever-growing tendency towards mutuality of life." Religion is a "passing beyond the casual, self-centered self, through living into the larger life of values."

PERRY, RALPH BARTON, "Religious Values," *The American Journal of Theology*, v.19 (1915), pp.1-16. Religion, like life, comes in stages: we want things, sacrifice some for others, and take substitutes. "There is value, when there is *having of what one wants or getting of what one wants.*"

REID, LOUIS ARNAUD, "Finite Value and Cosmic Value," *The Philosophical Review*, v.25 (1926), pp.39-52. "Each value is a concrete manifestation of Value."

REISNER, EDWARD HARTMAN, *Religious Values and Intellectual Consistency* (New York: Science Press, 1915). "Main concern of religion is with human values"; "spontaneity and richness of the religious depend upon an intellectual consistency among the objects which carry those values."

ROBINSON, DANIEL S., *The God of the Liberal Christian: a Study of Social Theology and the New Theism as . . . Progressive Religious Thought* (New York: Appleton, 1926). Value is derived from the fact that spiritual beings in quest of the real "tarry awhile to sample these mundane goods"; but the question for psychology is, What will bring to the spirit "harmony and peace and rest"?

SELLARS, ROY WOOD, *The Next Step in Religion* (New York: Macmillan, 1918). Religion means an enthusiasm for human values.

SHEEN, FULTON J., *Religion Without God* (New York and London: Longmans, 1928). Ch.10, "Religion and Values";

et passim. Religion is not faith in conservation of values. God and not values is man's ultimate end.

SORLEY, W. R., *Moral Values and the Idea of God* (Cambridge, 1918). Persons are charged with the discovery and realization of values. Objective moral value satisfies my purpose and completes my nature. God is the author and ruler of the world, and moral values and moral ideals express His nature.

TSANOFF, RADOSLAV ANDREA, *The Problem of Immortality: Studies in Personality and Value* (New York: Macmillan, 1924). Among moral beings, the eternal conservation and fulfillment of values "becomes the final idea and therefore the supreme postulate of religion."

TURNER, J. E., "The Conservation of Values in the Universe," *The Monist*, v.30 (1920), pp.203f.

WELLS, WESLEY R., "On Religious Values," *The Journal of Philosophy*, v.15 (1918), pp.488f.

WRIGHT, W. K., "Does the Objective System of Values Imply a Cosmic Intelligence?" *International Journal of Ethics*, v.38 (1928), pp.284-295. "To explain the origin of the actual system of values we must postulate some creative agency which selects from the infinite range of possibilities just these for realization."

—, *A Student's Philosophy of Religion* (New York: Macmillan, 1926). Ch.8, "Christianity and the Conservation of Values." Excellent bibliographies.

VII

SOCIAL VALUE

ALLPORT, FLOYD H., "Social Psychology and Human Values," *International Journal of Ethics*, v.38 (1928), pp.369-388. Social psychologist should tell why individuals yield to public regulation and teach them to cease yielding.

DESMOND, HUMPHREY J., *The Larger Values* (Chicago: McClurg, 1913). Very general.

DEWEY, JOHN, *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (Chicago, 1920).

(a) Man first looks to food, shelter, feelings, fancies, desires; (b) recurring desires become basis of group tradition, whence emerge ways of life: art, cult, doctrine, rooting morals and religion; (c) positivistic knowledge opposes conventional and imagined beliefs in religion and morals; (d) metaphysics takes the place of custom as source and guarantee of higher moral and social values.

DURKHEIM, E., *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (tr., by Swain; London: Allen, 1903). Superior, or societal, values, pp.415-447.

HUMPHREY, SETH K., *The Racial Prospect* (New York: Scribners, 1920). Ch.8, "Human Values in Reserve." General, inexact, popular.

OVERSTREET, H. A., "Conventional Economics and a Human Valuation," *The Journal of Philosophy*, v.12 (1915), pp.281-292.

RENAULD, JEANNE, "Observations sur l'Idée de Valeur Considérée dans ses Rapports avec la Société," *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, v.32 (1925), pp.447-474. Value exists only in society.

SELLARS, ROY WOOD, *Principles and Problems of Philosophy* (New York: Macmillan, 1926). Part 3, pp.385-490, "Human Life and Values." Follows Durkheim, Levy-Bruhl, Bouglé: society is the beginning and the end of morals and values.

VIII

COGNITIVE VALUE

BARTLETT, F. C., "Valuation and Existence," *Proc. Arist. Soc.*, v.17 (1917), pp.117-138.

BAUCH, BRUNO, *Wahrheit, Wert und Wirklichkeit* (Leipzig: Meiner, 1923). Truth is one value in the whole system of values, yet truth takes in value, i.e., as an object of knowledge.

BROGAN, A. P., "The Implications of Meliorism Concerning the Relation Between Value and Existence," *Proceedings of*

- the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy, 1926* (ed., by Brightman; New York, 1927). Pp.308-314. "All value is basically a matter of a relation," which may be called "betterness" or "worseness." "Value is betterness."
- DEWEY, JOHN, *Essays in Experimental Logic* (University of Chicago, 1916). Pp.349-389, "Judgments of Value."
- , "The Logic of Judgments of Practice," *The Journal of Philosophy*, v.12 (1915), pp.505f. A value judgment has "goods and bads for its subject-matter." It looks to "what is to be done," to "something to-be-given by future action." The "situation" exists, but as something whose value resides in something to be attained in action. Value is objective, but only "in an active or practical situation."
- , "The Objects of Valuation," *The Journal of Philosophy*, v.15 (1918), pp.253ff.
- DURKHEIM, E., "*Jugements de Valeur et Jugements de Réalité*," *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, v.19 (1911), pp.437-453. Some judgments "announce what is": hence, are judgments of existence. Some state my preference: I do prefer wine: judgments of reality. Some announce my opinion: this man is of noble character. Value, as in the instance of idolatrous worship, is conferred by the valuer; therefore, value cannot be in the object.
- FISHER, D. W., "Problem of the Value-Judgment," *Philosophical Review*, v.22 (1913), pp.623-638.
- GOBLOT, EDMOND, *La Logique des Jugements de Valeur: Théorie et Applications* (Paris: Colin, 1927).
- GOEDEKE, PAUL, *Wahrheit und Wert* (Hildburghausen, 1927). An inquiry into the relations between truth and value in neo-Kantian philosophy.
- GUICHAOUA, P., LA, "*Valeur et Limites de la Connaissance*," *Revue de Philosophie*, v.19 (1911), pp.722-737, and v.20, pp.55-93.
- KALLEN, HORACE M., "Value and Existence in Philosophy, Art and Religion," in *Creative Intelligence* (New York: Holt, 1917), pp.409-467.

- LINDSAY, JAMES, "The Knowledge of Other Minds," *The Philosophical Review*, v.26 (1917), pp.545-7.
- LODGE, R. C., "The Platonic Value-Judgment," *The Philosophical Review*, v.31 (1922), pp.237-256.
- MCINTYRE, J. L., "Value-Feelings and Judgments of Value," *Proc. Arist. Soc.*, v.5 (1904-5), pp.53-73. Value is not a "character or quality of an object, but always a relation between an object and a subject."
- NICOD, J., "*Les Relations de Valeurs et les Relations de Sens dans la Logique Formelle*," *Review de Métaphysique et de Morale*, v.31 (1924), pp.577-583.
- PERRY, RALPH BARTON, "Dewey and Urban on Value Judgments," *The Journal of Philosophy*, v.14 (1917), pp.169-181.
- PICKARD-CAMBRIDGE, W. A., "On Our Knowledge of Value," *Proc. Arist. Soc.*, v.17 (1917), pp.216-255. Studies the relation of value to knowing, and says that the knowledge of value is innate.
- PRALL, D. W., "Value and Thought-Process," *The Journal of Philosophy*, v.21 (1924), pp.117-125. "Value came first." Thought came by way of "an animal attitude, accepting or rejecting appearances as it felt them to be good or bad."
- RUSSELL, LEONARD J., "Value and Existence," *Sixth Internat. Cong. of Phil.* (New York, 1927), pp.301-7; also in *Internat. Jnl. Eth.*, v.37, pp.138f. Value is the source of existence and reality for us.
- RUSSELL, JOHN E., "Truth as Value and Value as Truth," *Mind*, v.20 (1911), pp.538-9.
- SCHILLER, F. C. S., "Fact and Value," *Proc. Sixth Intern. Congress of Philos.* (1927), pp.296-300. "Fact and Value, far from being antithetical, cooperate."
- , "Truth and Survival Value," *The Journal of Philosophy*, v.15 (1918), pp.505-515.
- , "Truth, Value and Biology," *The Journal of Philosophy*, v.17 (1920), pp.36f.
- SCHULTZ, J. A. H., *Die Philosophie am Scheidewege: die Antimonie im Werten und im Denken* (Leipzig, 1922).

- SELLARS, ROY WOOD, "Cognition and Valuation," *The Philosophical Review*, v.35 (1926), pp.124-144.
- SIDGWICK, ALFRED, "Truth and Purpose," *Mind*, v.33 (1924), pp.385-397.
- STUART, HENRY PALGRAVE, *Valuation as a Logical Process* (University of Chicago, 1918). Follows Dewey closely. Studies the practical situation, and sticks to economic and ethical value-judgments, which always look to objects.
- URBAN, WILBUR M., "The Knowledge of Other Minds and the Problem of Meaning and Value," *The Philosophical Review*, v.26 (1917), pp.274-296.
- , "Knowledge of Value and the Value-Judgment," *The Journal of Philosophy*, v.13 (1916), pp.673-687. Value is a "wholly irreducible" form of objectivity, "like existence," but "not a form of being." "Over against the world of mere objects, as such, are the categories of being and value. "Existence is not a necessary prerequisite of value."
- , "The Objective and the Value Judgment," *The Journal of Philosophy*, v.15 (1918), pp.393f.
- , "Definition and Analysis of the Consciousness of Value," *Psychological Review*, v.14 (1907), pp.1-36, 92-121.
- , "Intolerables: a Study in the Logic of Valuation," *The Philosophical Review*, v.24 (1915), pp.477-500.
- , "Value and Existence," *The Journal of Philosophy*, v.13 (1916), pp.449-465. "Better frankly to recognize value as a unique objective not reducible to being in any form."
- , "Value, Logic and Reality," *Proc. Sixth Internat. Congress of Philos.* (New York, 1927), pp.286-293. We cannot separate value and reality; "no existence without value and no value without existence."
- WALKER, C. T. H., *The Construction of the World in Terms of Fact and Value* (Oxford, 1919). Fact is "something that imposes itself on us, value is something of ourselves, which we impose upon things."
- WATERHOUSE, ERIC S., *The Philosophy of Religious Experience* (London: Epworth Press, 1923). Ch.13, "The Concept of

Value and the Nature of Reality." "Facts are established as facts because they are sought as values."

WRIGHT, H. W., "Value, Subjective and Objective," *The Journal of Philosophy*, v.23 (1926), pp.378-386. "The capacity for disclosing to operative intelligence a system of communicable meanings" is "resident within external environment."

IX

MISCELLANEOUS PROBLEMS OF VALUE

ABBOTT, E. STANLEY, "The Dynamic Content of Value," *The Journal of Philosophy*, v.14 (1917), pp.41-49.

ALEXANDER, H. B., "The Evolution of Ideals," *International Journal of Ethics*, v.16 (1906), pp.311-332.

ARNOLD, MATHEW. See Boyer.

BOYER, C. V., "Self-Expression and Happiness: a Study of Mathew Arnold's Idea of Perfection," *International Journal of Ethics*, v.33 (1923), pp.263f. Done with care and exactness, from Arnold's works.

BROGAN, A. P., "Urban's Axiological System," *The Journal of Philosophy*, v.18 (1921), pp.197-209.

BROWN, HAROLD CHAPMAN, "Value and Potentiality," *The Journal of Philosophy*, v.11 (1914).

BUSH, W. T., "Value and Causality," *The Journal of Philosophy*, v.15 (1918), pp.85f.

CALKINS, MARY, "Biological or Psychological?" *The Journal of Philosophy*, v.24 (1927), pp.577-581. Asks this question about Perry's *General Theory of Value*.

CHASE, MARY EVELYN, "Valuing and the Quality of Value," *The Journal of Philosophy*, v.22 (1925).

COHEN, MORRIS R., "History versus Values," *The Journal of Philosophy*, v.11 (1914), pp.701-716.

CONGER, GEORGE P., "A Critique of Some Idealistic Evaluations of Values," *The Journal of Philosophy*, v.20 (1923), pp.290-299. Sorley, Urban, Bosanquet and Münsterberg come "to a kind of mysticism."

- CUNNINGHAM, WILLIAM, "The Two Philosophies," *Catholic School Interests*, v.6 (1927), pp.232-3. Defends duty for duty's sake; discredits value in education.
- FISHER, D. W., "Professor Urban's Value-Theory," *The Journal of Philosophy*, v.14 (1917), pp.570-582.
- KATUIN, GERALD A., "The Values of Ideality," *The Journal of Philosophy*, v.17 (1920), pp.381f.
- LINK, HENRY C., "Instinct and Value," *American Journal of Psychology*, v.33 (1922), pp.1-18. When instincts, protoplasm and environment are united to form an organism, "the result is a new characteristic, namely, the valuing process." Value is "regarded as a characteristic of an organism—a peculiar and unique quality."
- LODGE, RUPERT CLENDON, "The Platonic Value-Scale," *International Journal of Ethics*, v.35 (1924-5), pp.1-23. Close-knit, orderly, full of references.
- MITCHELL, E. T., "Nietzsche on Ideals," *International Journal of Ethics*, v.38 (1928), pp.316-334. Nietzsche began the philosophy of value and gave the only usable standard, which is a numerical one.
- MONTGOMERY, GEORGE R., *The Place of Values* (Bridgeport, Conn., 1903). (Long out of date.)
- MOORE, JARED S., "Montague's Classification of Values," *The Journal of Philosophy*, v.11 (1914), pp.352-354.
- MUNRO, THOMAS, "Verification of Standards of Value," *The Journal of Philosophy*, v.20 (1923), pp.294f.
- NIETZSCHE, F. See Mitchell.
- PEMBERTON, E. KINGSDOWN, "The Commensurability of Values," *International Journal of Ethics*, v.33 (1922-3), pp.23f. Studies value in Rashdall's *Theory of Good and Evil*.
- PEPPER, S. C., "The Equivocation of Value," *Issues and Tendencies in Contemporary Philosophy* (ed., by Adams and Lowenberg; Berkeley, 1923), pp.107-132.
- , "Standard Value," in *Studies in the Problem of Norms* (Berkeley, 1925), pp.89-118.
- PERRY, CHARNER M., "Some Difficulties in Current Value

- Theory," *The Journal of Philosophy*, v.25 (1928), pp.281-287. Criticizes R. Perry, Dewey and Fite.
- PRALL, D. W., "In Defence of a Worthless Theory of Value," *The Journal of Philosophy*, v.20 (1923), pp.128-137.
- ROBINSON, DANIEL S., "A Critique of Meliorism," *International Journal of Ethics*, v.34 (1924), pp.175f. Criticizes Meliorism for saying that value is the object "as standing in the relation of satisfying to some desire"; for thus all value would be "relative."
- RUSSELL, JOHN E., "The Humanist Theory of Value," *Mind*, v.19 (1910), pp.547-9.
- SCHNEIDER, HERBERT W., "The Values of Pragmatic Theory," *The Journal of Philosophy*, v.14 (1917), pp.706-714.
- SELLARS, ROY WOOD, Introduction to Bouglé's *Evolution of Values* (tr., by Mrs. Sellars; New York, 1926), pp.i-xxxvii.
- SMITH, T. V., "Dewey's Theory of Value," *The Monist*, v.32 (1922), pp.339-354.
- SORLEY, W. R., "The Philosophical Attitude," *International Journal of Ethics*, v.20 (1910), pp.152-168.
- URBAN, WILBUR M., "Origin and Value," *The Philosophical Review*, v.32 (1923), pp.451-469.
- , "The Pragmatic Theory of Value," *The Journal of Philosophy*, v.14 (1917), pp.701-706.
- TAWNEY, G. A., "Purposive Consistency: the Outline of a Classification of Values," in *Essays in Honor of William James* (New York, 1918), pp.397-423.
- WEINBERG, ALFRED, "Value-Interpretation: the Methodological Foundation of a Psychological Discipline," *International Journal of Ethics*, v.38 (1927-8), pp.44-57. "Every value leads on to other values," and these "constitute the value of that value."
- WRIGHT, W. K., "The Evolution of Values from Instincts," *The Philosophical Review*, v.24 (1915), pp.165f. "Transition between the biological and psychological roots of valuation and its exuberant ethical, esthetic, and religious" appearance is feasible. The "roots of value" are in "the primary instincts and other innate emotional tendencies."

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